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Multi-Institutional Healthcare Ethics Committees: The Procedurally Fair
Internal Dispute Resolution Mechanism
Abstract
2.6 million Americans die each year. A majority of these deaths occur in a healthcare institution as the result of
a deliberate decision to stop life sustaining medical treatment. Unfortunately, these end-of-life decisions are
marked with significant conflict between patients' family members and healthcare providers. Healthcare ethics
committees (HECs) have been the dispute resolution forum for many of these conflicts.
HECs generally have been considered to play a mere advisory, facilitative role. But, in fact, HECs often serve a
decision making role. Both in law and practice HECs increasingly have been given significant authority and
responsibility to make treatment decisions. Sometimes, HECs make decisions on behalf of incapacitated
patients with no friends or family. Other times, HECs adjudicate disputes between providers and the patient
or patient's family.
Unfortunately, HECs are not up to the task. They lack the necessary independence, diversity, composition,
training, or resources. HECs are overwhelmingly intramural bodies, comprised of professionals employed
directly or indirectly by the very same institution whose dispute the HEC adjudicates. HECs make decisions
that are corrupted, biased, careless, and arbitrary.
To address the problems of intramural HECs, I propose that their adjudicatory authority be relocated to a
multi-institutional HEC (MI-HEC). Thereby, no HEC could have a controlling voice in the adjudication of its
own dispute. A multi-institutional HEC preserves the best but avoids the worst of intramural HECs.
Specifically, the MI-HEC preserves the expertise and extrajudicial nature of the HEC. But in contrast to an
intramural HEC, a multi-institutional HEC possesses better resources, a greater diversity of perspectives, and
the neutrality and independence required by due process.
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THADDEUS MASON POPE*
INTRODUCTION
Four patients have arrived at City Hospital in a comatose state.
The first patient has an advance directive,' but its instructions do not
clearly address her current circumstances. The family of the second
patient wants everything possible done to keep the patient alive,
despite the physician's recommendation that this is medically inappro-
priate and not in the patient's best interest. The hospital has been
unable to identify or locate any friends or family of the third patient.
The family of the fourth patient is divided: one son favors stopping
further aggressive treatment, while a daughter demands that every-
thing be done. In each case, should the patient's preferences be
honored? If so, what is the most reliable evidence of the patient's
preferences?
Complex ethical situations like these occur on a regular basis in
healthcare settings. End-of-life decisions are marked with significant
conflict.2 Healthcare ethics committees (HECs) have been the dispute
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Campbell Law Review Symposium on Practical Health Law (Jan. 2009). Previous
versions were presented at the Widener University Faculty WIP Workshop (March
2009), the Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network Conference (Dec. 2008),
the 31st Annual ASLME Health Law Professors Conference (June 2008), and the
Washington University Law School Junior Scholars Workshop (June 2008). Thanks to
the participants at these events for valuable comments and suggestions. Thanks to
Lindsey Anderson and Shannon Mace for their superb research assistance. This
Article was supported by a generous summer research grant from Widener University.
1. Advance healthcare directives (advance directives) are "instructions given by
individuals specifying what actions should be taken for their health in the event that
they are no longer able to make decisions due to illness or incapacity." Wikipedia,
Advance Health Care Directive, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AdvanceDirective (last
visited Feb. 8, 2009). An advance directive might take the form of a document such as
a living will or health care power of attorney. See id.
2. See, e.g., Dipanjan Banerjee & Ware G. Kuschner, Principles and Procedures of
Medical Ethics Case Consultation, 68 BRIT. J. Hosp. MED. 140, 140 (2007); William A.
Nelson, The Organizational Costs of Ethical Conflicts, 53 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT. 41, 41
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resolution forum for many of these conflicts.3 HECs are typically mul-
tidisciplinary groups comprised of representatives from different
departments of the healthcare facility-medicine, nursing, law, pas-
toral care, and social work, for example. HECs were established to
support and advise patients, families, and caregivers as they work
together to find solutions for delicate circumstances.
HECs generally have been considered to play a mere advisory,
facilitative role. But, in fact, HECs often serve a decision making role.
Both in law and practice HECs increasingly have been given significant
authority and responsibility to make treatment decisions. Sometimes,
HECs make decisions on behalf of incapacitated patients with no
friends or family. Other times, HECs adjudicate disputes between
providers and the patient or patient's family.
Unfortunately, HECs are not up to the task. Many lack the neces-
sary independence, diversity, composition, training, and resources.
HECs are overwhelmingly intramural bodies; that is, they are com-
prised of professionals employed directly or indirectly by the very
same institution whose decision the HEC adjudicates. Consequently,
many HECs make decisions that suffer from risks of corruption, bias,
carelessness, and arbitrariness.
To address the problems of intramural HECs, I propose that their
adjudicatory authority be relocated to a multi-institutional HEC.
Thereby, no single institution's HEC would have a controlling voice in
the adjudication of its own dispute. A multi-institutional HEC pre-
serves the expertise and extrajudicial nature of HECs. But in contrast
to an intramural HEC, a multi-institutional HEC possesses better
resources, a greater diversity of perspectives, and the neutrality and
independence required by due process.
In Part I, I review the history of HECs, and describe their three
primary functions. Notable among these functions is the adjudication
of treatment disputes. In Part II, I describe four significant problems
with intramural HECs: (i) their lack of independence and impartiality,
(ii) their lack of sufficient size and diversity, (iii) their lack of adequate
resources and training, and (iv) their lack of adequate methods and
procedures. I contend that a multi-institutional healthcare ethics com-
mittee (MI-HEC) can substantially mitigate these problems.
(2008), available at http://www.campfieldpr.com/uploads/Journal-of Healthcare_
Managementjan-Feb-2008.pdf ("Ethical conflicts are a common phenomenon in
today's health care settings.").
3. HECs are also known as "medical ethics committees," "institutional ethics
committees," "bioethics committees," "optimum care committees," "patient care
advisory committees," and other names.
258 [Vol. 31:257
2009] MULTI-INSTITUTIONAL HEALTHCARE ETHICS COMMITTEES 259
In Part III, I describe four types of multi-institutional ethics com-
mittees: (i) the network model, (ii) the extramural model, (iii) the
quasi-appellate model, and (iv) the joint model. I illustrate each model
with examples of actual implementation both in the clinical context
and in the analogous research context (with the IRB). 4
In Part IV, I explain how, with greater resources and detachment
from any single institution, the MI-HEC can solve the independence,
composition, resources, and procedural problems of intramural ethics
committees. Significant and growing experience with multi-institu-
tional committees both in the clinical and research contexts indicates
that, by replacing or supplementing intramural HECs, MI-HECs can
successfully ameliorate these problems.
Finally, in Part V, I assess why, if they are really so promising, MI-
HECs have not been adopted more widely. A number of obstacles have
been discussed, including: (i) transaction costs, (ii) locality, (iii) liabil-
ity, and (iv) confidentiality. But the most significant obstacle is the
lack of motivation to fix HECs. The current system both serves the
interests of healthcare facilities and satisfies accreditation and regula-
tory requirements to the limited extent that such requirements exist.
But as the limits of HECs are increasingly recognized, a MI-HEC solu-
tion will become more attractive to the healthcare community.
I. BACKGROUND: HEALTHCARE ETHICS COMMITTEES
Should healthcare providers withdraw life support from a brain
dead child over his parents' objections? Should these providers
restrain a patient who pulls out her nasogastric feeding tube? What is
the appropriate end-of-life treatment for a patient without family or
close friends? For a patient whose family members disagree with each
other? For a patient whose family members disagree with providers?
To get guidance in answering such questions, medical professionals
typically turn to the HEC.5
4. "IRB" is the eponymous acronym for "Institutional Review Board," an entity
that reviews proposed biomedical research on human subjects. See generally DENNIS
JOHN MAZUR, EVALUATING THE SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF RESEARCH ON HUMANS: A GUIDE
FOR IRB MEMBERS (2007); Jesse A. Goldner, A Review of Current Issues in the Regulation
of Human Subject Research in the United States, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES IN BIOETHICS 10
(Ana S. Iltis et al., eds. 2008).
5. See Alice Herb & Eliot J. Lazar, Ethics Committees and End-of-Life Decision
Making, in MEDICAL FUTILITY AND THE EVALUATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING INTERVENTIONS
110, 110 (Marjorie B. Zucker & Howard D. Zucker eds., 1997) ("In recent years,
institutional ethics committees have increasingly become the forum for the resolution
of these dilemmas.").
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The HEC is a group established by a healthcare facility and
charged with discussing, deciding, and advising on ethical questions
and policies that arise in clinical care.6 Its purpose is to [s]erve as a
reasonable and valid institutional endeavor to increase understanding
among all concerned-health care providers, families, patients, and
society-as well as to resolve many of the ethical, legal, and medical
dilemmas facing those who care for critically and terminally ill
patients.7
The very birth of bioethics was based in the idea that some health-
care decisions are too complicated and momentous to be left in the
hands of physicians alone.8 As medicine began to open the door to
new, unexplored areas, bioethics grew to serve as a check on the use of
medical technology. For example, as a result of bioethics at work in
the research context, investigators must now obtain the approval of an
institutional review board (IRB) before engaging in research on human
subjects. 9 In the clinical context, the healthcare ethics committee
serves an analogous function.1 ° The HEC offers a systematic and prin-
6. See Carol Levine, Questions and (Some Very Tentative) Answers About Hospital
Ethics Committees, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1984, at 9, 9.
7. RONALD E. CRANFORD & A. EDWARD DOUDERA, INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES
AND HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING 6 (1984) [hereinafter CRANFORD & DOUDERA].
8. See Warren T. Reich, Revisiting the Launch of the Kennedy Institute: Re-Visioning
the Origins of Bioethics, 6 KENNEDY INST. ETHICSJ. 323 (1996). Bioethics is a shift away
from science, away from insiders to outsiders; "[h]uman life is too precious and the
decisions regarding it too important to leave to any one group of specialists." Id. at
324.
9. See 21 C.F.R. § 56.103(a) (2008) (stating certain "clinical investigation[s]"
cannot be initiated unless they "remain[ ] subject to continuing review by, an IRB
meeting"); 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2008) ("[T]his policy applies to all research
involving human subjects conducted, supported or otherwise subject to regulation by
any federal department or agency which takes appropriate administrative action to
make the policy applicable to such research.").
10. Throughout this Article, I look to the IRB as a close cousin of the HEC. See
BOWEN HOSFORD, BIOETHICS COMMITTEES: THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER'S GUIDE 37
(1986); Robert M. Veatch, The Ethics of Institutional Ethics Committees, in CRANFORD &
DOUDERA, supra note 7, at 35, 37 ("The closest cousin to the institutional ethics
committee, [is] the [IRB] .... "); id. at 45 ("An IRB ... is similar in many ways to ethics
committees .... "); see also Alexander Morgan Capron, Decision Review: A Problematic
Task, in CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 7, at 174, 181; Joanne Lynne, Roles and
Functions of Institutional Ethics Committees: The President's Commission's View, in
CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 7, at 22, 27 ("The experience of [the IRBs] is very
instructive.").
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cipled approach to the contemporary dilemma of healthcare decision
making."
In this Part, I first review the origin and history of healthcare eth-
ics committees. I then describe their three primary functions: educa-
tion, policy development, and case consultation. Finally, I explain that
HECs are usually intramural decision makers. They are intramural in
that they typically are formed by and within a single healthcare facility
to serve that same facility. HECs are decision makers in that, while
serving their case consultation function, they often have de jure or de
facto adjudicatory authority.
A. Origin and History of HECs
One of the earliest issues prompting the creation of modern ethics
committees involved the allocation of dialysis machines. Renal dialysis
became technologically available in the early 1960s, but was not cov-
ered by Medicare until 1972.12 During this time, demand for dialysis
far exceeded supply.' 3 Committees were therefore established to deter-
mine which patients with renal failure would be eligible to receive the
treatment. 14
At about the same time, biomedical research was transitioning to
"shared decision making-between scientists, their interdisciplinary
peers, and the public.' 1 5 It had become "clear that the research team,
11. See Gergory A. Jaffe, Institutional Ethics Committees: Legitimate and Impartial
Review of Ethical Health Care Decisions, 10 J. LEG. MED. 393, 394 (1989) ("IECs have
been endorsed because they check the physician's influence over patients.").
12. End Stage Renal Disease Act, Pub. L. No. 95-292, 92 Stat. 307 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006)).
13. See Shana Alexander, They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies, LIFE, Nov. 9, 1962, at
102, 104 ("[Algonizing practical decisions must be made ... someone must choose
which patient out of 50 shall be permitted to hook up to Seattle's life-giving machines
and which shall be denied.").
14. See id. at 124 (describing "the novel double-screening device of a medical board
back-stopped by a lay committee ... [so] all segments of society, not just the medical
fraternity [c]ould share the burden of choice as to which patients to treat and which to
let die."); see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT:
ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 155-56 (1983)
[hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N], available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/past_
commissions/deciding-to-forego-tx.pdf. Indeed, even after Medicare funding until
1978, candidates were screened by local medical review boards for appropriateness.
See End Stage Renal Disease Act, Pub. L. No. 95-292, 92 Stat. 307 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006)).
15. John C. Fletcher & Edward M. Spencer, Ethics Services in Healthcare
Organizations, in INTRODUCTION TO CLINICAL ETHICS 257, 259 (John C. Fletcher et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1997).
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acting alone, was not able to protect human subjects." 16 Accordingly,
in 1966, the Public Health Service promulgated a policy announcing
that grants for research involving human subjects would be approved
only if a local review board had first approved the project and its plans
for informed consent.17 By 1974, Congress had enacted the National
Research Act, requiring that all institutions supported by federal funds
have their research reviewed by an IRB.18
Looking both to the dialysis committees of the 1960s and to the
research committees of the early 1970s,19 in 1975, Texas pediatrician
Karen Teel proposed the use of multidisciplinary committees for
"exploring all of the options for a particular patient. '2 0 Dr. Teel's pro-
posal was famously endorsed the very next year by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in In re Quinlan.21
In Quinlan, the Court held that Karen Ann Quinlan had a privacy
right to terminate the medical treatments sustaining her non-cognitive,
vegetative existence and that such a right could be asserted on her
behalf by her father. The court did require that the HEC first confirm
that there was no reasonable possibility of Karen emerging from her
comatose state. The court further suggested that HECs, rather than
courts, should review decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment as
a general practice and procedure. 2
16. Id. at 259.
17. See John C. Fletcher, The Bioethics Movement and Hospital Ethics Committees, 50
MD. L. REV. 859, 867 (1991); John C. Fletcher & Diane E. Hoffmann, Ethics
Committees: Time to Experiment with Standards, 120 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 335, 335
(1994).
18. National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 3401 (2006)).
19. Teel may have also been looking to analogous precedent involving sterilization
committees, abortion committees, and Catholic medical-moral committees, the last of
which examined the appropriateness of treatments in light of Catholic teachings. See
generally CARL L MIDDLETON, A MODEL MEDICAL-MORAL COMMITTEE FOR CATHOLIC
HEALTH CARE FACILITIES (1977); CATHOLIC Hosp. ASS'N OF CAN., MEDICO-MORAL GUIDE
(1971); see also Levine, supra note 6, at 10. Abortion and sterilization committees,
meanwhile, determined the appropriateness of those procedures for particular
patients. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927);
see also HOSFORD, supra note 10, at 65; JONATHAN D. MORENO, DECIDING TOGETHER:
BIOETHICS AND MORAL CONSENSUS 94-96 (1995); T.W. McElin, Tubal Sterilization. Study
at Evanston Hospital, 97 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 479 (1967).
20. Karen Teel, The Physician's Dilemma-A Doctor's View: What the Law Should Be,
27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6, 9 (1975).
21. 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976).
22. Id. at 669 ("[T]he value of additional views and diverse knowledge is
apparent."). Quinlan is emblematic, as most of the work of ethics committees has
concerned end-of-life issues. See infra notes 42, 53, 56, and 66.
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While some hospitals had ethics committees in the early 1970s,
ethics committees in the clinical context (as compared to the research
context) were still quite rare.2 3 Quinlan changed that state of affairs by
"giving credence to the importance of such committees for end-of-life
cases."24 Over the next decade, appellate courts in many states simi-
larly endorsed the notion that most end-of-life health decision making
could be, and should be, handled by ethics committees.
25
In 1983, the President's Commission cautiously endorsed hospi-
tals' use of ethics committees.26 The Commission even published a
model statute on the role and function of ethics committees as an
appendix to its widely influential report, Deciding to Forgo Life-Sus-
taining Treatment.27 In 1986, the New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law also encouraged resolving patient care dilemmas at the
institutional level.28 By the mid-1990s, many major medical associa-
tions had also endorsed the idea.29
Soon, ethics committees were not only encouraged but even effec-
tively legally required at the federal level.3" In its 1984 "Baby Doe"
23. By the early 1970s, there had been public calls for clinical ethics committees.
See Elizabeth Heitman, Institutional Ethics Committees: Local Perspectives on Ethical
Issues in Medicine, in SOCIETY'S CHOICES: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN
BIOMEDICINE 409, 409 (Ruth Ellen Bulger et al. eds., 1995). Some hospitals even had
functioning committees. See, e.g., Optimum Care for Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Report of
the Clinical Care Committee of the Massachusetts General Hospital, 295 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 362 (1976); Thomasine Kushner & Joan M. Gibson, Descriptive Summaries of
Extant Institutional Ethics Communities, in CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 7, at 247,
275 (providing self-descriptive report prepared by members of the Hennepin County
Medical Center Biomedical Ethics Committee in Minneapolis, Minnesota).
24. Glen McGee et al., Successes and Failure of Hospital Ethics Committees: A
National Survey of Ethics Committee Chairs, 11 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 87,
87 (2002).
25. See infra notes 73-85.
26. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 169-70.
27. Id. at 349.
28. See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, Do NOT RESUSCITATE ORDERS:
THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE
AND THE LAW 33-44 (1986).
29. See, e.g., Comm. on Bioethics, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Institutional Ethics
Committees, 107 PEDIATRICS 205 (2001), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.
org/cgi/reprint/107/1/205.pdf; Am. Hosp. Ass'n, Guidelines: Hospital Committees on
Biomedical Ethics, in HANDBOOK FOR HOSPITAL ETHICS COMMITTEES 57, 110-11 (Judith
Wilson Ross et al. eds., 1986); Am. Med. Ass'n Judicial Council, Guidelines for Ethics
Committees in Health Care Institutions, 253 JAMA 2698 (1985).
30. See Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Seeking a Seat at the Table: Has Law Left
Environmental Ethics Behind as it Embraces Bioethics?, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 273, 312-18 (2009). An early bill for the Patient Self Determination Act
would have also mandated HECs. See Heitman, supra note 23, at 410-11; Diane E.
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rule, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) sug-
gested the usefulness of "Infant Care Review Committees. '31 Like ear-
lier "Baby Doe" rules,3 2 the 1984 regulations were struck down for
administrative law reasons.33 But Congress authorized new regula-
tions under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act.34 In
response, DHHS promulgated new regulations in 1985. 35 Those regu-
lations, which remain in effect today, "encourage[] each recipient
health care provider that provides healthcare services to infants ... to
establish an Infant Care Review Committee.
36
Ethics committees were also legally mandated at the state level. In
1986, Maryland became the first state to enact legislation requiring the
creation of "patient care advisory committees" at hospitals and nurs-
ing homes.37 NewJersey followed in 1990.38 And Colorado and Texas
enacted similar laws in 1992.39 While other states do not categorically
mandate the formation and maintenance of ethics committees, many
Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics Committees in Health Care Institutions- Is it Time?, 50 MD.
L. REV. 746, 753 (1991). But this requirement was deleted from the final version of the
bill "because of concerns among smaller hospitals about the costs." Fletcher, supra
note 17, at 871.
31. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap; Procedures and Guidelines
Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 49 Fed. Reg. 1622 (Jan. 12, 1984)
(codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-.61 (2008)).
32. See Jaffe, supra note 11, at 398-400.
33. See Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 5103 (repealed 1996).
35. Services and Treatment for Disabled Infants; Model Guidelines for Health Care
Providers to Establish Infant Care Review Committees, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893 (Apr. 15,
1985).
36. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (2008). See id. § 1340.15; JAMES L. BERNAT, ETHICAL ISSUES IN
NEUROLOGY 117-18 (2008).
37. See Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 749, 1986 Md. Laws 2841 (codified as amended at
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN §§ 19-370 to -374 (LexisNexis 2005)); Paula C. Hollinger,
Hospital Ethics Committees and the Law: Introduction, 50 MD. L. REV. 742, 742 (1991).
Nursing homes were not included until 1990. See Act of May 29, 1990, ch. 545, 1990
Md. Laws 2376 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 19-370(e)
(LexisNexis 2005)).
38. NJ. ADMIN. CODE § 8:43G-5.1(h) (2009) (including as hospital licensing
standards: "The hospital shall have a multidisciplinary bioethics committee .. "). See
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-65(a)(5) (West 2007) (requiring all healthcare facilities to
establish an institutional dispute resolution mechanism to deal with issues
surrounding advance directives); NJ. ADMIN. CODE § 8:39-9.6(i)-(j) (requiring long-
term care facilities, residential care facilities, and home health agencies to maintain a
mechanism for dealing with ethical dilemmas).
39. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-18.5-103(6.5) (2008) ("The assistance of a health care
facility medical ethics committee shall be provided .... "); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 405.60(a) (2009) ("An ethics committee must be established by each facility.").
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of those states do mandate their use for certain types of treatment
decisions.4
But perhaps the most significant event in the history of ethics
committees occurred in 1992, when having a HEC effectively became a
necessary condition for hospital accreditation. The Joint Commission,
an independent, not-for-profit organization, is the nation's predomi-
nant standards-setting and accrediting body in healthcare.4 Joint
Commission accreditation is critically important to a healthcare facil-
ity's certification for Medicare and Medicaid and to licensing in many
states.42 Consequently, most facilities took notice-and took action-
when, in 1992, the Joint Commission amended its accreditation stan-
dards to require a "mechanism" for considering ethical issues.
43
"[Hiospital ethics committees have been the most common response to
[this] mandate.
44
B. Missions and Functions of HECs
More healthcare facilities have an ethics committee than do not.
4 5
But what exactly does an ethics committee do? HECs have three pri-
40. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.404 (West 2005) (requiring a judicially
appointed guardian to consult with the HEC before withdrawing life-sustaining
medical treatment from a patient in a persistent vegetative state).
41. Joint Comm'n, About Us, http://jointcommission.org/aboutus (last visited
Mar. 6, 2009) ("The Joint Commission accredits and certifies more than 15,000 health
care organizations and programs in the United States.").
42. ROBERT I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY,
CONFRONTATION, AND COMPROMISE 43-45 (2006); ROBERT D. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN
HEALTH CARE LAW § 2-4.5, at 73-74 (9th ed. 2006).
43. See JOINT COMM'N ON THE ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS § RI.1.1.6.1, at 104 (1992); id. § R1.1.2.3, at 156; see also JOINT
COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK § RIl..10 (2007).
44. See Ellen L. Csikai, The Status of Hospital Ethics Committees in Pennsylvania, 7
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 104, 104 (1998); see also Brief of Alliance of
Catholic Health Care et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 30, Wendland v.
Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001) (No. S087265); McGee et al., supra note 24, at 87;
Robert S. Olick & Paul W. Armstrong, Health Care Directives, in NEw JERSEY PRACTICE
§ 37.36 (3d ed. 2008) ("This provision is widely interpreted to refer to an ethics
committee .... ); Elizabeth Pharr, The Hospital Ethics Committee: Bridging the Gulf of
Miscommunication and Values, TRUSTEE, Mar. 2003, at 24, 25.
45. While this is statistically true, it is important not to overstate the prevalence of
HECs. Many rural healthcare facilities lack a functioning HEC. See Ann Cook &
Helena Hoas, Are Healthcare Ethics Committees Necessary in Rural Hospitals?, 11 HEC
FORUM 134 (1999); Karen M. Having et al., Ethics Committees in the Rural Midwest:
Exploring the Impact of HIPAA, 24 J. RURAL HEALTH 316, 319 (2009) ("The current
study brings to light the lack [only 36.7%] of formal EC in rural health facilities.").
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mary functions: education, policy development, and case consulta-
tion.46  All these functions primarily concern end-of-life situations,
such as determinations of patient capacity and the withholding and
withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment.47
Most HECs, like most IRBs in the research context, are institution-
ally based.48 Each healthcare facility establishes its own IRB to review
its own scientists' research proposals.49 Similarly, each healthcare
facility establishes its own HEC to educate and develop policies for its
46. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 441; U.S. OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, LIFE-SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGY AND THE ELDERLY 127 (1987); Ronald E.
Cranford & A. Edward Doudera, The Emergence of Institutional Ethics Committees, in
CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 7, at 5, 11-14; Fletcher & Spencer, supra note 15, at
264-79; Heitman, supra note 23, at 413; Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, The
Role and Legal Status of Health Care Ethics Committees in the United States, in LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES IN BIOETHICS 46, 50 (Ana S. Iltis et al. eds., 2008); Jaffe, supra note 11, at
401-09; see also MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 19-373 (LexisNexis 2008) (describing
duties and responsibilities of "patient care advisory committees"); NJ. ADMIN. CODE
§ 10:48B-2.1 (2009) (defining the term "Ethics Committee" to mean "a multi-
disciplinary standing committee, which shall . . . have a consultative role . . . in
reviewing a recommendation for a 'Do Not Resuscitate Order'... or for withholding or
withdrawing an individual's life-sustaining medical treatment"); Harold F. Olsen,
Hospital Ethics Committees and the Role of the Board, TRUSTEE, Dec. 1989, at 28.
Additional functions include regulatory compliance, biomedical research, palliative
care, and organizational ethics. See Thomas P. Gonsoulin, A Survey of Louisiana
Hospital Ethics Committees, 119 LARANGOSCOPE 330, 333 (2009).
47. See Myra Christopher, Role of Ethics Committee Networks and Ethics Centers in
Improving End-of-Life Care, 2 PAIN MED. 162, 162 (2001); Janet Fleetwood & Stephanie
S. Unger, Institutional Ethics Committees and the Shield of Immunity, 120 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 320, 321 (1994); Mary Beth Foglia et al., Ethical Challenges Within
Veterans Administration Healthcare Facilities, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Apr. 2009, at 28; Diane
E. Hoffmann, Does Legislating Hospital Ethics Committees Make a Difference? A Study of
Hospital Ethics Committees in Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Virginia, 19 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 105, 110, 113 (1991) [hereinafter Hoffmann Study]; Hoffmann
& Tarzian, supra note 46, at 51; Ruth Macklin, Consultative Roles and Responsibilities,
in CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 7, at 157, 160, 166; Susan M. Wolf, Ethics
Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of Caring, 50 MD. L. REV.
798, 819, 826 (1991) [hereinafter Wolf 1991]; Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees in the
Courts, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1986, at 12, 12 [hereinafter Wolf 1986].
48. See Robert G. Wilson & Thomas G. Gallegos, The Community Bioethics
Committee: A Unique Pathway Out of Bioethical Dilemmas, 4 HEC FORUM 372, 372
(1992); see also Raymond DeVries & Carl P. Forsberg, Who Decides? A Look at Ethics
Committee Membership, 14 HEC FORUM 252, 253-54 (2002) (finding ninety percent of
IRBs have a majority of affiliated members and half have eighty percent affiliated).
49. IRBs review research proposals in order to safeguard the rights, safety, and
well-being of human subjects. See MIRIAM SHERGOLD, GUIDING GOOD RESEARCH:
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH ETHICS AND ETHICS REVIEW 23 (2008), available at http://www.
rand.org/pubs/documented-briefings/2008/RANDDB536.pdf ("The granting or
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staff and to review treatment issues regarding its own patients. It is
generally believed that the best review is local review."0 Intramural
committees have substantial advantages over extramural bodies. They
know both the institution and the treatment team. And intramural
committees can readily meet with the patient, the patient's family, and
the treatment team.5'
1. Education
HECs provide information and education to three separate
groups.5 2 First, the HEC engages in self-education, often through liter-
ature review and invited presentations. After all, the HEC must be
familiar with the relevant legal framework for healthcare decisions,
with the principles of bioethics and ethical reasoning, and with rele-
vant institutional policies.53 Second, HECs educate institutions' staff
and residents through in-service programs. Third, HECs educate the
community, often making presentations about advance care
planning.54
2. Policy Development
In addition to education, ethics committees are also typically
responsible for the development of policies pertaining to end-of-life
and other bioethical issues involving patient consent and refusal of
treatment.55
withholding of ethical approval decides whether a given research project can be
realized .... ").
50. See infra Part V.A.2.
51. See Ronald B. Miller, Extramural Ethics Consultation: Relections [sic] on the
Mediation/Medical Advisory Panel Model and a Further Proposal, 13 J. CLINICAL ETHICS
203, 203-04 (2002).
52. Cf. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 19-373(b) (LexisNexis 2005) ("[T]he
advisory committee may . .. [elducate represented hospital and related institution
personnel, patients, and patients' families concerning medical decision-making.").
53. See Mark P. Aulisio & Robert M. Arnold, Role of the Ethics Committee: Helping to
Address Value Conflicts and Uncertainties, 134 CHEST 417, 419 (2008).
54. See Kathy Kinlaw, The Hospital Ethics Committee as Educator, in ETHICS BY
COMMITTEE: A TEXTBOOK ON CONSULTATION, ORGANIZATION, AND EDUCATION FOR
HOSPITAL ETHICS COMMITTEES 203 (D. Micah Hester ed., 2008) [hereinafter ETHICS BY
COMMITTEE].
55. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 19-373(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2005)
(providing that the advisory committee may also "[r]eview and recommend
institutional policies and guidelines concerning the withholding of medical
treatment"); NJ. ADMIN. CODE § 8:43G-5.1(h) (2009) ("The committee... shall have at
least the following functions: . . . formulation of hospital policy related to bioethical
issues . .. [and] formulation of policy related to advance directives.").
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Specifically, HECs often review and recommend institutional poli-
cies and guidelines pertaining to: (i) decision-making capacity, (ii)
confidentiality, (iii) informed consent, (iv) Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR)
Orders,56 (v) withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment,
(vi) organ donation, (vii) advance directives, (viii) medical futility, and
(ix) brain death.57 To a lesser extent, HECs also deal with (x) genetic
testing, (xi) abortion, (xii) fertility treatments, and (xiii) compromised
infants.58
3. Case Consultation
While education and policy development are important tasks, the
paradigm function of an ethics committee is prospective case consulta-
tion.59 In this role, the HEC reviews specific ongoing patient care situ-
56. These are now often referred to as Do Not Attempt Resuscitation (DNAR) or
Allow Natural Death (AND) orders. In many states, they are also subsumed under
Physician Orders for Scope of Treatment (POST), Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining
Treatment (POLST), or Medical Orders for Scope of Treatment (MOST).
57. See, e.g., UNIV. OF KAN. MED. CTR., HOSPITAL ETHICS HANDBOOK (5th ed. 2002),
available at http://www.kumc.edu/hospital/ethics/ethics.pdf.
58. See Aulisio & Arnold, supra note 53, at 420; McGee et al., supra note 24, at 92;
P. A. Schneider, A Study of Twelve Hospital Ethics Committees in Eastern South Carolina,
96 J. S.C. MED. ASS'N 409 (2000). HECs also deal with other issues like disaster
preparedness. See, e.g., Catholic Health Ass'n, Ethics Survey Results of CHA Ethicists
25 (2008), http://www.chausa.org/NR/rdonlyres/E7F8EFOF-DF81-4FBC-BDF5-
A6535BC82C7F/0/2008EthicsSurveyResults-Ethicist.pdf.
59. See Capron, supra note 8, at 178; John F. Monagle & Michael P. West, Hospital
Ethics Committees: Roles, Memberships, Structures, and Difficulties, in HEALTH CARE
ETHICS: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY 251, 257 (Eileen E. Morrison ed., 2009);
Veatch, supra note 10, at 42 ("[T]he first task people think of for an institutional ethics
committee is participation in individual patient care decisions."); Jack Freer, Ethics
Committee Function and Composition, http://wings.buffalo.edu/faculty/research/
bioethics/man-comp.html (last visited May 2, 2009) ("The most common function of
ethics committees is to provide clinical case consultation."). In this Article, I do not
distinguish between HECs and ethics consultation services. Cf. Banerjee & Kuschner,
supra note 2, at 140. Some argue that ethics committees are less needed due to the
availability of bioethics consultants. See, e.g., Terrence F. Ackerman, Conceptualizing
the Role of the Ethics Consultant: Some Theoretical Issues, in ETHICS CONSULTING IN
HEALTH Care 37, 37 (John C. Fletcher et al. eds., 1989); Kenneth A. Berkowitz & Nancy
Neveloff Dubler, Approaches to Ethics Consultation, in HANDBOOK FOR INSTITUTIONAL
ETHICS COMMITTEES 139, 140-42 (2006). Indeed, most clinical ethics issues are
resolved by individual consultants or small teams rather than full committees. See
Ellen Fox et al., Ethics Consultation in United States Hospitals: A National Survey, Am. J.
BIOETHICS, Feb. 2007, at 16.
But the HEC still plays a central role. First, where a dispute cannot be resolved,
the case is typically referred to the full committee. See, e.g., SIBLEY MEM'L Hosp., ETHICS
CONSULTATION SERVICES (2008), available at http://www.sibley.org/downloads/Ethics_
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ations and offers advice and recommendations.6 ° While HECs
typically review end-of-life cases,6 ' they also review cases concerning
capacity determinations, informed consent, and other issues.62 Pro-
spective case consultation is generally considered to be the HEC's
most important role.63
Consultation.pdf ("The on-call group ... may be able to help those involved come to
agreement .... If not, the full Ethics Advisory Committee ... will be called together to
consider a case."). Second, the committee must still exercise oversight over the
individual consultants. See, e.g., Am. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § E-9.115
(2008); NJ. ADMIN. CODE § 8:43G-5.1(h)(3) (2009) ("The committee may partially
delegate responsibility ... to any individual or individuals who are qualified ....");
Fletcher, supra note 17, at 878-80; Fletcher & Hoffmann, supra note 17, at 336
("Dependence by a committee on a single ethics consultant risks unchecked ethical
bias ...."); HOSFORD, supra note 10, at 97; Ralph Pinnock & Jan Crosthwaite, The
Aukland Hospital Ethics Committee: The First 7 Years, N.Z. MED. J., Nov. 2004, at 7,
available at http://www.nzma.org.nz/journal/117-1205/1152/content.pdf ("As
professionally trained ethicists become available they were seen as complementary to
but not substitutes for the committees.").
60. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 19-373(a) (LexisNexis 2005); NJ.
ADMIN. CODE § 8:43G-5.1(h)(3) (2009) ("The committee ... shall have the following
functions: .. .resolution of patient-specific bioethical issues ... responsibility for
conflict resolution concerning the patient's decision-making capacity and in the
interpretation and application of advance directives").
61. See Aulisio & Arnold, supra note 53, at 421; Ritabelle Fernandes et al.,
Enhancing Residents' Training in Medical Ethics: An Exploratory Study Assessing Attitudes
of Internal Medicine Residents, 67 HAW. MED. J. 317 (2008); Ron Hamel, A Critical
Juncture, HEALTH PROGRESS, Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 12, 17 ("The most frequently
mentioned issues .. .were end-of-life care and futile treatment."); Eric Racine,
Enriching Our Views on Clinical Ethics: Results of a Qualitative Study of the Moral
Psychology of Healthcare Ethics Committee Members, 5 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 57, 63
(2008).
62. See, e.g., Pinnock & Crosthwaite, supra note 59, at 3 (listing, in addition, the
genetic testing of children, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, sterilization,
nonresident access to healthcare, HIV infection, and confidentiality).
63. See Sharon E. Caulfield, Health Care Facility Ethics Committees: New Issues in the
Age of Transparency, HUM. RTS., Fall 2007, at 12, available at http://www.abanet.org/
irr/hr/fall07/caulfifall07.html. "Case consultation is perhaps the most useful
role ... a committee can play." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Bernard Lo, Behind Closed Doors: Promises and Pitfalls of Ethics Committees, 317 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 46 (1987); David C. Thomasma, Hospital Ethics Committees and Hospital
Policy, QUALITY REV. BULL., July 1985, at 204, 206 ("Perhaps the most
important ... role of the hospital ethics committees is consultation."). But see Aulisio
& Arnold, supra note 53, at 420 ("[E]ducation is ultimately the most important
function of an ethics committee because the majority of ethical issues in clinical
medicine will always be handled by clinicians ....").
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How do HECs fulfill this case consultation function? HECs are
generally described as mere advisory bodies.64 Many clarify that "the
bioethics committee will not make decisions for you or dictate treat-
ment."' 65 HECs facilitate problem resolution by encouraging dialogue,
identifying issues, and offering viable options. 66
But HECs certainly also can and do make decisions.6 7 "[HECs] in
most states serve a role as a mechanism for 'alternative' dispute resolu-
tion. '68 For example, they are formally authorized to decide treatment
for surrogateless patients.69 HECs adjudicate when there is a dispute
64. See, e.g., JONATHAN D. MORENO, Is THERE AN ETHICIST IN THE HOUSE? 84-85
(2005); Andrew L. Merritt, The Tort Liability of Hospital Ethics Committees, 60 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1239, 1273 (1987) ("Most ethics committees ... do not have formal authority to
issue binding opinions .... More typically, ethics committees are advisory bodies that
offer recommendations rather than mandatory directives.").
65. San Antonio Cmty. Hospital (Upland, CA), Homepage, http://www.sach.org
(last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
66. See Thaddeus M. Pope & Ellen A. Waldman, Mediation at the End of Life:
Getting Beyond the Limits of the Talking Cure, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 143 (2007).
67. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.7(a) (LexisNexis 2008) (defining HEC
as a committee "whose function is to ... make decisions regarding ethical questions,
including decisions on life-sustaining therapy"); see also Fox, supra note 59, at 18;
Carmel Shachar, Strengthening Clinical Ethics Committees: An Examination of the
Jurisprudence and a Call for Reform, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 1 (2009); Robin
Fretwell Wilson, Rethinking the Shield of Immunity: Should Ethics Committees Be
Accountable for Their Mistakes?, 14 HEC FORUM 172, 172 (2002) (explaining that
states "repose considerable authority for ethical decisions in individual institutions").
Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-270.15(a)(22) (2008) (requiring psychologists to cooperate
promptly and completely with a HEC).
68. Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 46, at 46.
69. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-11(d)(7) (LexisNexis 1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 36-
3231 (2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.404 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-39-4(e)
(2006); IOWA CODE § 135.29 (2008) ("[T]he local substitute medical decision-making
board may act as a substitute decision maker for patients incapable of making their
own medical care decisions if no other substitute decision maker is available to act.");
Miss. CODE § 41-41-215(a) (2008), N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE CODE § 80.05 (2008); OR.
CODE § 127.635 (2008); TENN. COMp. R. & REGS. § 1200-8-11.12(16)(h)(1) (2008)
("If... none of the individuals eligible to act as a surrogate ... is reasonably available,
the designated physician may make health care decisions for the resident after the
designated physician either: ... Consults with and obtains the recommendations of a
facility's ethics mechanism or standing committee in the facility that evaluates health
care issues; or .. .Obtains concurrence from a second physician who is not directly
involved in the resident's health care, does not serve in a capacity of decision-making,
influence, or responsibility over the designated physician, and is not under the
designated physician's decision-making, influence, or responsibility."); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Vernon Supp. 2008) (describing interaction of
committee with the patient or "the person responsible for the health care decisions");
25 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 405.60(c)(1)-(2) (2009) ("Consultation with the ethics
270
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between default surrogates of the same class. 70 They adjudicate medi-
cal futility disputes. 71  And even when HECs do not have formal
authority, their recommendations often have a practically dispositive
effect.72
Recognizing that decisions to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
would be frequent and routine, courts have wisely determined that
such decisions could and should be made without judicial review.73
Courts have enthusiastically supported HECs.74 Judges do not want to
committee ... should be sought as follows: (1) when an individual is unable to give
direction regarding the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, has no
legal guardian, and has no person legally designated to make such a decision
according to [state law]; and (2) when a decision regarding the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is to be made and there is a conflict between or
among the decision-makers."); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-9(a)(7) (2008).
70. See, e.g., DEL. CODE § 16-2507(b)(8) (2008); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 166.039(e) (Vernon 2001); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 405.60(c)(2) (2009); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 16-30-5(d) (LexisNexis 2008).
71. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
72. See GeorgeJ. Agich, Authority in Ethics Consultation, 23J.L. MED. & ETHICS 273,
275 (1995) (observing that recommendations have a "practical effect akin to power");
LISA BELKIN, FIRST Do No HARM 73 (1992) ("Officially, the committee only gives
consultation and advice . . .[but tihe advice is almost always followed."); Ronald E.
Cranford & A. Edward Doudera, The Emergence of Institutional Ethics Committees, in
CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 7, at 5, 16 ("[I]t is hard to believe that a committee's
recommendation would not carry weight."); Gonsoulin, supra note 46, at 339 ("While
HEC recommendations were considered advisory, they were usually followed by the
physicians involved."); HOSFORD, supra note 10, at 94 ("It is inescapable that a
bioethics committee will influence physicians' decisions .. "); id. at 231 (explaining
that HEC "recommendations carry weight": "'De facto we are making decisions...."
(quoting Ronald Cranford)); id. at 232 ("A gradual evolution will probably take place,
with committees assuming more authority."); id. at 277 (quoting Dr. Norman C. Fost
describing HECs as engaged in "de facto decision making" because they can place
"enormous pressures on physicians"); Shelia A.M. McLean, Clinical Ethics Committees,
Due Process and the Right to a Fair Hearing, 15 J.L. & MED. 1, 1 (2008) (finding that
HECs are "increasingly authoritative"); Shachar, supra note 67, at 7 ("[A] patient's
family may feel disempowered ... lack of resources ... [or perceive the HEC decision]
as authoritative."); Margaret Somerville, The Ethics of Allowing Babies to Die, MONTREAL
GAZETTE, Mar. 25, 2009 (referring to a lawsuit recently filed against a Montreal HEC:
"Ethics committees... are very influential."); David N. Sontag, Comment, Are Clinical
Ethics Consultants in Danger? An Analysis of the Potential Legal Liability of Individual
Clinical Ethicists, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 700-03 (2002) (discussing causal relationship
between HEC decisions and harm caused by medical negligence).
73. See generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW
OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING §§ 3.19-.20, .23, .26 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2007)
(collecting relevant authority).
74. See supra Part I.A.
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decide these cases.75 Moreover, the general consensus has been that
there is no need for judicial review 76 because HECs are both better
positioned and better equipped to resolve treatment disputes.77
Judicial review is generally thought to be an inappropriate mecha-
nism for resolving medical treatment disputes.78  First, it is cumber-
some, being both time-consuming and expensive. 79 Thus, it cannot
usefully address complex, urgent medical issues. Second, as courts are
adversarial and open to the public, they are an unwelcome forum in
75. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 n.2 (D.C. 1990) ("[I]t would be far
better if judges were not called to patients' bedsides .... Because judgment in such a
case involves complex medical and ethical issues as well as the application of legal
principles, we would urge the establishment . . .of another tribunal to make these
decisions .. "); In re Nemser, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624, 629 (N.Y. 1966) ("[In no way does
[this] court intend to imply that an individual must be judicially declared incompetent
before it will or may intervene in his or her behalf.... It seems incongruous in light of
the physicians' oath that they even seek legal immunity prior to action necessary to
sustain life. . . . Emergency requirements . . . should not be delayed nor the
responsibility therefor shirked while fearful physicians and hospitals first seek judicial
sanction ....").
76. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 73, § 3.19 n.265.
77. Id § 3.25(a); Brief for Alliance of Catholic Health Care et al., supra note 44, at
31 ("[E]thics committees are capable of an interdisciplinary review that no trial or
appellate court could ever match .... ); Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of
Privatization of Justice through ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 241, 289-90 (1996)
(arguing that bioethics disputes are "probably better resolved privately"). This general
position has been challenged most forcefully by Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson, of
Washington and Lee University School of Law. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Hospital
Ethics Committees as the Forum of Last Resort: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 76
N.C. L. REV. 353 (1998); Wilson, supra note 67, at 187-88 (stating that judges have
resolved highly technical cases and stressing the benefits of court proceedings).
78. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 73, § 3.26 Bear in mind that ethics
committees may be considered, and evaluated, as another form of alternative dispute
resolution. They offer most of the same benefits: speed, low cost, ease of access,
informality, and confidentiality.
79. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 14, at 159 (describing court involvement
with treatment disputes as intrusive, slow, costly and framed in adversarial terms). In
futility disputes, for example, courts typically issue a temporary injunction ordering
continued treatment pending a full evidentiary hearing; but the patient often dies in
the meantime, mooting the dispute. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Involuntary Passive
Euthanasia in U.S. Courts: Reassessing the Judicial Treatment of Medical Futility Cases, 9
MARQ. ELDER'S ADvISOR 229 (2008). Requiring judicial review for approval of
treatment decisions may, because of the required time and expense, effectively deny a
right to such treatment. See, e.g., Mike E. Jorgensen, Today Is the Day We Free
Elect roconvulsive Therapy?, 12 QuiNN. HEALTH LJ. 1, 1, 56 (2008).
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which to resolve sensitive medical treatment disputes.80 Third, judicial
review is an encroachment on the medical profession.8s
In contrast, the responses of ethics committees are "more rapid
and sensitive" and "closer to the treatment setting. "82 "IT]heir deliber-
ations are informal and typically private, 83 which is important for
medical decisions and for the informal resolution of disputes.84 And
ethics committees better respect the role and judgment of physicians.
Courts themselves recognize these comparative strengths and
weaknesses. While they remain open to resolve intractable disputes,
courts have shown a willingness to consider the role and capabilities of
the HEC, as well as the substance of its recommendations, as signifi-
cantly impacting the final result.8 5 Thus, it appears HECs significantly
influence-and sometimes control-the outcome. The HEC is often
the forum of last resort.
80. See Herb & Lazar, supra note 5, at 111.
81. See Wilson, supra note 67.
82. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 14, at 169.
83. Id.
84. See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (NJ. 1987) (stating that "committee review
can be more sensitive, prompt, and discreet" than judicial review); PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N, supra note 14, at 165 (observing that "ethics committees will probably be less
formal and burdensome than judicial review in any particular case").
85. See, e.g., Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 n.4 (2d Cir. 1996) (suggesting states
allowing assisted suicide might "require the establishment of local ethics committees
as resources for physicians faced with questions relating to requests for lethal
medications"), rev'd, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Bernstein v. Sup. Ct., No. B212067, at 21
(Cal. App. Feb. 2, 2009); Severns v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1341-
44 (Del. 1980); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990); DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d
698, 710 (Ky. 1993); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 120 (Mass. 1980) ("[Tlhe
concurrence of qualified consultants may be highly persuasive .... "); Superintendent
of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 429 (Mass. 1977); In re
Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 336 n.2 (Minn. 1984) ("[T]hese committees are uniquely
suited to provide guidance .... "); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d at 463-64; In re Moorhouse,
593 A.2d 1256, 1257 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); In re Doe, 45 Pa. D. & C.3d 371
(C.C.P. 1987); In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 63-64 (Wis. 1992); see also BETHANY
SPIELMAN, BioETHics IN LAW 41-56 (2007); Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 780; Alexander
M. Capron, Legal Perspectives on Institutional Ethics Committees, 11 J.C. & U.L. 416
(1985). In some respects, HECs are analogous to medical review panels in the liability
context. While the decisions of neither forum typically are formally dispositive, they
have significant practical effect. Cf. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 519-B:1 (2008).
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II. PROBLEMS WITH INTRAMURAL ETHICS COMMITTEES
Since their beginnings, ethics committees have been subjected to
nearly constant criticism.86 Neither prior criticisms nor those appear-
ing in this Article can be properly directed at all ethics committees.
Many do a fine job. But ethics committees are subject to almost zero
oversight. Furthermore, government regulation, self-regulation, certifi-
cation, and accreditation have done little to strengthen HEC accounta-
bility.87 Consequently, there is enormous variation in quality among
HECs at different facilities.8"
Professor Hunter89 describes four distinct types of risks applica-
ble to medical decisions: (i) the risk of corruption, (ii) the risk of bias,
86. See McLean, supra note 67, at 6 ("Criticism of the make-up and procedures of
HECs in the United States is not uncommon.").
87. See Charles L. Bosk & Joel Frader, Institutional Ethics Committees: Sociological
Oxymoron, Empirical Black Box, in WHAT WOULD You Do: JUGGLING BIOETHICS AND
ETHNOGRAPHY 39, 41 (Charles L. Bosk ed. 2008) ("IECs ... grew in a much more free-
form way, with no regulations for representation, no clear delineated tasks, no set
procedures .... "); Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 46, at 46 ("[HECs] remain
unregulated and lack homogeneity in structure and operation."); id. at 54 ("Because
there are virtually no regulations governing ethics committees, their operations and
procedures vary from committee to committee."); see also Nancy Neveloff Dubler &
Jeffrey Blustein, Credentialing Ethics Consultants: An Invitation to Collaboration, AM. J.
BIOETHICS, Feb. 2007, at 35, 37 ("[C]linical ethics consultation is a field without
adequate standards, training, or quality review."); David A. Fleming, Responding to
Ethical Dilemmas in Nursing Homes: Do We Always Need an "Ethicist"?, 19 HEC FORUM
245, 251 (2007) ("Presently, there are no unified standards of clinical ethics
education, training, or practice."); Fox et al., supra note 59, at 13, 20 ("[T]here appear
to be . . . few mechanisms for quality control."); Hearing Before Texas H.R. Comm. on
Public Health, 80th Legis. (2007) (statement of Colleen Horton, Univ. of Tex. Ctr. for
Disabilities Studies) (testifying about the lack of HEC oversight, monitoring,
accountability, consistency, and standardization); Hearing Before Texas H.R. Comm. on
Public Health Interim Rep., 80th Legis. (2006) (statement of Richard Mullin)
(complaining that committees have no system of review, are not held to clear
standards, do not impose qualifications for membership, do not report whether their
decisions are unanimous or by a slim majority or whether dissent existed); SPIELMAN,
supra note 85, at 180.
88. See Hearing Before Texas H.R. Comm. on Public Health, 80th Legis. (2007)
(statement of Gregory Hooser) ("[E]thics committees come in all shapes and sizes.");
Wilson, supra note 67, at 177; Wolf 1991, supra note 47, at 847.
89. Nan Hunter is a law professor at the Georgetown University Law Center.
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(iii) the risk of arbitrariness, and (iv) the risk of carelessness. 90 Many
HECs suffer from some or all of these decision-making risks.9 '
A "corrupted decision" is one driven by the self-interest of the
decision maker. 92 For example, a treatment decision may be corrupted
when the decision maker has a financial interest in the outcome. A
"biased decision" is one reflecting a pattern of unfairness, which dis-
parages the interests of certain persons or classes of persons.93 For
example, a treatment decision may be biased when the decision maker
is prejudiced against the race of the patient. A "careless decision" is
one based on ill-considered or unsupported beliefs due to insufficien-
cies in the decision maker's training.94 For example, a treatment deci-
sion may be careless when the decision maker misapplies relevant
standards, such as those for determining capacity. Finally, an "arbi-
trary decision" is one that is the product of an abuse of appropriate
process norms.95 For example, a treatment decision may be arbitrary
when the decision maker fails to obtain relevant information or engage
in adequate deliberation.
A. Intramural HECs Make Corrupt Decisions
Ideally, HECs are independent and neutral forums.96 After all,
their purpose is to provide a perspective broader than that of the
clinical team involved with the patient's treatment.97 The American
90. Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability in
Health Care, 6 YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 93, 109 (2006) (citing Mark A. Hall et
al., Trust in Physicians and Medical Institutions: What Is It, Can It Be Measured, and Does
It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613, 620-24 (2001)).
91. See I. Glenn Cohen, Negotiating Death: ADR and End-of-Life Decision Making, 9
HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 253, 309 (2004).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 14, at 4 ("Health care institutions ... have a
responsibility . . . to overcome the influence of dominant institutional biases ....");
Daniel Wikler, Institutional Agendas and Ethics Committees, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 21, 22 ("Giving some weight to institutional concerns ... would
deliberately skew the results of moral judgment toward expediency .... [T]he ethics
committee will generally do its job best if it does not concern itself with the hospital's
interests."). If the HEC is viewed as an ADR mechanism, then it even more obviously
must comply with due process principles like neutrality and independence. See AAA,
ABA & AMA COMM'N ON HEALTH CARE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, FINAL REPORT (July 27,
1998).
97. See Susan B. Apel, Access to Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 12 MICH. ST. J.
MED. & L. 33, 42-43 (2008) ("The advantage of using the ethics committee is that it
removes the dispute from those most intimately involved, and places the issue before a
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Medical Association advises that "[clommittee members should not
have other responsibilities that are likely to prove incompatible with
their duties as members of the ethics committee."" s The Universal
Declaration of Bioethics states that to "provide advice on ethical
problems in clinical settings," HECs should be "independent, multidis-
ciplinary, and pluralist.""
But the objectivity of HECs is seriously compromised. Structural
factors inhibit their ability to act impartially. Since most members of
an intramural HEC work for the institution, they have a conflict of
interest when adjudicating disputes in which the institution has a
stake. This insider composition corrupts the HEC's decisions. This
corruption is exacerbated by the dynamics of group decision making.
1. HEC Conflicts of Interest
Intramural committees suffer from a significant conflict of inter-
est. Most (and often all) members of HECs are employed directly or
indirectly by the very institution in which the committee is situated." 0
As a result of this economic dependence, the committee members may
tend to act out of a sense of duty to the institution.' 0 ' "As an institu-
new-and supposedly neutral-audience that is skilled in making ethical
determinations.").
98. See AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9.11 (2008); Council on
Judicial & Ethical Affairs, Guidelines for Ethics Committees in Health Care Institutions,
253 JAMA 2698, 2698 (1985), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/
upload/mm/369/cejaei84.pdf.
99. UNITED NATIONS, EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
ON BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, at art. 19, U.N. Doc. SHS/EST/BIO/06/1 (2005)
[hereinafter UNESCO DECLARATION], available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/
0014/001461/146180E.pdf.
100. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 73, § 3.26[c] ("[Miost institutions have no
established structure for review of such decisions by disinterested individuals .... ");
MORENO, supra note 64, at 83 ("Certainly, a committee system can easily lead to abuse
. . . their nature warrants caution."); Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 47, at 323
("[Mlost ethics committee members are employees of the facility .... ); Miller, supra
note 51, at 205 ("[Tihe preponderance of ethics committee members are health care
professionals and work in the hospital (even if not technically hospital
employees) .... "); Robert D. Truog, Tackling Medical Futility in Texas, 357 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1, 2 (2007), available at available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/
357/1/1 ("[HEC members] are unavoidably 'insiders' .... ).
101. See ROBERT P. CRAIG ET AL., ETHICS COMMITTEES: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 5 (1986)
("IECs might be tempted to look after the interests of their colleagues and the
institution they serve."); JUDITH WILSON RoSS ET AL., HEALTHCARE ETHICS COMMITTEES:
THE NEXT GENERATION 40 (1993) ("[W]orking in any institution over time places
blinders on the employee."); George Annas, Do Ethics Committees Work: No, TRUSTEE,
July 1994, at 17 ("[E]thics committees ... can't be objective."); id. at 19 (arguing that
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the failure of IRBs "can generally be traced to an over-identification with the perceived
needs and interests of the institution," in reference to the artificial heart experiment at
the University of Utah and the Baby Face experiment at Loma Linda); Mildred K. Cho
et al., Strangers at the Benchside: Research Ethics Consultation, AM. J. BIoETHics, Nov.
2008, at 4 ("[C]ritics have questioned the independence of most institutionally-based
ethics consultation and have raised the worry that a built-in conflict of interest could
undermine the value of such a service."); Mildred K. Cho & Paul Billings, Conflict of
Interest and Institutional Review Boards, 45 J. INVESTIGATIVE MED. 154, 155 (1997)
("[Tihe placement of the IRB within its own institution and its composition being
primarily of members of the institution may itself create conflicts of interest.");
California Law Review Commission, Staff Memorandum 98-63: Health Care Decisions:
Comments on Tentative Recommendations 13-14 (Sept. 18, 1998); Kenneth A. De Ville &
Gregory L. Hassler, Healthcare Ethics Committees and the Law: Uneasy But Inevitable
Bedfellows, 13 HEC FORUM 13, 25 (2001); Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 47, at 323
("[Miembers may feel inclined to make decisions in the interest of their employer ....
[A]dministrators or colleagues might place pressure on members ...."); Eleanor
Kinney, Tapping and Resolving Consumer Concerns About Health Care, 26 AM. J. L. &
MED. 335, 392 (2000) ("[Tihe decision maker must be knowledgeable and unbiased.
This is particularly a problem when the ... provider 'owns' the adjudicative process.");
Frank Leavitt, Letter, Hospital Ethics Committees May Discourage Staff from Making Own
Decisions, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 1414, 1414 (2000), available at http://www.
pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1119129&blobtype=pdf ("[E]thicists ...
who are hired ... by hospitals ... may naturally be selected to serve the interests of
management."); Linda T. Powell, Hospital Ethics Committees and the Future of Health
Care Decision Making, Hosp. MATERIAL MGMT. Q., Aug. 1998, at 82, 83 (1998) ("It is
likely that committee members will act from a sense of duty to the institution, their
fellow professionals ...."); Samuel L. Tilden, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Using an
Identical Twin as a Skin Transplant Donor for a Severely Burned Minor, 31 AM. J. L. &
MED. 87, 112 (2005) ("Examination of the individual makeup of the [HEC] reveals that
its decisions were ripe for inherent bias. All committee members were either employed
by the hospital or served as members of its medical staff .. "); Wilson & Gallegos,
supra note 48, at 379 (describing committee members' view of their role as one of
service to the physician; a means of preserving their place in the institution); Wilson,
supra note 67, at 180 (same); Wolf 1991, supra note 47, at 838 (describing HECs as
"[s]till dominated" by institutional forces); id. at 852 ("[l]f the committee exists within
a health care institution and is composed of members of that institution's staff, then
the committee will never provide the independent judgment of a body such as a
court."). Cf. See CAROLYNN M. RYAN, INTERNAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 4 (1998) ("The
concept of a neutral in-house decision maker obviously leads to complex problems
and to skepticism about IDR ...."); id. at 13 ("Persons chosen as neutrals may not
want to damage their own careers in the firm by antagonizing management."); Samuel
R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 28 (2006) ("While professional cultures can sometimes be enlisted to effect
changes within organizations, there are good reasons to doubt the wisdom of a
strategy that broadly empowers intermediaries to set workplace equality norms and
the means of achieving them."); id. at 31 ("Although professionals occasionally employ
their own norms to transform workplaces, a professional's own interests and milieu
necessarily constrain and mold those norms. And when a professional works for
management, she must heed managers' interests as well."); Richard S. Saver, What IRBs
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tional player, an HEC may internalize and perpetuate the interests and
biases of its parent hospital.' 10 2 Therefore, HECs may not promote
patient interests that conflict with institutional interests.
10 3
Admittedly, most HEC members have no personal, direct, sub-
stantial pecuniary interest in the committee's parent institution.'0 4
Still, those members are not impartial. 10 5 Giles Scofield asks, "Who
hires them? Who are they accountable to? What group do they least
wish to offend?"'1 6 Scholars and policymakers have extensively dis-
cussed the influence of even small gifts (especially from the drug
industry) on physician behavior. l0 7 When pharmaceutical companies
Could Learn from Corporate Boards, IRB ETHICS & HUM. RES., Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 1, 2
("Inside directors ... may be averse to challenging current management .... ").
102. See Wilson & Gallegos, supra note 48, at 382 ("[T]he committee may be
concerned about preserving its place in the institution ... [and] may internalize and
perpetuate its parent hospital's dominant institutional biases."); see also Wilson, supra
note 67, at 180.
103. BELKIN, supra note 72 (showing an HEC taking into consideration the financial
impact of care provided); Bosk & Frader, supra note 87, at 57 ("[T]he problem is the
propriety of a committee ruling on a procedure in which so much is at stake
institutionally."); De Ville & Hassler, supra note 101, at 25; Hoffmann, supra note 30,
at 785 ("[Tlhere is a danger that ethics committees may act as 'puppets' of the health
care institution in which they serve."); Cynthia B. Cohen, The Social Transformation of
Some American Ethics Committees, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 21, 21
("Ethics committees are experiencing new pressures to safeguard the institution's
financial interests . . . to help meet institutional marketing goals .... "); Richard A.
McCormick, Ethics Committees: Promise or Peril?, L. MED. & HEALTH CARE, Sept. 1984,
at 150, 154 (describing "inhouse protectionism" as "a potential problem against which
we should guard"); J. Randal, Are Ethics Committees Alive and Well?, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Dec. 1983, at 10, 12 (warning that ethics committees might "be pressed into
service and handmaidens to money saving strategy"). See In re Smith, 133 P.3d 924,
926 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (observing that the Department of Human Services did not
seek appointment as healthcare guardian of severely disabled three-year-old because
"such an appointment could create the appearance of a conflict of interest, in
that . . . continued care . . . could cost the state a large amount of money"); F. Ross
Woolley, Ethical Issues in the Implantation of the Total Artificial Heart, 310 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 292 (1984) (describing how the IRB responsible for approving the protocol for
the artificial heart was under intense pressure to approve it).
104. Compare Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927) (discussing, in a different
context, application of the general rule that "officers acting in a judicial or quasi-
judicial capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be decided").
105. See supra Part II.A.1.
106. Giles R. Scofield, Ethics Consultation: The Least Dangerous Profession?, 2
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 417 (1993) (arguing that the HEC has too little
critical distance to exercise independent objective judgment).
107. See, e.g., Robert A. Berenson & Christie K. Cassel, Consumer-Driven Health
Care May Not Be What Patient Medicine Caveat Emptor, 301 JAMA 321, 321 (2009)
("Evidence amassed over two decades suggests that the gravitational pull of market
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established their own ethics committees, many seriously questioned
whether bioethicists could be "taken seriously if they are on the pay-
roll of the very corporations whose practices they are expected to
assess."'
10 8
The tendency of insiders to favor their own institution is well-rec-
ognized.10 9 For example, the New Jersey Medical Society Futility
Guidelines caution ethics committee members to watch their "alle-
giance."" 0 The Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Association criticized
giving ethics committees the authority to make decisions for "friend-
less incompetents"; that is, incapacitated patients without friends or
family to speak on their behalf."' The Association doubted whether
committee members could make decisions "that were free and inde-
pendent of their hospital's administrative or financial goals.""' 2
These concerns appear to be well-grounded. HECs do seem to get
pressed into serving the institution's financial goals, mainly in avoid-
ing uncompensated care and liability exposure. 13 For example, the
pressures frequently thwarts physician commitment or capacity to fulfill professional
ideals."); Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to
Physicians from Industry, 290 JAMA 252 (2002). If corporations and other business
entities have a significant advantage in third-party ADR, then they certainly have it in
internal dispute resolution (IDR), where they more directly and completely control the
process. See Peter L. Murray, The Privatization of Civil Justice, 91 JUDICATURE 272, 275,
315 (2008); Weinstein, supra note 72, at 260-61.
108. Carol Elliott, Pharma Buys a Conscience, Am. PROSPECT, Sept. 14, 2001.
109. See supra Part II.A.1.
110. Cf. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FINAL REPORT: DUNLOP
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ch. IV (1995)
("[P]otential for abuse... concerns are obvious if the process is controlled unilaterally
by employers .... ).
111. Kate Scannell, What to Do About Patients Without a Friend in the World?,
ALAMEDA TIMES-STAR, Sept. 14, 2003.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Belkin, supra note 72, at 8 ("[D]iscussions of money have been
increasingly difficult to avoid ...."); id. at 177; id. at 258 ("The problem of finances
always manages to enter Room 3485 ...."). Intramural HECs also suffer from a
conflict of interest when they serve as the designated decision makers regarding
whether the institution can proceed with high-profit procedures like organ transplants.
In Singapore and the Philippines, for example, where most organs come from live
donors, intramural HECs have been attacked as insufficiently robust to ensure that
donations are bona fide. See, e.g., Alastair Mclndoe, Filipinos Find It Harder to Sell
Organs, STRAITS TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008; Lee Siew Hua, Transplants: No National Ethical
Panel, STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 27, 2008; see also Barbara Martinez, Pursuing Charitable
Mission Leaves a Hospital Struggling, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2008 (suggesting that a more
profit-oriented Chicago hospital concluded a patient's cancer was "incurable ... too
far advanced ... irrespective to treatment," while a hospital focused on irs charitable
mission provided uncompensated chemotherapy).
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
very day after comatose three-year-old Brianna Rideout's insurance was
exhausted, the Hershey Medical Center HEC authorized the unilateral
withdrawal of her ventilator over her parent's vehement objections. 14
Financial relationships influence intramural HECs not only in
subtle ways but also rather overtly. Many ethics committees' 1 5 deliber-
ately aim to serve a risk management role for the institution. 116 This
should not be surprising, considering HECs often include institutional
114. Rideout v. Hershey Med. Ctr., 30 Pa. D. & C.4th 57 (C.C.P. 1995).
115. This is especially true of administration HECs, as compared to medical staff
HECs. See Jack Freer, Ethics Committee Models (1997), http://www.wings.
buffalo.edu.
116. See SPIELMAN, supra note 85, at 190; George Annas, Ethics Committees in
Neonatal Care: Substantive Protection or Procedural Diversion?, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
843, 843 (1984) ("Institutions and their staffs often see the primary function of ethics
committees as protecting them against potential legal liability for treating or not
treating particular patients."); Capron, supra note 85, at 429 ("[Slome people ... favor
ethics committees in the belief that they will protect physicians or hospitals."); Capron,
supra note 8, at 177 ("[T]here is a real danger in this area that institutions will regard
the purpose of protecting hospitals and physicians as the primary one. ... );
Caulfield, supra note 63; Cohen, supra note 103, at 21 (Ethics committees "have been
encouraged to gloss over especially difficult cases to avoid expensive legal maneuvers
that could work to the institution's disadvantage. The structure of some committees
has been designed to protect institutional interests .... ); Fletcher & Hoffmann, supra
note 17, at 336; Hoffmann Study, supra note 47, at 112 (seventy-two percent of
surveyed DC-area ethics committees responded that they were significantly influenced
by legal consequences); Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 767 (noting a conflict among
goals: to protect the institution, providers, and the patient); Levine, supra note 6, at 11;
McGee et al., supra note 24, at 91 ("One [survey respondent] wrote that the ethics
committee functioned 'mostly for risk management."'); Melinda Murray & Amy
Templeton, The Role of Legal Counsel on Hospital Ethics Committees, ETHICSCOPE, Spring
1990 ("ITIhe committee often considers whether or not an action is legal or at least
defensible, from a risk management perspective."); Kevin B. O'Reilly, Willing, But
Waiting: Hospital Ethics Committees, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 28, 2008 [hereinafter Willing,
But Waiting] ("[T]oo many ethics committees and consult teams operate under the
aegis or with the review of risk management at their institution."); Kevin B. O'Reilly,
AMA Meeting: Delegates Weigh Ethics Committee's Role, Am. MED. NEWS, Dec. 1, 2008
("[Dlelegates complained that ethics services too often operate in secrecy and avoid
cases that could pose challenges for the organization .... It's not the committee's job
to cover the hospital's butt."); John A. Robertson, Committees as Decision Makers:
Alternative Structures and Responsibilities, in CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 7, at
85, 88-89; J.W. Summers, Closing Unprofitable Services: Ethical Issues and Management
Responses, 30 Hosp. HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. 8, 10 (1985); see also Univ. of Chi. MacLean
Ctr. for Clinical Med. Ethics, Services and Resources: Consultation, http://medicine.
uchicago.edu/centers/ccme/consult.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) ("The ethics
consultation service works closely with the Office of Medical Legal Affairs ....").
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risk managers and lawyers, 17 and the very creation of such commit-
tees was "motivated in part by a need for legal protection. '"18 Even the
nation's Supreme Court observed that "the committee's function is
protective. It enables the hospital appropriately to be advised that its
posture and activities are in accord with legal requirements."" 9
In In re Edna M.F., for example, the sister (who was also the
guardian) of a 71-year-old severely demented patient, sought HEC
review of her decision to withdraw the patient's feeding tube.' 2 ° But in
conducting this review, "[tihe committee seemed to understand that its
function was to reach a determination that would insulate the facility
from legal liability."'' Fulfillment of the patient's wishes or best inter-
ests, not consensus, is the appropriate healthcare decision-making
standard; yet the HEC agreed to withdrawal of the feeding tube only if
no family member objected.' 2 2 One did object, so the HEC disallowed
the withdrawal, even though it was likely in the patient's best inter-
est.' 2 3 Wisconsin Chief Justice Abrahamson refused to give weight to
117. See Freer, supra note 59 ("Some committees are heavily represented by hospital
administration or hospital counsel, and maintain a defensive posture for the
institution .... "); Gonsoulin, supra note 46, at 333 ("Most HECs had at least one
hospital administrator as a member."); Hoffmann Study, supra note 47 (stating eighty-
six percent of committees have a lawyer as a member). See also Lawrence E. Gottlieb,
Point and Counterpoint: Should an Institution's Risk Manager/Lawyer Serve as HEC
Members?, 3 HEC FORUM 91 (1991); Robert F. Weir, Pediatric Ethics Committees:
Ethical Advisers or Legal Watchdogs?, 15 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 99, 106 ("Rather than
giving primacy to the institution's interests, this conflict of interest means that the
hospital legal counsel will advise-urge, try to compel-the committee to take the
position on a case that is least likely to cause legal problems for the institution.");
Bruce White, Point and Counterpoint: Should an Institution's Risk Manager/Lawyer
Serve as HEC Members?, 3 HEC FORUM 87 (1991); Wilson & Gallegos, supra note 48.
118. See Fred Rosner, Hospital Medical Ethics Committees: A Review of their
Development, 253 JAMA 2693, 2694 (1985); see also George J. Annas, Legal Aspects of
Ethics Committees, in CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 7, at 51, 52-53 ("[It is really a
'risk management' or 'liability control' committee."); id. at 55 (describing doctors "fear
that they might be criminally and civilly liable" if they terminate life support for an
incompetent patient, and suggesting such fear spawns ethics committees); John A.
Robertson, Committees as Decision Makers: Alternative Structures and Responsibilities,
in CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 7, at 85, 88-89; H. Hirsch, Establish Ethics
Committees to Minimize Liability, 3 HOSPITAL RISK MANAGEMENT 45 (1981).
119. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973) (emphasis added).
120. See In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 495-96 (Wis. 1997).
121. Id. at 496.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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the HEC recommendation and criticized the HEC for its marked insti-
tutional bias. 1
24
More recently, Kalilah Roberson-Reese underwent a cesarean sec-
tion at Memorial Hermann Hospital.' 2 ' But amniotic fluid began to
leak into her lungs, forcing providers to put her on a ventilator. 126
Later, her tracheal tube fell out and she went without oxygen for
twenty minutes, which caused serious brain damage.1 27 Within days,
the hospital initiated Texas's statutory process by which, with approval
of the HEC, providers could withdraw life-sustaining treatment even
over family objections. 128 But again, the HEC was conflicted: the
patient had exhausted her Medicaid benefits and it appeared that the
hospital was trying to "bury mistakes" and avoid exposure to both lia-
bility and uncompensated treatment.' 29
The same corruption and conflict of interest problems plague the
close cousin of the intramural HEC, the intramural IRB that approves
research with human subjects. 3 ° IRB members are conflicted for three
main reasons. First, the investigator's research grants may affect both
the IRB member's compensation and the prestige of their institu-
tion. 13 1 Second, members review the proposals of colleagues and
124. Id.
125. Todd Ackerman, Texas' Patient Care Law at Hub of Houston Dispute, Hous.
CHRON., July 9, 2006, at Al. Another case involving Sabrina Martin is now being
litigated with very similar allegations. Chris Vogel, Doctors v. Parents: Who Decides
Right to Life?, Hous. PRESS, Apr. 29, 2008, http://www.houstonpress.com/2008-05-01/
news/doctors-vs-parents-who-decides-right-to-life/. See Mimi Swartz, Not What the
Doctor Ordered, TEX. MONTHLY, Mar. 1995 (describing case in which CIGNA pressured
the HEC chair to stop expensive treatment for end-stage AIDS patient James D. Bland);
see also In re Estate of Bland v. CIGNA Health Plan of Tex., No. 93-52630A (Harris
Cty., Tex.).
126. Ackerman, supra note 131, at Al.
127. Id.
128. Id (referring to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Vernon Supp.
2008)).
129. Id.
130. See DeVries & Forsberg, supra note 48, at 253-55; Christine Vogeli et al.,
Policies and Management of Conflicts of Interest Within Medical Research Institutional
Review Boards: Results of a National Study, 84 ACAD. MED. 488 (2009).
131. Leslie Francis, Institutional Review Boards and Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICT
OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 418 (Roy G. Spece Jr. et al. eds., 1996);
Erica Heath, The History, Function, and Future of Independent Institutional Review
Boards, ONLINE ETHICS CENTER, June 14, 2006, http://www.onlineethics.org/cms/
8080.aspx ("IRB board members . . . often have a collegial relationship with the
investigators for whom they provide review, . . . may share office space with the
institutional arm that obtains grants and contracts .... [and may be] concerned about
the financial well-being and prestige of the institution that employs them."); Sharona
282
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friends. 132 Third, members know that their own proposals will be
reviewed and the rules extracted from their review decisions will be
applied to them. 133 Because of this "built-in self-interest," IRBs "are
often friendly regulators.'
13 4
Famously, in Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, the Maryland
Court of Appeals found that IRBs have a conflict of interest because
they are committees of the very research institute that they are charged
to oversee. 13' The IRB in Grimes had approved research exposing
small children to risks of lead poisoning while offering those same
children no prospect of direct medical benefit.'
36
HECs may be beholden not only to their respective institutions
but also to the individual physicians who refer the cases to the commit-
tee. 1 3 7 The repeat player phenomenon provides that the party that
arbitrates many disputes (hospitals) will have greater experience with
and exposure to the process than the party that typically arbitrates just
Hoffman & Jessica Wilen Berg, The Suitability of IRB Liability, 67 U. PiTT. L. REV. 365,
378 (2005).
132. See Robert Dingwall, "Turn Off the Oxygen .. ," 41 L. & Soc'' REv. 787, 788-89
(2007).
133. See Cinead R. Kubiak, Note, Conflicting Interests & Conflicting Laws: Re-Aligning
the Purpose and Practice of Research Ethics Committees, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 759
(2005).
134. Leonard H. Glantz, Contrasting Institutional Review Boards with Institutional
Ethics Committees, in CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 7, at 129, 131 (emphasis
added).
135. 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001).
136. At least federal regulations address this conflict of interest in some contexts.
See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.304 (2008) (requiring that, with research on prisoners: the
majority of the IRB "have no association with the prison[ ] involved" and at least one
member "shall be a prisoner or prisoner representative").
137. Cf. Bosk & Frader, supra note 87, at 55 ("[I]n the closed world of the tertiary
care hospital ...an independent judgment ...should not be a taken-for-granted
outcome."); Cho & Billings, supra note 101, at 156 ("[I]ndividual conflicts stem from
the relationship between an individual IRB member and his or her colleagues.
Institutional conflicts are linked to the relationship between the IRB as a group and its
institution."). Accountability can be defined by location in the institutional hierarchy.
Heitman, supra note 23, at 419. If a HEC reported to the medical executive committee,
it might not have independence to question physicians. On the other hand, if a HEC
reported to the administration, it might be too aligned with risk management.
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one dispute (patient, surrogates). 138 Eager to maintain relationships
with physicians, committees over-identify with their interests. 139
In sum, HECs are creatures of the healthcare institutions in which
they are situated. Since, in many treatment disputes, the interest of the
institution may not align with that of the patient, HECs cannot act as
sufficiently impartial, independent decision makers. They serve "two
sets of masters."'14 Susan Wolf141 states that "to ask institutional com-
mittees dominated by caregivers to be the guardians of patients' rights
and interests is like asking the fox to guard the chicken coop." 142
138. See generally Marc Galanter, When the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974); Hunter, supra note 90, at 155;
Carrie Menkel Meadow, Do the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?
Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 19 (1999); Powell, supra note
101 (act out of sense of duty to fellow professionals).
139. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 251-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that psychiatrists had a conflict of interest in reviewing their colleagues who
would then review their performance); SPIELMAN, supra note 85, at 183-84; id. at 190
(reputation COI); Winifred Ann Meeker-O'Connell, Institutional Review Boards:
Current Compliance Trends and Emerging Models, 9 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 5
(2007) ("Members may also face non-financial conflicts in an academic setting, for
example, when approving a colleague's or competitor's project could impact an IRB
member's career."); Jonathan D. Moreno, Institutional Ethics Committees: Proceed with
Caution, 50 MD. L. REV. 895 (1991) (describing intricacies of small group relations);
Tilden, supra note 101, at 112-13 (describing procedural inadequacies with a HEC
that approved skin harvesting from six-year-old girl for her sister: the only surgeon on
the committee "worked as the direct supervisor to and colleague of [the burned girl's]
surgeon"; he may have been "conflicted regarding the preservation of his interpersonal
relationship ... demonstration of supportive leadership for his faculty, maintenance of
divisional harmony, and avoidance of encroachment on the surgeon-patient
relationship"); Wilson, supra note 77, at 382; Joann Starr, The Ethical Implications of
the Use of Power by Hospital Ethics Committees 80 (2002) (unpublished dissertation
for Graduate Theological Union) ("[C]ollegial manner ethics committees become sites
of resistance to the institutional power-over-dynamic."). See also Saver, supra note 101,
at 2 ("[M]embers can become entangled in a web of personal associations."); Wilson
& Gallegos, supra note 48, at 379 (suggesting members defer to the health care
providers because of the dynamics of group decision making).
140. Wolf 1991, supra note 47, at 820.
141. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
142. Susan M. Wolf, Due Process in Ethics Committee Case Review, 4 HEC FORUM 83,
92-93 (1992). See id. at 94 ("Committees ... lack the necessary independence of a
court."). See Bosk & Frader, supra note 87, at 65 n.10 ("[Tihey are and can be nothing
more than an attempt to preserve professional power by internalizing a critique and
thereby dissolving it. In this line of thought, IECs are simply a away of silencing
resistance and challenges to medical authority by taking charge of the dispute process
...."); Veatch, supra note 10, at 47 (arguing against the notion of "quasi-judicial
authority" in HECs because "[tihe committee at best will reflect the moral consensus
of the institution and its sponsors").
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Moreover, as if an actual lack of neutrality were not bad enough, the
perception of bias creates among patients and families "serious suspi-
cions of complicity, rubber-stamping, or cover-up." 143
2. Exacerbating Conflicts with Groupthink and Bandwagons
Even if only some individual members are motivated or affected
by a conflict of interest, the overall HEC decision-making process may
still be corrupted. Sometimes a mere few individuals control, or the
chairperson dominates the deliberation.144 Sometimes when an
aggressive lawyer speaks, other members of the HEC feel as though the
discussion has ended. 14 5 The remaining members may not indepen-
dently reflect or assert their position but instead just go along with the
crowd. 146
143. Miller, supra note 51, at 205. Notably, most ADR programs in health care
operate "independently of health care providers, operating instead as outsourced
contractors." Susan J. Szmania, ADR in Medical Malpractice: A Survey of Emerging
Trends and Practices, 26 CONFL. REsOL. Q. 71, 78 (2008).
144. See Hoffmann Study, supra note 47, at 111 (stating three percent of surveyed
DC-area ethics committees reported being "dominated by a few individuals");
Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 764; Thomasine Kushner & Joan M. Gibson, Institutional
Ethics Committees Speak for Themselves, in CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 7, at 96,
105 ("[C]ommittees may simply reflect the views of the dominant members."); DAVID
ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW AND BIOETHICS
TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 211-12 (1991); Saver, supra note 101, at 2
("Nonaffiliated members can easily find their own concerns dismissed or
marginalized."); Tilden, supra note 101, at 112-13 (describing a committee in which
the opinion of the "lone surgeon" "carried great weight with the committee" since he
served in "politically powerful capacities within the institution"); Wikler, supra note
96, at 23 ("[T]he administrator who might sit on the committee can control
perquisites, salaries, and career paths for some of the other committee members.").
145. See Chris Hackler & D. Micah Hester, Introduction: What Should a Hospital
Ethics Committee Look and Act Like?, in ETHICS BY COMMITTEE, supra note 54, at 1, 15;
Hoffmann Study, supra note 47, at 111 (finding that roughly one-quarter of surveyed
DC-area ethics committees reported that their recommendations were most influenced
by lawyers); Jaffe, supra note 11, at 414 (suggesting that not only will counsel protect
the interests of the institution, but others are likely to accede); R.L. Lowes, How an
Ethics Panel Can-and Can't Help You, MED. ECON., May 18, 1992, at 166, 173; Weir,
supra note 117, at 106 ("[A]ttorneys ... can easily become a dominant figure in the
committee's review of a case."). But see Kenneth A. De Ville & Gregory L. Hassler,
Handling the Law in Hospital Ethics Committee Deliberations, in ETHICS BY COMMITTEE,
supra note 54, at 267, 272-82 (defending the role of lawyers on HECs).
146. See Bosk & Frader, supra note 87, at 45 ("[Tlhe well-known tendency of legal
opinions to quiet if not quash discussion... may also undermine ideal moral problem
solving."); Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 47, at 323 ("[Clommittee members may
pressure one another ... may fail to consider alternatives ... may be pushed into hasty
decisions ...."); Gregory P. Gramelspacher, Institutional Ethics Committees and Case
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This bandwagon phenomenon means that not all arguments, per-
spectives, or alternatives are considered by the HEC because its mem-
bers do not want to rock the boat, or are content to ride the wave.
1 4 7
Either way, the committee is not likely to consider its less powerful,
less vocal members' input;1 48 for once the more powerful members
hint at or broadcast their position, discourse is hindered and participa-
tion is demobilized.
1 49
Increasingly, this problem is being recognized and addressed in
analogous entities. The Food and Drug Administration, for example,
now requires that the members of its advisory panels vote simultane-
ously.150 Research had showed that when they voted one-by-one,
panel members altered their positions based on how colleagues
voted.1 5 '
Consultation: Is There a Role, 7 IssuEs L. & MED. 73 (1992); Hoffmann, supra note 30,
at 764 (arguing that HECs are too homogenous, too isolated, too cohesive); Lo, supra
note 63, at 48 ("[C]ommittees may inadvertently pressure members to reach
consensus .... "); Saver, supra note 101, at 2 (describing "pressures to conform to the
group" that "discounts critical examination of alternatives and urges consensus among
members even if suboptimal and inaccurate decisions result"); C.A. Schuppli & D.
Fraser, Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Research Ethics Committees, 3 J. MED.
ETHICS 297 (2007); Wilson, supra note 67, at 180 ("[T]he dynamics of group
decisionmaking may inadvertently cause committees to avoid controversial
alternatives that prevent quick agreement."). Cf. Gardiner Harris, British Balance
Benefit vs. Cost of Latest Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2008, at Al ("[G]aps in the idea of
openness remain .... The committee's chairman ... was so intent on keeping the
meeting brief that he told a committee member 'This must be the last question. It
must be relevant. Otherwise you will feel my wrath."').
147. See McCormick, supra note 103, at 154 ("Since ethics committees can easily be
oversensitive to the felt need of consensus, many people distrust them. Such a felt
need, it is asserted, can flatten the sharp differences ... in ethics."); Jordan Silberman
et al., Pride and Prejudice: How Might Ethics Consultation Services Minimize Bias?, AM. J.
BIOETHIcs, Feb. 2007, at 32, 33.
148. See Don Milmore, Hospital Ethics Committees: A Survey in Upstate New York, 18
HEC FORUM 222, 235, 239 (2006); see also Belkin, supra note 72, at 201 (the idea of
asking tough questions "intimidated" the new member of the committee); Edmund G.
Howe, How Ethics Committees May Go Wrong, MID-ATLANTIC ETHICS COMMITTEE NEWSL.,
Spring 2008, at 1, 3 ("Commonly, members 'higher' on the 'medical
hierarchy'... tend to speak most during committee discussions, and others say less, in
part, because they may feel intimidated.").
149. Cf. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. CAMPAIGNS, ELECTIONS, AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 58
(Kenneth F. Warren ed., 2008).
150. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Draft Guidance for FDA Advisory Committee
Members and FDA Staff: Voting Procedures for Advisory Committee Meetings (Nov.
2007), http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/VotingGuidance.html.
151. Id.
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Unfortunately, such a quick-fix procedural rule is unlikely to
work in the case of intramural HECs. Bandwagon thinking does not
corrupt an otherwise neutral HEC, such that one or a few members
with a conflict "infect" the other members. Rather, the bandwagon
phenomenon exacerbates already-existing widespread corruption in
the HEC. Not only do a majority of committee members have a con-
flict of interest, but also the minority is unlikely to check the majority's
self-serving decisions.
B. Intramural HECs Make Biased Decisions
HECs make "corrupted" decisions, driven by the self-interest of
the HEC. But they also make "biased" decisions, reflecting a pattern of
unfairness which disparages certain persons or entire classes of per-
sons-such as those of a particular gender, ethnicity, or age.'1 2 "Non-
white race of the patient and diagnosis of [AIDS] have been cited to be
important reasons to withdraw support. ' 153 Private dispute resolution
generally exaggerates prejudices to minority participants, 154 and the
HEC is no different in this regard.
Bias has been well-documented from the earliest ancestor of the
modern ethics committee, the dialysis allocation committee.' 5 5 In
Seattle, one such committee considered patients' social or moral worth
in deciding whether to allocate scarce dialysis treatment.15 6 By mea-
152. Cf. Hunter, supra note 90, at 108-09.
153. Seetharaman Harihan, Futility of Care Decisions in the Treatment of Moribund
Intensive Care Patients in a Developing Country, 50 CAN. J. ANESTHESIA 847, 850 (2003).
154. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in ADR, 1985 Wis. L. REV 1359, 1375-91(1985); Kimberlee K. Kovach,
Privatization of Dispute Resolution: In the Spirit of Pound, but Mission Incomplete:
Lessons Learned and a Possible Blueprint for the Future, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 1003, 1036
(2007); see also Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Alexander Morgan Capron, How Can
Hospital Futility Policies Contribute to Establishing Standards of Practice?, 9 CAMBRIDGE
Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 524, 528-29 (2000) (arguing that prejudices about the lives of
some patients may affect the committee's judgments; this is the reason for community
representatives).
155. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. Even earlier, therapeutic
abortion committees were established because physicians disagreed about acceptable
indications for abortion. These committees were criticized as a "smokescreen" and as
being susceptible to being set up to "make it do anything you want." HYMAN RODMAN
ET AL., THE ABORTION QUESTION 182 (1987).
156. See R.C. Fox & J.P. SwAzEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL: A SOCIAL VIEW OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS AND DIALYSIS 246-79 (1974); Alexander, supra note 13, at 106 (describing
factors used by "Life or Death Committee"); Robert P. Baker & Victoria Hargreaves,
Organ Donation and Transplantation: A Brief History of Technical and Ethical
Developments, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 32-35 (Wayne Shelton &
John Balint eds., 2001); Moreno, supra note 139, at 898 (observing that even those
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suring applicants in accordance with their own middle class value sys-
tem, committee members chose transplant recipients with similar
backgrounds, rejecting a prostitute, a playboy, and others the commit-
tee perceived as lacking the requisite decency and responsibility. 157
No safeguards apply to the modern ethics committee that would
prevent or mitigate these continuing biases. 158  Because it is often
unconscious, such partiality goes uncorrected.'5 9  "[A] committee
composed completely of health care insiders might, however inadver-
tently, misrepresent the actual needs and concerns of patients and
their family members."' 6 ° Recommendations and decisions will be
applied unevenly because HECs are influenced by the patient's
income, age, gender, and political power, along with the parent institu-
tion's financial status.'
6 1
This bias can be substantially mitigated by attending to the com-
position of the HEC. A HEC will be less biased where it has a larger
membership with a diversity of disciplinary and life perspectives.' 62
Cognizant of this, the DHHS "encourages" federally-funded infant care
"well-meaning people" who initially decided who would receive kidney dialysis "came
to see their inclination toward middle-class patients with backgrounds similar to theirs
as troubling").
157. Baker & Hargreaves, supra note 156, at 34; Fox & SWAzEY, supra note 156, at
232; David Sanders & Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., Medical Advance and Legal Lag:
Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplantation, 15 UCLA L. REV. 357, 378 (1968)..
158. Cf. Bosk & Frader, supra note 87, at 47 ("[A] powerful group of (mostly)
professionals, the IEC, simply chose to support one value system ... over another...
held by those with much less institutional and social power, families of patients.");
Miller, supra note 51, at 205 ("[Sluspicions of complicity, rubber-stamping, or cover-
up . . . may be more common than we think .. ").
159. See Dana & Loewenstein, supra note 107, at 252; Bagenstos, supra note 101, at
5-6.
160. RICHARD E. THOMPSON, SO YOU'RE ON THE ETHICS COMMITTEE? 59 (2007). See
SIGRID FRY-REVERE, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF BIOETHICS COMMITTEES AND CONSULTANTS
100 (1992) ("I have seen the concerns of some individuals be ignored because they are
old, young, women, or health care personnel other than physicians.").
161. See Terese Hudson & Kevin Lumsdon, Are Futile Care Policies the Answer?
Providers Struggle with Decisions for Patients Near the End of Life, 68 HosPs. & HEALTH
NETWORKS, Feb. 1994, at 26, 32; Karl Schupp, Discussion, 89 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 353, 353 (1964) ("It is perfectly obvious when you set up one of these
committees that you can make it do anything you want depending on how many
people you put on it, what their religious convictions are .... ); see also Ann Cook &
Helena Hoas, Ethics and Rural Healthcare: What Really Happens, What Might Help?, AM.
J. BIOETHICS, Apr. 2008, at 52 [hereinafter Ethics and Rural Healthcare].
162. See SUE DILL CALLOWAY, ETHICS, RIGHTS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES: WINNING
STRATEGIES FOR JCAHO AND CMS COMPLIANCE 154 (2005); LINDA FARBER POST ET AL.,
HANDBOOK FOR HEALTH CARE ETHICS COMMITTEES 203 (2007); W.R. Sexson & J.
Thigpen, Organization and Function of a Hospital Ethics Committee, 23 CLINICAL
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providers "to establish an Infant Care Review Committee.' 63 Its regu-
lations advise that such a committee should be "composed of individu-
als representing a broad range of perspectives"'164  including a
"representative of a disability group, or a developmental disability
expert."116 5 Encouragingly, after being swept into a high profile deba-
cle in the Ashley X case, the Seattle Children's Hospital added a disa-
bility rights representative. 166  And some Texas hospitals have
responded to bias charges by appointing disability advocates to their
HECs.
167
Outsiders can reduce prejudices, biases, and cover-ups.
168
Accordingly, most commentators agree that HECs should include rep-
PERINATOLOGY 429 (1996); Laszlo T. Vasvar et al., Hospital Ethics Case Consultations:
Practical Guidelines, 31 COMPREHENSIVE THERAPY 279, 280 (2005).
163. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(a) (2008) (stating the purpose of this recommended
committee is "to assist the health care provider in the development of standards,
policies and procedures for providing treatment to handicapped infants and in making
decisions concerning medically beneficial treatment in specific cases," but also
clarifying that "such committees are not required")
164. Id.
165. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(f)(2)(v) (describing the Department's advisory "Model Infant
Care Review Committee," which proposes mandatory constituency requirements). See
NJ. ADMIN CODE § 10:48B-3.1 (2006) (requiring HECs to include "at least one member
of the committee interested in and experiences with individuals with developmental
disabilities")..
166. See Alicia Oullette, Growth Attenuation, Parental Choice, and the Rights of
Disabled Children: Lessons from the Ashley X Case, 8 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 207,
243 (2008). Ashley was born with static encephalopathy in 1997, leaving her
permanently at an infant mental level. See Ashley's Mom & Dad, Towards a Better
Quality of Life for "Pillow Angels" 1, http://pillowangel.org/Ashley%20Treatment
%20v7.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2009). To better care for Ashley, her parents
consented to a variety of growth attenuation procedures. Id. at 3. These medical
treatments and surgeries were aimed at limiting Ashley's sexual development and
keeping her as "child-like" as possible. See David R. Carlson & Deborah A. Dorfman,
Washington Protection & Advocacy System, Investigative Report Regarding the
"Ashley Treatment" 11 (May 8, 2007), http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/news-1
(follow "Full Report" hyperlink) ("[T]he parents maintain that this procedure was not
intended to ease their work as Ashley's primary supports," yet wrote that it "helped
make 'it more possible to include her in the typical family life and activities that
provide her with needed comfort, closeness, security and love: meal time, car trips,
snuggles, etc."'). These procedures included "the removal of Ashley's uterus and
breast buds and the administration [ofn high doses of hormones." Id. at 7.
167. See Hearing Before the Comm. on State Affairs, 2009 Leg., 81st Sess. (Tex. Apr.
14, 2009) (statement of Suzanne Shepherd, Seton Family of Hospitals).
168. See Bosk & Frader, supra note 87, at 57 ("Membership indicates who can
speak, whose opinions are counted, and whose discounted. Membership may
determine which issues are seen .. "); Daniel Callahan, Ethics by Committee?, HEALTH
PROGRESS, Oct. 1988, at 76 (arguing that membership "can correct for individual
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resentatives from the community. 169 Indeed, in the more regulated
research context, each IRB must include at least one unaffiliated mem-
ber. 17' However, this bare minimum is recognized to be insufficient.
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission, for example, recom-
mended that at least twenty-five percent of any IRB's membership con-
sist of persons from outside the institution.' 7 ' Other countries require
at least fifty percent of an IRB's members to be outsiders. 172
These outside members can help provide the committee with a
solid sense of the surrounding community's moral views. 173 In this
idiosyncrasies and biases"); DeVries & Forsberg, supra note 48, at 256 (expressing
concern over "the over-representation of certain voices"); Hoffmann, supra note 30, at
792; HOSFORD, supra note 10, at 98; A. Nyika et al., Composition, Training Needs, and
Independence of Ethics Review Committees across Africa: Are the Gatekeepers Rising to the
Emerging Challenges, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 189, 192 (2009) ("[A] committee made up of
members from the institution that hosts it, without external members, faces a high risk
of bias in its work."); Ross, supra note 101, at 40 ("The ethicist who comes from
beyond the hospital walls may be able to broaden the committee members' views
because his or her perspective differs from theirs .... ); DAVID ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT
THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION
MAKING (1991); Daniel Wikler, Institutional Agendas and Ethics Committees, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Sept. 1989, at 21 (arguing that HECs should be "insulate[d] from less
noble imperatives in their midst"); Saver, supra note 101, at 2 ("Nonaffiliated members
drawn from the community are supposed to ... provide a check against bias .... );
Silberman et al., supra note 147, at 33 ("One method to offset these biases is to
purposefully create diversity within the members ....").
169. See Heitman, supra note 23, at 420 (diverse age, gender, ethnicity,
socioeconomic); Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 792 ("[A] significant percentage of the
members [should] be from outside of the hospital [and reflect] the patient population
with respect to 'race, age, gender, income, education, and religion"'); id. at 793
(stating that in the event of a simple majority vote, outsiders could get outvoted);
HOSFORD, supra note 10, at 42; Pinnock & Crosthwaite, supra note 59 ("[S]ome health
professional members should be external to the institution to avoid parochialism.");
Jeffrey Spike & Jane Greenlaw, Ethics Consultation: High Ideas or Unrealistic
Expectations, 133 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 56 (2000) (arguing that at least one member
"should not be employed by the institution's administration or malpractice office").
170. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(d) (2005); 21 C.F.R. § 56.107(d) (1991) ("Each IRB shall
include at least one member who is not otherwise affiliated with the institution.");
PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS, IRB GUIDEBOOK (1993) (discussing the
desirability of requiring a diverse background including racial and cultural heritage).
171. NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 12 (2001)..
172. SHERGOLD, supra note 49, at 18. New Zealand IRBs must have fifty percent lay
members and a lay chair. See Pinnock & Crosthwaite, supra note 59, at 1. The UK
requires a one-third "lay member," or community membership. DEP'T OF HEALTH
GOVERNANCE, ARRANGEMENTS FOR NHS RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEES (2001).
173. See Merritt, supra note 64, at 1247; Tex. Dep't of Aging & Disability Servs.,
Ethics Committees & Ethics Process, http://qmweb.dads.state.tx.us/Ethics.asp (last
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sense, the HEC serves much the same role as a jury.1 74 And just as it
is important for a jury to represent a diverse cross-section of the com-
munity, 175 so too is it important for the HEC.
1 76
But most HECs have few outside members.' 7 7 Many HECs have
zero unaffiliated members. 178 Nearly half have only one unaffiliated
member. 179 Moreover, even the few HECs with community members
on the roster may not benefit from their participation. Given the laxity
or absence of quorum or voting requirements, community members
may neither attend nor participate in HEC activities. 180 The picture is
visited Mar. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Texas DADS] ("Using a multidisciplinary ethics
group helps to guard against the tendency to create policies that are based solely [on] a
single perspective. . . . A multidisciplinary committee is better able to reflect the
richness and diversity of the moral life in a pluralistic society.").
174. Cf. Capron, supra note 8, at 182; Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 46, at 48.
175. RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 114-27 (2003).
176. Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (2002) ("The IRB shall be sufficiently qualified
through the experience and expertise of its members, and the diversity of the
members, including consideration of race, gender, and cultural backgrounds ....");
see also id. § 46.107(d); 42 C.F.R. § 121.3(a)(ii) (requiring the Board of Directors of an
Organ Procurement Transplant Network to include "25 percent transplant candidates,
transplant recipients, organ donors, and family members ... [and] to the extent
practicable, the minority and gender diversity of this population").
177. This is not surprising since there is little motivation to serve. HECs almost
never provide compensation, and participating creates social tension and bad feelings.
Ronald G. Spaeth et al., Quality Assurance and Hospital Structure: How the Physician-
Hospital Relationship Affects Quality Measures, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 235, 239-40
(2003)
178. Milmore, supra note 148, at 227-28 (reporting that thirteen percent of upstate
New York facilities surveyed had zero unaffiliated members).
179. Id. at 228 (finding that forty-five percent of upstate New York facilities
surveyed had zero or one unaffiliated members). See Hoffmann Study, supra note 47,
at 108 (finding that one-half of surveyed DC-area ethics committees reported no
community representative); id. at 767 (finding that they also lack broad
representation); Powell, supra note 101 (finding two-thirds of committees had no
community member); Mary Beth West & Joan Mclver Gibson, Facilitating Medical
Ethics Case Review: What Ethics Committees Can Learn from Mediation and Facilitation
Techniques, 1 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 63, 66 (1992).
180. See Cho & Billings, supra note 101, at 155 (observing that lay members "may
not feel competent or empowered to comment critically"); DeVries & Forsberg, supra
note 48, at 253-55; Glantz, supra note 134, at 132; (reporting community members
being outnumbered, intimidated, and underappreciated; and reporting the impact on
the decision process of variable attendance); Schuppli & Fraser, supra note 146, at
294; HOSFORD, supra note 10, at 270-71; R. Pedersen et al., What Is Happening During
Case Deliberation in CECs: A Pilot Study, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 147 (2009) (observing
"content and results" of deliberation were influenced by attendance and composition);
THOMPSON, supra note 160, at 52-53 ("Often, the committee member needed for a
specific agenda item can't make it to a meeting."); id. at 59 ("[W]e [doctors] are very
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much the same for IRBs,' 8 the close cousin of HECs, but IRBs at least
are held to minimum diversity standards. 182
In sum, since most HECs are comprised entirely, or almost
entirely, of healthcare professionals, HECs are upper middle-class and
homogenous across a range of relevant values.' 8 3 They are aligned
with the powerful and are not constituted so as to mitigate bias.' 84
One of the earliest expressions of judicial skepticism toward eth-
ics committees is perhaps the most eloquent. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court explained: "Detached but passionate investiga-
tion and decision ... forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of
the government was created."'8 5 This is "not to be entrusted to any
other group... no matter how highly motivated or impressively consti-
tuted."'18 6 In fact, HECs are often neither highly motivated nor impres-
sively constituted.
C. Intramural HECs Make Careless Decisions
Not only do intramural HECs make corrupt and biased decisions,
but they also lack adequate expertise or training to make those deci-
sions.' 87 HECs should feature a diverse membership if they are to
have the expertise necessary to resolve the medical, ethical, social,
likely to ignore, however inadvertently, the concerns of co-workers like nurses,
technicians, and therapists.").
181. See Saver, supra note 101, at 2 ("[O]nly a token number of nonaffiliated
members serve on most IRBs.").
182. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (2002) ("The IRB shall be sufficiently qualified through
... the diversity of the members, including consideration of race, gender, and cultural
backgrounds. . . . If an IRB regularly reviews research that involves a vulnerable
category of subjects, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, or handicapped or
mentally disabled persons, consideration shall be given to the inclusion of one or more
individuals who are knowledgeable about and experienced in working with these
subjects."); 21 C.F.R. § 56.107(c) (2002) ("Each IRB shall include at least one member
whose primary concerns are in the scientific area and at least one member whose
primary concerns are in nonscientific areas."); id. § 56.107(d) ("Each IRB shall
include at least one member who is not otherwise affiliated with the institution ... ").
183. See Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 765-66, 782-83; Powell, supra note 101, at 83;
DeVries & Forsberg, supra note 48, at 253-54.
184. See Milmore, supra note 148; DeVries & Forsberg, supra note 48, at 256
(describing the "over-representation of certain voices").
185. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435
(Mass. 1977).
186. Id.
187. See Willing, But Waiting, supra note 116 ("[T]oo many ethics committees are
bare-bones efforts ....").
292 [Vol. 31:257
2009] MULTI-INSTITUTIONAL HEALTHCARE ETHICS COMMITTEES 293
religious, and philosophical issues surrounding complex medical
decisions. 188
A diverse committee "can identify a greater range of value[s] and
options. " 19 Accordingly, the committee needs representatives from
different disciplines. 190 It should ideally include physicians (including
specialists in critical care and palliative care), hospital administrators,
clergy, attorneys, social workers, nurses, psychiatrists, psychologists,
patient advocates, philosophers, and representatives of a disability
group.
19 1
188. See, e.g., IowA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.3(1) (2008) (requiring local substitute
medical decision-making boards to include a physician, a nurse, or a psychologist in
addition to either a social worker or a licensed attorney); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.
§ 19-372(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring committee to include a physician, a
nurse, and a social worker); NJ. ADMIN. CODE §§ 10:48B-2.1, -3.1 (2006); Am. Acad. of
Pediatrics: Comm. on Bioethics, Institutional Ethics Committees, 107 PEDIATRICS 205,
208 (2001) ("Ideally, the members of an IEC encompass a wide range of clinical
experiences, personal backgrounds, and professional perspectives .... "); Hoffmann,
supra note 30, at 764-65 (comparing HECs to to juries as being committees that are
"broadly representative of the values within our society"); id. at 785 (describing the
"advantage of a broadly constituted committee"); Wilson & Gallegos, supra note 48, at
373 ("The members ... should be chosen from a wide variety of
perspectives ... wisdom, life experiences, knowledge of options .... ").
189. Jaffe, supra note 11, at 407. See also Banerjee & Kuschner, supra note 2, at 141
("Professional diversity among members ensures a broader knowledge base .... ");
Peter Winn & Jacque Cook, Ethics Committees in Long Term Care, 8 ANN LONG TERM
CARE 35, 40 (2000) ("The number of members of an ethics committee should be
sufficient . . . to promote divergent points of view, to allow it to function with
absenteeism and to be both multidisciplinary and representative.").
190. See, e.g., NJ. ADMIN. CODE § 8:43G-5.1(h) (2006) ("The hospital shall assure
participation by individuals with medical, nursing, legal, social work, and clergy
backgrounds."); id. 10:48B-3.1; Ronald E. Cranford & A. Edward Doudera, The
Emergence of Institutional Ethics Committees, in CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 7, at
5, 15; Norman Fost & Ronald E. Cranford, Hospital Ethics Committees: Administrative
Aspects, 253 JAMA 2687, 2689 (1985). See UNESCO DECLARATION, supra note 99;
Assoc. OF AM. MED. COLLS., PROTECTING SUBJECTS, PRESERVING TRUST, PROMOTING
PROGRESS 11 (2002), available at http://www.aamc.org/research/coi/2002coireport.pdf
("[Tihe inclusion of public members will increase the transparency of the committee's
deliberations and enhance the credibility of its determinations."); THOMPSON, supra
note 160, at 59; Eleanor Updale, The Challenge of Lay Membership of Clinical Ethics
Committees, CLINICAL ETHICS, Mar. 2006, at 60.
191. Fost & Cranford, supra note 190; Having et al., supra note 42, at 318; Jaffe,
supra note 11, at 410-15. Maryland requires four members: a physician not directly
involved in the patient's care, a registered nurse not directly involved, a social worker,
and the CEO or a designee. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 19-372(a)(1) (LexisNexis
2008). Heitman is more specific, suggesting physicians of various specialties (critical
care, neurology, psychiatry), nurses of various specialties, discharge planners, and
physical and respiratory therapists. Heitman, supra note 23, at 420-23. Some
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While some HECs consist of members representing a broad array
of disciplinary perspectives,' 92 many others, especially those in rural
areas, lack multidisciplinary professionals. 193 Some suggest that the
optimal number of members is around fifteen. 194 A recent survey of
upstate New York facilities shows the average ethics committee has
thirteen members. 195 But elsewhere, many HECs have three or fewer
members.
19 6
HEC composition varies dramatically from institution to institu-
tion. In 1980, the New York Court of Appeals derogatorily described
the ethics committee as an "ill-defined, amorphous body."' 97 During
the subsequent three decades, HECs have failed to acquire any addi-
tional definition or shape.
Commentators have long observed that the quality of HECs varies
tremendously' 98 This is to be expected, as HECs "have no established
committees actually have this much diversity. See, e.g., Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med.
Ctr., Ethics Committee, http://www.dhmc.org/webpage.cfm?site-id=2&org-id=512
(last visited Mar. 17, 2009). One commentator suggests that, because end-of-life care
for animals is often more humane, a veterinarian should be on HECs. Doctor Gifford
Jones, Euthanasia Debate, TORONTO SUN, Feb. 7, 2009.
192. Fox et al., supra note 59, at 17.
193. William A. Nelson, Ethics Programs in Small Rural Hospitals, HEALTHCARE
EXECUTIVE, Nov.-Dec. 2007, at 30, 30.
194. See Vasvar et al., supra note 162; see also Jeffrey Spike & Jane Greenlaw, Ethics
Consultation: High Ideals or Unrealistic Expectations?, 133 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 55
(2000). One result of larger size may be that members "never become completely at
easy with one another," though it might be desirable that "everyone be a little bit on
edge." BELKIN, supra note 72, at 71.
195. Milmore, supra note 148, at 227-28. See NJ. ADMIN. CODE § 10:48B-3.1 (2006)
(requiring "a membership of no less than five individuals optimally drawn from
different disciplines").
196. Id.; Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 46, at 48. See Martin L. Smith et al., Texas
Hospitals' Experience with the Texas Advance Directives Act, 35 CRITICAL CARE MED.
1271, 1272 (2007) (remarking that fifty-six percent of surveyed hospitals had a
"medical appropriateness review committee distinct from their ethics committee" and
that "the number of members was most frequently 1-5"). Compare MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN § 19-372(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring only four members), with 25
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 405.60(b) (2008) (requiring seven members, two of whom must
be unaffiliated). Another survey in the Washington, D.C. area showed pretty much the
same thing. Hoffmann Study, supra note 47, at 107 (finding that the size of surveyed
D.C.-area ethics committees ranged from four to thirty, with an average around
thirteen). See Csikai, supra note 44, at 105; Starr, supra note 139, at 35 (finding
seventy-five percent of surveyed hospitals "have between ten and twenty members with
half of the committees having exactly fifteen members").
197. In re Eichner, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 549 (1980).
198. See, e.g., George J. Annas, At Law: Ethics Committees: From Ethical Comfort to
Ethical Cover, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1991, at 18, 19 (stating that
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training curriculum ... [or] fixed job descriptions."' 99 A recent survey
shows that fewer than twenty percent of ethics committee members
have formal training in bioethics. 20 0 At least one-third of HECs, espe-
cially those in rural institutions,2 ° ' have zero trained members.20 2 Pro-
fessor Nancy Dubler is "horrified at the number of people out there
who don't have appropriate training" and wishes she could just "stamp
institutional ethics committees "vary widely in terms of purpose, composition,
authority, and resources"); Apel, supra note 97, at 43 ("[W]hether or not an ethics
committee consultation adds anything of value to the deliberations concerning access
issues appears to depend on the luck of the draw."); DeVries & Forsberg, supra note
48, at 253-55; Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 47, at 321; Fox et al., supra note 59, at
20 ("[T]here appear to be wide variations in practice .... "); Hoffmann, supra note 30,
at 762 ("The quality of ethics committees is likely to vary considerably .... Not all
institutions have the resources and expertise necessary to operate a committee .... "
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Laura Williamson, The Quality of Bioethics
Debate: Implications for Clinical Ethics Committees, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 357 (2008);
Wilson & Gallegos, supra note 48, at 371; Wilson, supra note 67, at 177; Wolf, supra
note 142, at 94 ("[Clommittees vary enormously in quality .... "); Wolf 1991, supra
note 47, at 808 ("[A]n ethics committee is not an ethics committee is not an ethics
committee.").
199. James M. Dubois, The Varieties of Clinical Consulting Experience, 15 HEC
FORUM 303, 307 (2003). See Core Competencies for Ethics Consultations, MED. ETHICS
ADVISOR, Nov. 1, 2008 ("[Tlhere's no clearly regulated national standards. ... )
(quoting Ellen Fox); Fleming, supra note 87, at 251 ("Presently, there are no unified
standards of clinical ethics education, training, or practice."); John D. Lantos, Complex
Ethics Consultations: Cases That Haunt Us, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 738, 738 (2009);
Giles R. Scofield, What Is Medical Ethics Consultation?, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 95
(2008) (severely criticizing the field and concluding that "the field of medical ethics
consultation is, if not an ethics disaster, a disaster waiting to happen"). On the other
hand, this situation is at least being addresses. See Mark Kuczewski & Kayhan Parsi,
The Making of a Clinical Ethicist: Reviewing the Big Questions, HEALTH PROGRESS, Mar.-
Apr. 2009, at 42.
200. Milmore, supra note 148, at 229-30, 236.
201. See Nelson, supra note 193, at 30; Denise Niemira et al., Multi-Institutional
Ethics Committees, 1 HEC FORUM 77, 77 (1989).
202. Milmore, supra note 148, at 229-30, 236. See Carol Bayley, Ethics Committees
DV: Failure to Thrive, 18 HEC FORUM 357, 357 (2006) ("They frequently have no
training, no administrative support, and no budget."); Fox et al., supra note 59, at 17;
Hamel, supra note 61, at 13 (describing the Catholic Healthcare Association's 2008
survey as finding the overwhelming majority of HEC members have no formal
training); Thomas May, The Breadth of Bioethics: Core Areas of Bioethics Education for
Hospital Ethics Committees, 26 J. MED. & PHIL. 101 (2001). Cf. Edith Valdez Martinez
et al., Institutional Ethics Committees in Mexico: The Ambiguous Boundary between
Health Care Ethics and Research Ethics, 24 PAN-AMERICAN MAG. PUB. HEALTH (2008)
(finding fewer than three percent of Mexican HEC members had at least a masters
degree and fewer than twenty percent had any training whatsoever).
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her foot and make them go away."'20 3 Much "half-baked ethics analy-
sis '"204 is conducted without reference to or reliance on settled
bioethics principles.20 5
The situation is little better in the research context with respect to
IRBs.2°6 Indeed, IRBs are both better developed and better regulated
than HECs. 20 7 Just as HECs mediate and adjudicate treatment dis-
putes in the clinical context, IRBs are positioned between investigators
and human subjects in the research context. IRBs are more often, more
clearly, and more formally empowered to serve this gatekeeping role.
Yet, the IRB members often have no more training than HEC
members.208
Courts have noted the lack of ethics committee training. For
example, in In re Edna M.F., the Chief Justice of Wisconsin wrote a
concurring opinion specifically to call out that the ethics committee in
that case "functioned without either a shared body of rules or training
in ethics.
20 9
203. Ruth Shalit, When We Were Philosopher Kings, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 29, 1997.
See Aulisio & Arnold, supra note 53, at 419 ("[E]thics committees are staffed
primarily by health professionals and others who have had little or no formal training
in either clinical ethics or conflict resolution."); Dubler & Blustein, supra note 87, at
35 ("It has been a quietly growing scandal... [that] [m]any who now participate or
direct bioethics consultation have little if any formal training."); id. ("[C]ilinical ethics
consultation is a field without adequate standards, training, or quality review."); Laura
Landro, Life and Death: Helping Families on Big Questions, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2008, at
DI.
204. Evan G. DeRenzo, The Imperative of Training for Ethics Consultations, MID-
ATLANTIC ETHICS COMMITTEE NEWSL., Summer 2000, at 1, 1.
205. While necessary, substantive bioethics knowledge is not sufficient. HEC
members should also have expertise in: (i) information gathering, (ii) conceptual
clarification and analysis, (iii) normative analysis, and (iv) facilitation or mediation.
See Aulisio & Arnold, supra note 53, at 421. Other core competencies may be required
in Catholic organizations. Hamel, sputa note 61, at 19-20.
206. See Hoffman & Berg, supra note 131, at 375; Saver, supra note 101, at 1 ("Many
IRBs lack sufficient resources and expertise .... "). On the other hand, the problem is
now under serious regulatory investigation. Request for Information and Comments
on the Implementation of Human Subjects Protection Training and Education
Programs, 73 Fed. Reg. 37,460 (July 1, 2008).
207. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 56.107(a) (2008) ("Each IRB shall . . . be sufficiently
qualified through the experience and expertise of its members .... ").
208. See, e.g., Request for Information and Comment on the Implementation of
Human Subjects Protection Training and Education Programs, 73 Fed. Reg. 37,460
(July 1, 2008).
209. In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 495 (Wis. 1997).
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In In re Gianelli, the parents of a seriously ill fourteen-year-old boy
asked to stop his life-sustaining treatment.210 The boy had Hunter's
Syndrome, a serious genetic disorder that would be fatal within two
years.211 He was dependent on a ventilator and a feeding tube, but was
alert and could sense his surroundings. 21 2 "The members of the ethics
committee independently came to the conclusion that the mother's
decision was an ethical one."21 3 Nevertheless, the court refused to
credit the HEC's opinion because the only physician on the committee
"did not have experience with Hunter's Syndrome and was not well
versed in [this patient's] care and condition. "214
Of course, not every member of an HEC needs bioethics or media-
tion training.215 Sometimes an HEC needs leaders-people who are
respected and who create a sense of enthusiasm.216 It needs people "to
enhance the credibility" of the committee and its "standing within the
institution. 21 7  And the HEC needs community members.
2 "8  But
there is little danger of overstatement here. The overwhelming major-
ity of HEC members continue to have no bioethics or mediation
219training.
D. Intramural HECs Make Arbitrary Decisions
We have seen that HEC decisions are often corrupt, biased, and
careless. In addition, HEC decisions are frequently arbitrary. Admit-
tedly, some ethics committees do operate in a formal manner, pursu-
ant to detailed bylaws. Maryland law requires that each HEC have a
written procedure by which it is convened. 220 But those requirements
210. In re Gianelli, 834 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (2007).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 626.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 629-30. See id. at 625 (noting that the physician was "serving in an
administrative position at the hospital" and the "nurse on the team was not a pediatric
nurse").
215. FRY-REVERE, supra note 160, at 95.
216. Heitman, supra note 23, at 420; William A. Nelson, Evaluating Your Ethics
Committees, HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVE, Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 48, 49 (discussing desirability
of committee leadership).
217. Susan Fox Buchanan et al., A Mediation/Medical Advisory Panel Model for
Resolving Disputes About End-of-Life, 13 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 188, 201 (2002); Jaffe, supra
note 11, at 411
218. See supra Part II.C.
219. Milmore, supra note 148 (stating only nineteen percent of ethics committee
members in upstate New York facilities surveyed had training and twenty-nine percent
of committees had no trained members).
220. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-371(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2008).
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are quite thin.221 For example, a Maryland ethics director explained
that how a vote turns out often may depend on a number of "highly
arbitrary" factors such as "who happens to be present at a given
meeting.
2 22
Outside Maryland, HECs operate in an even more informal and
casual manner.223 In In re Edna M.F., for example, Chief Justice Shir-
ley Abrahamson criticized a La Crosse, Wisconsin ethics committee for
failing to prepare formal minutes, for having no shared body of rules,
and for failing to prepare a report.224 Similarly, in Rideout v. Hershey
Medical Center, some ethics committee members at the Hershey Medi-
cal Center could not even recall a recent discussion of a case in which
the committee authorized the treating physician to unilaterally with-
draw a ventilator from a three-year-old girl over her parents'
objections.225
In In re Martin, a wife wanted to withdraw life-sustaining medical
treatment from her husband, Michael Martin, who was in a minimally
conscious state.226 The HEC agreed with her that withdrawal was the
appropriate action.227 Aware that HEC opinions have historically been
quite persuasive evidence of the propriety of difficult healthcare deci-
sions, Martin's wife offered the HEC recommendation to the court.228
But the court placed little weight on the recommendation, as the HEC
221. Id. § 19-372(a)(3) (requiring consultation of specific parties); id. § 19-372(b)
(allowing petitioner to be accompanied).
222. Howe, supra note 148, at 1. See Sigrid Fry-Revere, Some Suggestions for Holding
Bioethics Committees and Consultants Accountable, 2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS
449, 452-53 (1993).
223. FRY-REVERE, supra note 160, at 100 (observing that many HECs operate
"without knowledge of the key decision makers such as the patient, the attending
physician, or the patient's surrogate"); Hoffmann Study, supra note 47, at 111
(reporting that of surveyed D.C.-area ethics committees, ninety percent operate by
consensus and seven percent by majority); Wilson, supra note 67, at 177. Cf. Hunter,
supra note 90, at 109 n.62 (observing that HECs suffer from process deficiencies);
SHERGOLD, supra note 49, at 23 (observing that IRB "internal processes of decision
making have been likened to a 'black box' and that the soundness of judgments has
been questioned.").
224. In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 495 (Wis. 1997).
225. See Rideout v. Hershey Med. Ctr., 30 Pa. D. & C.4th 57 (C.C.P. 1995); see also
Alison Delsite, Suit Against Hershey Raises Touchy Questions, THE PATRIOT, Mar. 8, 1996,
at Al.
226. In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995).
227. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Martin v. Major, No. 95-821, 1995 WL
17035828, at *3 (Nov. 20, 1995).
228. Id.
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had never consulted other members of Michael's family in producing
it.229
Courts are good at observing procedural regularities, 230 and gen-
erally provide litigants a principled, thorough review of the issues in
dispute.2 3 If HECs purport to substitute for courts, they must also
follow procedural guidelines.23 2 HECs must base their decisions on
reasonable rationales that appeal to relevant evidence, reasons, and
principles.233
Lamenting this procedural laxity, commentators warned that
reviewing courts would start looking more closely at HEC minutes to
see how carefully their meetings were conducted.234 This prediction
was accurate, as courts today are more carefully scrutinizing the bases
for HEC recommendations, being increasingly unwilling to continue
their tradition of deference to ethics committees.235
229. In re Martin, 504 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
230. See generally Richard Abel, Informalism: A Tactical Equivalent to Law?, 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 375, 383 (1985); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality:
Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV.
1359, 1398-99 (1985); William H. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics,
19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 384, 385 (1985).
231. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 14, at 159 ("Uludicial decisionmaking is
(ideally, at least) principled-with like cases decided alike and pains taken to develop
reasoned bases for decisions.").
232. Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 765 ("[Eithics committees often lack substantive
guidelines for decision making .... ."); Wolf, supra note 142, at 94 ("[E]thics
committees now wield sufficient influence over the fate of real patients[;] . . . they
must do so responsibly, accountably, and with some guiding rules ....
Committees ... are bound by no commonly accepted rules of reasoning or system of
precedent ....").
233. M. Sheehan, Should Research Ethics Committees Meet in Public?, 34 J. MED.
ETHICS 631, 632 (2008).
234. JAMES F. DRANE, CLINICAL BIOETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN MEDICAL ETHICAL
DECISION MAKING 99, 117 (1994) (predicting that courts will scrutinize the qualities of
HECs, including their longevity, preparation, and grounding in ethics). See Fleetwood
& Unger, supra note 44, at 321; Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 46, at 63 ("Courts
may wish to give different weight to committee recommendations as ethics committees
vary significantly in composition, experience, expertise, and procedures."); Jaffe, supra
note 11, at 427 ("The more uniform and formal the committee procedures and the
more open its processes, the more likely that a court will give this evidence substantial
weight and deference.").
235. See, e.g., Wendland v. Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 155 (Cal. 2001) (ignoring
recommendation of 20-member HEC that agreed with patient's wife determining
appropriateness of life support withdrawal without consulting patient's mother or
sister); In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992); Martin v. Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 413
(Mich. 1995) (disagreeing with committee's recommendation); In re Gianelli, 834
N.Y.S.2d 623, 630 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007); In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 573 (Wis.
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E. The Problems of Intramural HECs Are Worth Fixing
HEC decisions are often corrupt, biased, careless, and arbitrary.
Yet I write not to bury HECs but to praise them. HECs are ubiquitous.
They can and do serve an important role in our healthcare system.236
The modern HEC as an institution is not inherently flawed; rather, it is
a victim of neglect. There are at least three significant reasons to repair
HECs rather than replace them altogether.
First, HECs are well-entrenched in out healthcare infrastructure.
They are recommended by professional medical associations;237 prac-
tically required by accreditation standards; 238 and often literally
required by regulation and statutes.239 Scrapping the HEC would be
not only an unpopular idea among medical professionals, but also
legally unrealistic.
Second, the trend, both in and out of healthcare, is for businesses
to fashion internal systems for conflict management and resolution. 240
Like other engines of "internal dispute resolution," HECs have signifi-
cant advantages over extra-institutional arbiters. 241  They are cheaper
1997). On the other hand, where the HEC's process is more careful, courts are more
prepared to defer. See, e.g., In re I.H.V., [2008] A.B.Q.B. 250, '1 31 (Can. Ct. Q.B.),
available at http://www.albertacourts.ab.ca/jdb/2003-/qb/civil/2008/2008abqbO250.
pdf ("I am not satisfied that we as judges should be replacing our opinion with that of
the medical community that has obtained extensive unbiased third party analysis,
including opinions from medical ethicists . . . not associated with this health
region ....").
236. See Len Doyal, Clinical Ethics Committees and the Formulation of Health Care
Policy, J. MED. ETHICS, Apr. 2001, at i44, i44 ("In North America, CECs
have ... become an integral part of the organizational infrastructure ...."); Marshall
B. Kapp, Handbook for Health Care Ethics Committees, 9 CARE MANAGEMENT J. 38, 38
(2008) ("[T]he IEC device has become a common and valuable fixture throughout the
current American healthcare enterprise . . . . [F]ormal resort to the judicial system for
a legally definitive adjudication is very rarely desirable from anyone's perspective.");
Wilson, supra note 67, at 173 ("HECs have become a fixture ...."); Wilson &
Gallegos, supra note 48, at 357 ("[H]ospital ethics committees are so ingrained in
American medicine ... ").
237. See, e.g., AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § E-9.1115 (2001); Am. Med. Dirs.
Ass'n, Resolution D97: Ethics Committees in Nursing Homes, http://www.amda.com/
governance/resolutions/d97.cfm (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
238. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
240. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why Hasn't the World Gotten to Yes? An Appreciation
and Some Reflections, 22 NEGOTIATION J. 485 (2006).
241. CAROLYNN M. RYAN, INTERNAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2 (1998); NORMAN DANIELS,
JUST HEALTH CARE: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 132 (2008) ("With a well-developed
internal dispute resolution process, patients or clinicians adversely affected by
decisions may be less inclined to seek the help of authorities .... Even if litigation
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and faster than courts.242 And committee members are usually con-
cerned about the patient's welfare and familiar with the medical treat-
ment context.243 Consequently, many are urging an expanded role for
HECs.
2 4 4
Third, for ongoing ethical controversies such as "medical futil-
ity,"245 HECs have been the most constructive mechanism yet
devised.246 Though the bioethics community cannot conclusively
address the substantive issues raised by some treatment disputes, the
HEC can at least address the procedure through which such conflicts
are settled.247
So while HECs are riddled with problems relating to indepen-
dence, composition, and resources, they should not be replaced, but
improved upon.248 Improvement does not mean stripping them of
decision-making power, but helping them exercise that power bet-
and legislation are pursued, however, the presence of a strong internal dispute
resolution mechanism can lead to improved external deliberation."). But see Wilson,
supra note 67, at 172.
242. See infra notes 73 -85 and accompanying text.
243. Lynne, supra note 10, at 24.
244. Jorgensen, supra note 79, at 27 (arguing that, with respect to electroconvulsive
therapy, HECs "could provide meaningful recommendations without the necessity of a
judicial hearing" and "assume the role of hearing officers").
245. See Barbara Resnick, Ethics and Medical Futility: The Healthcare Professional's
Role, in HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF GERONTOLOGICAL NURSE
PRACTITIONERS 25TH ANNUAL MEETING (2006), available at http://www.medscape.com/
viewarticle/550278 ("Medical futility is described as proposed therapy that should not
be performed because available data have shown that it will not improve the patient's
medical condition.").
246. FRY-REVERE, supra note 160, at 11; MORENO, supra note 19, at 93-96 ("[HECs]
promise a politically attractive way for moral controversies to be procedurally
accommodated."); McCormick, supra note 103, at 152 ("[C]ommittees have been seen
as appropriate vehicles to achieve a livable policy-to permit yet to control
[sterilization]."); RODMAN ET AL., supra note 155, at 182 ("[A]bortion committees
clearly served a purpose for hospitals and physicians in a situation where little
consensus could be achieved .... ").
247. See NORMAN DANIELS & JAMES E. SABIN, SETTING LIMITS FAIRLY 4 (2002) ("When
we lack consensus on principles ... we may nevertheless find a process or procedure
that most can accept as fair to those who are affected by such decisions."); Thaddeus
Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse Life-
Sustaining Treatment, 71 TENN. L. REV. 1, 68-69, 79-80 (2007)..
248. Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 761 n.93 ("This article ... assumes that these
committees have the potential to work well and provide some benefit to their users.");
Wolf, supra note 142, at 93 ("Instead of offering the more radical proposal to move
case review out of the institution ... my proposal pursues a middle course .... In
matters of health care the fox always guards the chicken coop .... ").
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ter.249 Specifically, form must follow function.25 ° Since the function
of HECs has evolved from one of merely advising on, clarifying, and
facilitating decision making to one of actually making the decisions,
the form of HECs must evolve as well.25
III. THE MULTI-INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEE
I contend that the corruption, bias, disparate expertise, and proce-
dural problems associated with intramural committees are largely a
byproduct of their intramural character. In Part IV, I will explain how
a multi-institutional ethics committee (MI-HEC) can substantially over-
come these four problems. But first, in this Part, I describe the nature
and prevalence of MI-HECs.
There are four basic types of MI-HECs. First, some take the form
of regional networks of ethics committees-the network model. These
committees operate like professional associations, serving as an educa-
tional resource for their intramural HEC members. Second, some
institutions follow an extramural model. Institutions that are either
unable or unwilling to form their own intramural HEC may instead
contract with another (usually larger academic) facility to provide
those services. Third, some hospitals retain their own intramural
HECs but also join with a multi-institutional committee that serves in a
quasi-appellate capacity in particularly difficult cases. Finally, some
healthcare institutions join together to create a shared multi-institu-
tional committee that they use instead of their own intramural
HECs.252
A. The Network Model
Intramural HEC members may feel a sense of isolation and a
desire to meet with members of other committees to share experiences
and to provide encouragement.25 3 To meet this need and to help insti-
249. Cf. McCormick, supra note 103, at 153 ("Because these committees are here to
stay and are worthwhile, we should face their problems and objections unflinchingly
and in their strongest form.").
250. Cf. IVAR HOLM, IDEAS AND BELIEFS IN ARCHITECTURE AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGN 160
(2006); PHILLIP STEADMAN, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIGNS: BIOLOGICAL ANALOGY IN
ARCHITECTURE AND THE APPLIED ARTS 56, 183 (rev. ed. 2008).
251. Cf. Robertson, supra note 116, at 89.
252. See Miller, supra note 51, at 207 (describing the "informal, curbstone
discussion amongst colleagues from different institutions").
253. See Michael Parker, The Development of Clinical Ethics Support in the United
Kingdom, 18 NOTIZIE DI POLITEIA 82, 82 (2002).
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tutions develop new HECs, many HEC member networks have been
established.
Across the United States a number of regional ethics committee
networks serve many HEC members.254 Particularly active among
these are (i) the Kansas City Area Ethics Committee Consortium,
25
(ii) the West Virginia Network of Ethics Committees,2 6 (iii) the Mary-
land Healthcare Ethics Committee Network,25 7 (iv) the New Hamp-
254. See Anita Tarzian et al., The Role of Healthcare Ethics Committee Networks in
Shaping Healthcare Policy and Practices, 18 HEC FORUM 85 (2006). See, e.g., Howard
Brody et al., Medical Ethics Resource Network of Michigan, 3 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH CARE
ETHICS 271 (1992); Patrick M. Dunn, The Health Ethics Network of Oregon: A Model To
Enhance Healthcare Ethics Committee Collaboration, 4 HEC FORUM 135 (1992);
Christopher, supra note 47; Fletcher & Hoffmann, supra note 17, at 337 nn.38-40;
Thomasine Kushner, Networks Across America, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1989,
at 24; S. Mass, Orange County Bioethics Network, 2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH CARE ETHICS
109 (1993); B. Minogue, The Bioethics Network of Ohio (BENO), 2 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTH CARE ETHICS 107 (1993); T. Sagin, The Philadelphia Story, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 24; Geoffrey D. Seidel, Assessing the Need for Bioethics Networks,
96 PA. MED. 16 (1993); Edward M. Spencer et al., Ethics Programs at Community
Hospitals in Virginia, 119 VA. MED. Q. 178 (1992); Jay M. Baruch, What Is the Ocean
State Ethics Network?, http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Center forBiomedical_
Ethics/whatis.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) ("there was a need for a collaborative
forum" because HECs in Rhode Island were "functioning at varying degrees of
sophistication"); Greater Dayton Area Hosp. Ass'n Ethics Consortium, http://gdaha.
org (last visited Mar. 30, 2009); N. Tex. Bioethics Network, http://www3.
utsouthwestern.edu/ethics/NorthTexasBiomedicalEthicsNetwork.htm (last visited
Mar. 17, 2009). It seems reports of the death of ethics committee networks have been
greatly exaggerated. See, e.g., Arthur R. Derse, Whither Ethics Committee Networks?,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1997, at 47.
255. Ctr. for Practical Bioethics, Kansas City Area Ethics Committee Consortium,
http://www.practicalbioethics.org/cpb.aspx?pgID=936 (last visited Mar. 30, 2009)
("[T]he consortium is the largest and longest operating network of its kind in the
nation.").
256. W. Va. Univ., West Virginia Network of Ethics Committees, http://www.hsc.
wvu.edu/chel/wvnec (last visited Mar. 30, 2009) ("[Tlhe WVNEC is considered to be
one of the largest and most successful ethics committee networks."); A.H. Moss, West
Virginia Network of Ethics Committees, 2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 108 (1993).
257. Univ. of Md. Sch. Law, Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network, http:/
/www.law.umaryland.edu/programs/health/mhecn/index.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2009).
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shire-Vermont Hospital Ethics Committee Network, 25 8 and (v) the
University of Pittsburgh Consortium Ethics Program.
259
Ethics committee networks primarily provide educational materi-
als and model policies for their member committees.260 They hold
conferences and distribute materials such as newsletters and
videos.261 Some networks provide an even more "integrated and con-
tinuous educational program. '2 62 In this fashion, a network may
enhance the informational and educational resources of its member
HECs. The network enables its constituent HECs to better serve their
parent institutions, but in so doing it "never supplants" these commit-
tees.263 The individual committee members "retain an autonomous
identity within their institutions. "264
Networks help intramural HECs address their resource deficien-
cies and training problems.265 But networks do not directly address
such committees' independence and composition problems.266 Moreo-
ver, unlike the extramural, quasi-appellate, and joint MI-HEC models,
the network model does not engage its constituents with specific cases
from member institutions. Consequently, the network model holds
comparatively less promise for overcoming the problems of the intra-
mural HEC.267
258. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., Ethics Committee: What We Do, http://www.
dhmc.org/webpage.cfm?orgjid=512 (follow "What We Do" hyperlink) (last visited
Mar. 26, 2009) (explaining the Ethics Committee represents the HECs of 40 hospitals
and other healthcare centers).
259. Unive. of Pittsburgh, Consortium Ethics Program, http://www.pitt.edu/-cep/
(last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
260. Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 46, at 50; Miller, supra note 51, at 206-07;
Nelson, supra note 193, at 32; Tarzian et al., supra note 254, at 86.
261. See sources cited supra note 260.
262. Rosa Lynn Pinkus, The Consortium Ethics Program: An Approach to Establishing
a Permanent Regional Ethics Network, 7 HEC FORUM 13, 14 (1995).
263. Niemira et al., supra note 201, at 77.
264. Id. Confusingly, some networks, like the Sonoma County Bioethics Network,
are referred to as "joint ethics committees." See Texas DADS, supra note 173.
265. See Greg S. Loeben, Networking Health Care Ethics Committees: Benefits and
Obstacles, 11 HEC FORUM 226, 227-28 (1999) ("[T]he benefits of HEC networking
[include] . . . educational materials and methods ... policy standardization .. .[and]
exposure to problems that other institutions are currently facing, but which have not
yet surfaces at one's own institution.").
266. See Ken S. Meece, Long-Term Care Bioethics Committees: A Cooperative Model, 2
HEC FORUM 127, 130 (1990) (envisioning teams "educated jointly" but "meeting
individually for consultation on individual cases" such that "[t]he cooperative would
only be an educational and policy-review center").
267. Networks are also useful for non-institutional HECs. For example, in 1993,
independent IRBs formed the Consortium of Independent IRBs (CIRB), to provide a
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B. The Extramural Model
Large hospitals and academic medical centers are likely to have a
functioning HEC.268 Conversely, small hospitals269 and other facilities
like nursing homes and dialysis centers are less likely to have an
HEC.2 70 It may be quite challenging for small institutions, lacking suf-
ficient resources and organizational experience, to form an intramural
committee or to work "horizontally" to form a joint-also known as
"shared" -committee. 27 1
It is often easier for these institutions to work "vertically,"
allowing "a recognized ethics center, tertiary care hospital, or state
medical society [to] provide the initial leadership. 272 Indeed, the Joint
central discussion area concerning public policies and issues. See Heath, supra note
131.
268. See Am. Med. Dirs. Ass'n, supra note 256 ("Smaller facilities may not have the
personnel or the volume to maintain an ethics committee."); Fox et al., supra note 59,
at 15; Hoffmann Study, infra note 47, at 116 ("[L]arge hospitals ... and teaching
hospitals are more likely to have ethics committees than small non-teaching
hospitals."); Gonsoulin, supra note 46, at 331-32; Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 757
n.70.
269. See Ethics and Rural Healthcare, supra note 161, at 52; Cook & Hoas, supra note
45. See also Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 762.
270. See Meece, supra note 266, at 127; How Regional Long-Term Care Ethics
Committees Improve End-of-Life Care, STATE INITIATIVES IN END-OF-LIFE CARE, Jan. 2000,
at 1, 1 [hereinafter STATE INITIATIVES] ("Although nursing homes and other long-term
care facilities are regularly confronted with wrenching bioethical dilemmas, few have
the resources to establish real, in-house ethics committees."); Am. Med. Dirs. Ass'n,
The Role of a Facility Ethics Committee in Decision-Making at the End of Life, http://
amda.com/governance/whitepapers/ethicscommittee.cfm (last visited Jan. 18, 2009);
Univ. of Fla. Coll. of Med., Clinical Ethics and Organizational Ethics Consultation
Services for Hospitals & Nursing Homes, http://chfm.ufl.edu/programs/blmp/
blmp.consult.shtml (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) ("For many hospitals it is simply not
cost-effective to maintain an active ethics committee ...."); Patricia L. Spath, What's
Your Complaint Policy, 6 RADIOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 21, 2005, at 26 ("Smaller facilities may
not have the same resources to devote to handling grievances as larger facilities .... ).
But see Christine M. Weston et al., The NJ SEED Project: Evaluation of an Innovative
Initiative for Ethics Training in Nursing Homes, 6 J. Am. Med. Directors 68, 71 (2005)
(reporting that twenty-seven percent of LTC facilities had an intramural HEC).
271. See Niemira et al., supra note 201, at 78-79; Univ. of Fla. Coll. of Med., supra
note 270 ("For many hospitals it is simply not cost effective to maintain an active
ethics committee which meets Joint Commission requirements.").
272. Niemira et al., supra note 201, at 78-79. See Patricia Angelucci, Ethics Guidance
Through Committees, Nursing Mgmt., June 2007, at 30, 33 ("[C]onsider connecting
with institutions of higher learning .... [C]ommittees partner with other facilities
that have an ethics committee in place ...."); HOSFORD, supra note 10, at 116 ("[Al
small institution . . .representative could attend meetings of a larger one's bioethics
committee, in lieu of having their own.").
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Commission specifically suggested using such outsourcing relation-
ships as a way to satisfy its accreditation standards' ethics mechanism
requirement: "Patient rights mechanisms may include a variety of
implementation strategies [including] 24-hour access to an external
consulting service ... [or] access to the ethics service of a large medi-
cal center in a neighboring town. "273
A typical extramural MI-HEC entails the smaller facility outsourc-
ing its ethics committee work to the larger facility.274 The larger facil-
ity has resources and experience that the smaller facility could not
sustain on its own. Some large institutions have recognized the
smaller facilities' need, and have created extramural services suited to
serving the smaller institutions. For example, the Wake Forest Univer-
sity Medical Center, recognizing its "importance" to the region, antici-
pates that its Bioethics Committee will assist "other organizations
including some smaller hospitals.
275
273. JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANS., 1994 MANUAL FOR
HOSPITALS 10 (1994). Again, there are earlier models for such structures. For example,
in the 1950s, the work of Marin General Hospital's therapeutic abortion committee
became "accepted so widely that the other three hospitals of the [San Rafael]
community now refer all their applications for therapeutic abortion to this committee
for review-a most unusual arrangement." Howard Harmond, Therapeutic Abortion:
Ten Years Experience with Hospital Committee Control, 89 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 349, 350-51 (1964).
274. See Am. Med. Dirs. Ass'n, supra note 256 ("Other options for smaller facilities
may include collaboration with . . . local hospital ethics committees"); Texas DADS,
supra note 173 ("A [long-term care] facility can utilize an external ethics committee
(i.e., one that is in a hospital, is community-wide, or part of another [long-term care]
facility .... "); Nelson, supra note 193, at 32.
275. Wake Forest University Health Sciences, Main Ethics Committee By-Laws &
Procedures, http://wwwl.wfubmc.edu/bioethics/CommitteeStructure/>. See also
University of Pennsylvania Center for Bioethics Mediation Service ("Specific
applications at your institution: Using the Service as an alternative or complement to
existing ethics mechanisms.") ("For institutions without existing ethics mechanisms,
our Service can provide a complete program."). See Jane N. Bolin et al., An Alternative
Strategy for Resolving Ethical Dilemmas in Rural Healthcare, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Apr. 2008,
at 63 (describing program run by Texas A&M Health Science Center); Cleveland
Clinic, Bioethics Department, http://my.clevelandclinic.org/bioethics/default.aspx
(last visited May 4, 2009) ("External agencies [may] request a formal analysis or
recommendation about a case."); Columbus Cmty. Hospital, Ethics Committee, http:/
/www.cch-inc.com/internet/home/columbus.nsf/documents/ethics+committee (last
visited May 4, 2009) ("The committee ... addresses relevant issues to the hospital, the
nursing home, and the community."); Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center, Ethics
Committee, http://www.dhmc.org/webpage.cfm?site id=2&org-id=512&morgid=0&
sec id=0&gsec.id=25602&item id=25602 (last visited May 4, 2009) ("The DHMC
Bioethics Advisory Committee will consider providing advice if requested by staff of
community hospitals and nursing homes."); Med. College of Wis., Services, http://
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Statutes in Florida, Colorado, and Maryland specifically antici-
pate that one healthcare facility might use another healthcare facility's
HEC.2 76 For example, when a guardian in Florida wants to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment from a patient, that decision must be con-
firmed by the HEC.277 If there is no HEC at the facility, then "the
facility must have an arrangement with the medical ethics committee
of another facility or with a community-based ethics committee
approved by the Florida Bio-ethics Network."27 8
More recently, extramural HECs have been provided not only by
another (larger) institution's HEC but also by an academic unit or by
an independent organization formed specifically to provide such ser-
vices.2 79 For example, Kansas Health Ethics, Inc. offers consultation
services on a sliding fee scale to help resolve healthcare ethics dilem-
www.mcw.edu/populationhealth/Services.htm (last visited May 4, 2009) ("The Center
for the Study of Bioethics has established and staffs a clinical consultation service for
hospitals and health care institutions in the Milwaukee area.").
276. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-18.5-103(6.5) (2008) ("If there is no medical
ethics committee for a health care facility, such facility may provide an outside referral
for such assistance or consultation."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.404(2) (2008); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 19-371(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2008) ("An advisory committee at a
related institution may function jointly with a hospital advisory committee.").
277. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.404(2) (2008).
278. Id. The University of Florida offers such a service. See Univ. of Fla. Coll. of
Med., supra note 270. Similarly, Maryland law anticipates that a nursing home ethics
committee might function "[jlointly with a hospital advisory committee." MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 19-371(b).
279. See, e.g., Hamel, supra note 61, at 22 n.3 ("Some systems and facilities employ
the part-time services of an ethicist who is generally based in a bioethics center or
university."); Loras Coll. Bioethics Res. Ctr., Comprehensive Report 1987-2000, http:/
/www2.loras.edu/-CatholicHE/report.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) ("[The Center]
provides consulting services to health care facilities and professionals."); Denver
Cmty. Bioethics Comm., http://www.denverbioethics.org (last visited Mar. 17, 2009)
("Any individual or institution in the state may present a case to the DCBC."); Ctr. for
Health Ethics, Univ. of Mo., Tele-Ethics Consultation Servs., http://hmi.missouri.edu/
ethics/telethicsconsultation.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2009); Mo. LONG-TERM CARE
OMBUDSMAN PROGRAM & CTR. FOR PRACTICAL BIOETHICS, LONG-TERM CARE ETHICS CASE
CONSULTATION, http:// www.dhss.mo.gov/Ombudsman/LTCCaseConsultation.pdf
(last visited May 4, 2009) (providing a free, neutral, and confidential "mediation
service"); St. Louis Univ. Dep't of Health Care Ethics, Faculty Consultation Services,
http://hce.slu.edu/Consultation.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2009); Markkula Ctr. for
Applied Ethics, Santa Clara Univ., Mission, http://scu.edu/ethics/practicing/
focusareas/medical/oconnor/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2009); Vital Decisions, http://
www.vitaldecisions.net (last visited Mar. 26, 2009) ("If necessary, counselors help
with conflict resolution ....").
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
mas.280 Other organizations, such as the Health Priorities Group (for-
merly Bioethics Consultation Group) 281 and The Ethics Practice, 282
consult with healthcare institutions.283 Bioethics Services of Virginia,
Inc. operates in a similar way.284 In addition, some HEC networks are
planning to move beyond education to "serve as a resource
for . .. mediation" in specific cases.285
In Ontario, the Consent and Capacity Board (the CCB) operates
as an extramural ethics committee. 286 The CCB is a body created by
the Ontario government under its Health Care Consent Act. 28 7 "When
'in-house' conflict resolution fails, [the] CCB can mediate. If this medi-
ation fails, [the] CCB adjudicates .... "288 The CCB is, in short, "an
independent, quasi-judicial tribunal;" a "neutral, expert board" which,
in intractable treatment disputes, can make a "legal, binding decision
that can only be reversed on appeal through the courts. '289
Here again, the IRB provides guidance in our discussion of HECs.
The extramural model is better developed in the research context for
IRBs than in the clinical context for HECs. Indeed, over the past dec-
ade, there has been an exponential expansion of "independent"
IRBs. 9 °
280. Kan. Health Ethics, Inc., Ethics Consultation, http://www.kansashealthethics.
org/index.php?topic=ethicsComm (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
281. Health Priorities Group, Inc., Services, http://bioethic.cust.he.net/services.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
282. The Ethics Practice provides "clinical ethics consultation and education
services to health care providers and health care systems nationally." Soc'y for
Women's Health Res., About Us, http://www.womenshealthresearch.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=about_zoloth (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (discussing co-
founder of the Ethics Practice, Laurie Zoloth).
283. See, e.g., Dawn Dudley Oosterhoff & Mary Rowell, Shared Leadership: The
Freedom to Do Bioethics, 16 HEC FORUM 297, 299, 307 (2004) (describing how
southwestern Ontario had "consulting-for-fee contracts" and a joint committee); Cmty.
Ethics Comm. for Skilled Nursing Facilities, Bioethics Law Project, http://www.
bioethicslawproject.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
284. Bioethical Servs. of Va., Inc., Services, http://bsvinc.com/services.htm (last
visited Mar., 26 2009).
285. Baruch, supra note 254. See, e.g., Health Care Ethics Consortium of Ga.,
Membership, http://www.hcecg.org/membership (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
286. Health Care Consent Act, S.O., ch. 2 (1996) (Can.), available at http://www.
canlii.org/on/laws/sta/1996c.2sch.a/20080821/whole.html.
287. Id.
288. Mark Handelman & Bob Parke, The Beneficial Role of a Judicial Process When
"Everything" Is Too Much, HEALTHCARE Q., Winter 2008, at 46, 48.
289. Id. at 50.
290. See INST. OF MED., PRESERVING THE PUBLIC TRUST 40 (2001); Sharona Hoffman &
Jessica Wilen Berg, The Suitability of IRB Liability, 67 U. PlI-r. L. REv. 365, 404 (2005)
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Independent IRBs review research proposals (to assure adequate
protection of human subjects) for entities that are not affiliated with
the IRB.291 Oftentimes, much research is conducted by those in
smaller facilities and physician's offices where the economy of scale
precludes forming an IRB. Also, multi-center research is more effi-
ciently reviewed by a single IRB than through duplicative review at
each participating site.292 Accordingly, institutions have developed
new models of IRB review, which include schemes whereby one insti-
tution relies on the review of another institution's IRB, or whereby mul-
tiple institutions rely on the review of an independent IRB.293
In contrast to committees based on the network model, the extra-
mural HEC engages with specific cases from member institutions.
Since the decision maker is separate and independent from the facility
in which the case arose, the extramural model offers promise for over-
coming the corruption associated with intramural HECs. Moreover,
with both a higher volume of cases and the incentive to maintain its
member institution "customers," the extramural HEC can also achieve
efficiencies of scale to overcome the intramural HEC's problems of
bias, carelessness, and arbitrariness.
C. The Quasi-Appellate Model
Just as ethics committees are a step removed from the medical
treatment team, some have proposed what is effectively an ethics com-
("[Tiraditional IRBs are at times being replaced by a relatively new entity, the
independent or for-profit IRB."). See, e.g., Chesapeake Res. Review, Inc., http://www.
chesapeakeirb.com (last updated Mar. 30, 2009); Copernicus Group IRB, http://
copernicusgroup.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2009); Goodwyn IRB, http://www.
goodwynsirb.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2009); New England IRB, Welcome to New
England IRB, http://www.neirb.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2009); Quorum Review Inc.,
An Institutional Review Board, http://www.quorumreview.com (last visited Mar. 30,
2009); W. Inst. Review Bd., WIRB Mission, http://www.wirb.com (last visited Mar. 30,
2009) (representing the oldest and largest of these IRBs). 1RBs, like HECs, have
traditionally been intramural entities. And like HECs, IRBs are plagued with many of
the same independence, composition, and training problems. See supra notes 130-
136, 181, 206-208.
291. See Heath, supra note 131.
292. See 21 C.F.R. § 56.114 (2009) ("[Ilnstitutions involved in multi-institutional
studies may use joint review, reliance upon the review of another qualified IRB, or
similar arrangements aimed at avoidance of duplication of effort.").
293. See NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH ET AL., ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF IRB REVIEW:
WORKSHOP SUMMARY REPORT 1 (2005), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp/
documents/AltModIRB.pdf.
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mittee for ethics committees.294 Some hospitals retain their own inter-
nal ethics committee but join with others to form a separate, shared
committee that hears only particularly complicated cases.295 Each
institution sends representatives to sit on a panel that serves all the
member institutions. On this model, an ethics dispute first goes to the
intramural HEC; but if it is not resolved intramurally, the case goes to
the MI-HEC.296
Unaffiliated private hospitals have experimented with quasi-
appellate HECs. 29 7 Several have been formed and implemented. For
example, the Vancouver Island Health Authority formed a "regional
ethics committee." While there are five additional ethics committees in
the VIHA, the regional committee "deals with issues that cross bounda-
294. See, e.g., DRANE, supra note 234, at 163 ("If conflict remains intractable and the
decision preferred by the surrogate or patient conflicts with institutional policy, then
the health care ethics committee should move the case to a more authoritative/regional
committee ...."); George P. Smith, Restructuring the Principle of Medical Futility, J.
PALLIATIVE CARE, Fall 1995, at 9 (proposing a three-tier decisional structure in which
the third tier recognizes a right of limited appeal to the courts), available at http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7472798; Truog, supra note 100, at 2 ("Some have
suggested setting up ad hoc ethics committees with a membership . . .without any
financial or social ties to the hospitals they serve, specifically to offer a more legitimate
sounding board for difficult cases in which the hospital ethics committee could be
seen as having a conflict of interests or biased perspective.").
295. Michelle Hey, Shared Corporate Ethics Committee: Two Systems Collaborate to
Enhance Ethical Decision Making, HEALTH PROGRESS, Sept. 1994 ("Cincinnati-based
Mercy Health System and Radnor, PA-based Eastern Mercy Health System have formed
a Shared Corporate Ethics Committee (SCEC) .... Local facilities will retain their own
ethics committees but benefit from the [system] guidance of the shared committee.").
A quasi-appellate panel could also serve as an extramural committee. Cf. Email from
Dr. David Fleming, University of Missouri Center for Health Ethics, to Thaddeus
Mason Pope, Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law (June 5,
2008) (on file with author) ("Most, if not all, of the outlying hospitals that we serve do
have ethics committees, and we serve to support their efforts with the most difficult
cases.").
296. See Miller, supra note 51, at 210-13 (providing a flow chart illustrating the
operation of what this Article refers to as the quasi-appellate model). See also KENNETH
A. FISHER, IN DEFIANCE OF DEATH: EXPOSING THE REAL COSTS OF END-OF-LIFE CARE 30-31
(2008) (proposing a "three-tiered (local, state, and national) Appropriate Care
Committee System"). But see Michael Bevins, Review of "In Defiance of Death," 301
JAMA 108, 109 (2009) ("[T]he idea of appropriate care committees ... is woefully
underdeveloped ....").
297. See Buchanan et al., supra note 217 (describing The Colorado Collective for
Medical Decisions). See Scannell, supra note 111 (describing a proposal for the
"creation of an independent organization composed of diverse community and
professional representatives who would advise hospitals or help make decisions for
their friendless incompetent patients").
310 [Vol. 31:257
2009] MULTI-INSTITUTIONAL HEALTHCARE ETHICS COMMITTEES 311
ries."298 Similarly, in Fort Wayne, Indiana, three separate institutions
formed a "community ethics consensus panel '299 to handle disputes
that could not be resolved by any of the single institutions' intramural
HECs. Today, each institution sends three of its own representatives to
serve on the panel. These are joined by a local philosophy professor
and a local attorney. 3° ° The panel provides another level of review
when a given conflict cannot be resolved internally.
30 1
Perhaps the most notable example of the quasi-appellate model is
found in the Veterans Health Administration (VHA). Each VHA facil-
ity has its own ethics committee.30 2  But there is also a central,
national ethics committee available to provide consultation to "field-
based ethics programs on request. '30 3 However, unlike the Fort
Wayne MI-HEC, the VHA central committee only advises-it does not
approve or reject recommendations or decisions made by individual
HECs.
As with the extramural model, the quasi-appellate model has ana-
logues in the U.S. research context. For example, when reviewing pro-
posed research on "vulnerable populations," a local IRB must seek a
second level of review.30 4 Similarly, in New Zealand, the 1990
Research Council Act established the Health Research Council Ethics
Committee: a national ethics committee "to review the independent
298. Vancouver Island Health Authority, Committees, http://www.viha.ca/ethics/
committees (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
299. Lauren Phillips, A Question of Ethics, TRUSTEE, Feb. 1997, at 27; Lynne
McKenna Frazier, Panel to Hear Rifts About Life Support, FT. WAYNE NEWS-SENTINEL,
Dec. 14, 1996, at lA.
300. See sources cited supra note 299.
301. Phillips, supra note 299. See Denver Cmty. Bioethics Comm., supra note 279
("The DCBC can also serve as a resource to other institutional ethics committees,
providing 'second opinions' and additional review of cases."); Univ. of Fla. Coll. of
Med., supra note 270 ("Even hospitals which maintain an ethics committee may
benefit from the consultation services we offer ....").
302. U.S. DEP'T OF VETERAN AFFAIRS, ETHICS CONSULTATION, http://www.ethics.va.
gov/activities/consult.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
303. Id.
304. See AI. Assoc. OF MED. COLLEGES, TASK FORCE ON FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST IN CLINICAL RESEARCH (2001) ("When the ICOI has determined that
compelling circumstances exist ... the institution should consider the desirability of
contracting with an external IRB to provide a second level of review."). Cf. Standards
for Institutional Review Boards for Clinical Investigators, 43 Fed. Reg. 35,186 (Aug. 8,
1978), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/documents/19780808.pdf (permitting
the creation of an "appellate IRB").
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ethical assessment made . . . by an approved ethics committee. '30 5
While this committee currently provides only "nonbinding second
opinions," New Zealand's Minister of Health is "attempting to establish
an appellate committee.
30 6
D. The Joint Committee Model
While a quasi-appellate HEC serves member institutions so that
each still retains its own intramural HEC, a joint committee serves
institutions that do not have their own internal ethics committee. On
this model, the joint (or "shared") committee is the principal ethics
forum for its participating institutions,30 7 each of which sends repre-
sentatives to form the joint committee.30 8 These are also referred to as
"regional," "municipal," "cooperative," "inter-institutional," and "com-
munity" ethics committees. Institutions form joint committees for one
of two basic reasons: either they cannot form an intramural HEC of
their own, or it would be more convenient to use a joint committee.
1. Joint Committees for Institutions Unable to Form Their Own
Intramural HECs
Healthcare facilities such as freestanding dialysis clinics, nursing
homes, and rural hospitals are unlikely to have their own intramural
HECs, as they are too thinly staffed.30 9 To address this problem, the
American Medical Association advises healthcare facilities lacking eth-
ics committees to "develop flexible, efficient mechanisms of ethics
review that divide the burden of committee functioning among collab-
orating health care facilities. 3 10
305. Health Research Council Act of 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 25, available at http://
www.hrc.govt.nz/root/pages-policy/HRCEthicsCommitteeTerms-ofReference.
html.
306. Tim Dare, Ethical Review of Research in New Zealand, ETHICS NOTES, Oct. 2008,
at 1, available at http://www.hrc.govt.nz/assets/pdfs/HRC%20Ethics%2ONotes%20
FINAL%20221008.pdf.
307. Nelson, supra note 193.
308. Id., at 33 ("Each participating facility would identify one or two professionals
to serve on the committee .... ); Niemira et al., supra note 201, at 78. See MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-372(a)(1)(iv) (LexisNexis 2005) ("Each advisory committee
shall ... [include] the chief executive officer or a designee from each hospital and each
related institution represented on that advisory committee.").
309. See supra notes 269-271.
310. AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § E-9.1115 (2001). See also Am. Med. Dirs.
Ass'n, supra note 256 ("Other options for smaller facilities may include collaboration
with other nursing homes .... ); HOSFORD, supra note 10, at 116 ("[R]epresentatives
of several institutions in a town or small city could associate in a joint bioethics
committee."); Levine, supra note 6, at 11 ("[S]everal such . . . small
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Similarly, Maryland encourages non-hospital institutions to oper-
ate joint committees.311 A 1990 statute specifically anticipates that a
nursing home ethics committee may function "jointly with an advisory
committee representing no more than 30 other related institutions. 
' 312
Pursuant to this statute, the Health Facilities Association helped estab-
lish eight joint committees, each composed of four to six facilities.3 13
Other cooperative regional ethics committees have been created
for institutions unable to create an HEC individually.31 4 For example,
the National Kidney Foundation of Kansas and Western Missouri and
the Center for Practical Bioethics created a "standing ethics commit-
tee" that functions to provide "individual consultations," among other
services.315 Similarly, the Dubuque Regional Heahhcare Ethics Com-
mittee established "a service for facilities and agencies in the tri-state
area[,] [Iowa, Wisconsin, and Illinois,] which do not have their own
ethics committee. '"316
Perhaps most impressive is the even broader system of joint com-
mittees established in New Jersey. While New Jersey licensing regula-
tions require that long-term care facilities have access to a dispute
community . . .hospitals might together form a committee ...."). Similarly, CMS
recommends that small hospitals satisfy their "utilization review committee"
requirement by having the committee "established by the local medical society and
some or all of the hospitals in the locality." 42 C.F.R. § 482.30(b)(1)(ii) (2008).
311. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-371(b)(3). See also 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.55(f)(1)(i) (2008) ("The hospital establishes an Infant Care Review Committee
(ICRC) or joins with one or more other hospitals to create a joint ICRC."); 25 TEx.
ADMIN. CODE § 405.60(a) (2009) ("The committee may be established multi-
institutionally in cooperation with other health care providers, e.g. local hospitals
serving the same geographic area.").
312. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-371(b).
313. Texas DADS, supra note 173 (observing that the institutions which formed the
Maryland HEC network "reported that the network helped them gain confidence in
making ethical decisions and improving working relationships with their peers").
314. Heitman, supra note 23, at 43.
315. Eugene C. Grochowski & Erika Blacksher, Collaborative Ethics: A Standing
Renal Dialysis Ethics Committee, 7 ADVANCES IN RENAL REPLACEMENT THERAPY 355, 355
(2000). While the standing ethics committee in Kansas City is the only healthcare
ethics committee among the fifty-two National Kidney Foundation affiliates, others
could be "linked together under the national umbrella." Id. at 357. While the
committee may not have actually done much consultation, it was certainly positioned
to do so. See Email from Terrence Rosell, Professor of Pastoral Theology and Ethics, to
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law
(May 9, 2008) (on file with author).
316. Loras Coll. Bioethics Res. Ctr., supra note 279. See also IowA ADMIN. CODE
r. 641-85.3(2) (2008) (allowing the formation of "multi-county local substitute
medical decision-making boards").
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resolution forum like an ethics committee, the "[s]taff of long-term
care facilities often do not have the knowledge and experience to
address complex ethical issues. '317 So, starting in 1996, under the
direction of the Office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Eld-
erly, New Jersey formed and trained a statewide network of fifteen
"Regional Long Term Care Ethics Committees" to serve the state's
nearly 400 long-term care facilities.3 18 Many of these regional commit-
tees consult on a regular basis.319
2. Joint Committees for Convenience
While the most common motivation for joint ethics committees is
necessity, some are formed for convenience. For example, in Chico,
California, healthcare providers formed a joint committee serving both
the Enloe and Chico Community Hospitals.3 2 ° Since most physicians
had staff privileges at both institutions, the creation of this joint com-
mittee was likely motivated by institutional distaste for duplication of
effort.
Again, there is an analogy in the research context. 321  Centers
engaged in multi-site research sometimes form a consortium by which
each agrees to accept review by any other participating institution's
317. Robert Wood Johnson Found., A Moral Compass in Navigating Long-Term
Care Decisions in New Jersey (Mar. 2005), http://www.rwjf.org/reports/grr/035786.
htm.
318. See id.; STATE OF NJ. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR THE INSTITUTIONALIZED
ELDERLY, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2006), available at http://www.state.nj.us/
publicadvocate/home/reports/pdfs/elderlyombudsmanreport.pdf. The facilities in
each region share a committee, and the committees themselves are linked to the New
Jersey Long Term Care Ethics Consortium, which is a forum for "legislative
update .... continuing ethics education, peer support, and retrospective case review."
Robert Wood Johnson Found., supra note 317.
319. STATE INITIATIVES, supra note 270, at 2. See, e.g., Ocean County Ethics Comm.,
http://oceancountyethics.com (last visited Mar. 18, 2009); Tri-County Reg'l Ethics
Comm., Home, http://njtrec.org (last visited Mar. 18, 2009). Indeed, the New Jersey
project proved so successful that the project director formed a nonprofit corporation,
ElderCare Ethics Associates, to aid other geographic regions in developing similar
initiatives. Linda A. O'Brien, Establishing and Educating a Long-Term Care Regional
Ethics Committee: The NJ Model, 6 J. A MED. DIRECTORS ASS'N. 66, 67 (2005).
320. See Email from Becky White, Professor of Philosophy California State
University, Chico, to Thaddeus Mason Pope, Associate Professor of Law, Widener
University School of Law (May 5, 1998) (on file with author). There were four outside
members and other members unique to each hospital; the larger of the two hospitals
subsequently purchased the smaller.
321. Cf. Paul Herbert & Raphael Saginor, Research Ethics Boards: Do It Once and Do
It Well, CAN. MED. Ass'NJ. 597 (2009) (describing increased "centralized ethics review"
at the "regional level" and observing: "If all of Europe is collaborating ... [w]e need to
314
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IRB. 322 Notable examples include the Biomedical Research Alliance of
New York,323 the Multicenter Academic Clinical Research Organiza-
tion,324 and the Michigan State University Community Research
IRB.325
It is important to distinguish one type of joint committee. Often
committees that are part of the same corporate health entity may estab-
lish committees that serve more than one facility. For example, the
Pittsburgh Mercy Health System HEC in Pittsburgh serves three hospi-
tals.3 2 6 There are many other examples.327 But it is unlikely that the
joint committees of entity-related institutions achieve the same degree
of independence as the joint committees of unaffiliated institutions.
Since some facilities lack the resources to support an intramural
HEC, a quasi-appellate MI-HEC is not a realistic option. For these
institutions, the joint MI-HEC model offers the best promise for over-
coming problems with the intramural HEC.
overhaul the ethics review system from an autonomous local review committee process
into an interdependent collaboration of local committees.").
322. Meeker-O'Connell, supra note 139.
323. Biomedical Research Alliance of N.Y., Home, http://www.brany.com (last
visited Mar. 30, 2009)
324. Multicenter Academic Clinical Research Org., http://www.med.upenn.edu/
ohr/aboutmacro.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
325. Mich. State Univ. Human Research Protection Plan, Research and Creative
Endeavor, http://hr.msu.edu/HRsite/Documents/Faculty/Handbooks/Faculty/
ResearchCreativeEndeavor/vi-protection.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
326. See Pittsburgh Mercy Health Sys., http://www.pmhs.org (last visited Mar. 18,
2009). See also Mercy Health Partners of Nw. Ohio, http://www.ehealthconnection.
com/regions/toledo (last visited Mar. 18, 2009). Before merging into Catholic Health
East, a Philadelphia and a Cincinatti hospital of Eastern Mercy Health System shared
an ethics committee. Emails from Sister Patricia Forret to Thaddeus Mason Pope,
Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law (May 15 & 18, 2008)
(on file with author).
327. E.g., Joanne Davidson, Children's Future Will Reap Reward of "Planting" Dinner,
DENVER POST, Apr. 7, 1996, at E07 (describing Dr. Maxine Glaz acting as co-chair of a
six-hospital joint ethics committee); Hoffmann Study, supra note 47, at 107 ("In two
cases, two hospitals shared the same committee .... ); MedCentral Health Sys., Ethics
at MedCentral Health System, http://www.medcentral.org/default.cfm?id=123 (last
visited Mar. 18, 2009) (discussing use of one HEC for a system of two hospitals and
other facilities); see also Kendra Rosencrans, God, Medicine, Money: Religious Secular
Union Raises Ethical Issues, DULUTH NEws TRIB., Apr. 28, 1996, at 1A; Texas DADS,
supra note 173 ("Mt. St. Vincent Nursing Home in Holyoke, Massachusetts established
an ethics committee that served three LTC facilities ... under the ownership of Sisters
of Providence Health System."); SMDC Health Sys., Patient Resources: Healthcare
Directives, http://www.smdc.org/patientresources/healthcaredirectives.htm (last
visited Jan. 18, 2009) ("All hospitals within the [System] have access to an ethics
committee.").
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
IV. THE MULTI-INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEE CAN MITIGATE THE
PROBLEMS EXISTING IN INTRAMURAL HECs
While they cannot solve all the HEC's problems, 328 MI-HECs are
an excellent first step, as they address many of the defects this Article
has described above.329 Indeed, their remedial effectiveness was fore-
casted by the Joint Commission. 330 Encouragingly, the multi-institu-
tional model appears to be working to address similar problems with
IRBs. Given the similarity between HECs and IRBs, MI-HECs should
be able to replicate their research-field success in the healthcare ethics
arena. We should, therefore, chart a course for HECs based on the
prior (and current) voyage of IRBs.
A. MI-HECs Mitigate the Risk of Corrupt Decision Making
If a HEC decision maker's deliberation is distorted by pressure
and biases, then the typical solution is to get another decision
maker.33' An MI-HEC is just such a source of independent evaluation.
The MI-HEC will be less beholden to the peculiar social or professional
328. Most significantly, HECs need additional procedural protections. See Wilson,
supra note 67; Wilson, supra note 77; Wolf, supra note 142; Wolf 1991, supra note 47.
329. See supra Part II. (describing HEC problems); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Multi-
Institutional Ethics Committees: For Rural Hospitals, and Urban Ones Too, AM. J.
BIOETHICS, Apr. 2008, at 69, 69 (arguing that MI-HECs represent a promising starting
point in committee resolution of bioethical conflicts, as they can "significantly
ameliorate deficiencies regarding [HEC] resources, competence, and independence").
330. See Banerjee & Kuschner, supra note 2, at 143 ("Consideration should be given
to an external reviewing mechanism for the oversight of HEC .... ").
331. See generally ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2008); JAMES SAMPLE ET
AL., FAIR COURTS: SETTING RECUSAL STANDARDS (2008). Cf. E.P. McDERMOTT & A.E.
BERKELEY, ADR IN THE WORKPLACE: CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES FOR HUMAN RESOURCE
EXECUTIVES AND THEIR COUNSEL (1996) (arguing for bringing in more senior
management because they can be more objective than lower-level management directly
involved with workplace disputes); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Dispute Resolution in
the Boundaryless Workplace, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 467, 480-81 (2001)
(describing the "new wave of in-house dispute resolution systems" as commonly
utilizing "decision makers who are outside the employee's normal chain of
command").
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relationships in place at any single institution.332 Indeed, sometimes
an external HEC is sought specifically because of its independence.333
For example, there have been several medical futility cases in
which the provider's decision about whether to accede to the surro-
gate's request for continued treatment was swayed by the family's
money and influence. 334 In contrast, a MI-HEC would presumably be
less willing to accede to an 86-year-old terminal cancer patient's
request for surgery because he "was influential, well-known, and
respected in the community. '331 Likewise, the MI-HEC might be more
circumspect about denying "recommended vaccinations" to a prema-
332. See SPIELMAN, supra note 85, at 192 (describing problems with in-house dispute
resolution programs); Cho & Billings, supra note 101, at 157 (suggesting
"independence from any single institution, i.e. regional or non-institutional review
boards" to "minimize individual and institutional conflicts of interest"); Frazier, supra
note 299, at Al ("Airing a case before a community panel might help alleviate
concerns that a hospital's recommendation that life support be removed is being made
in its own self-interest ...."); Glantz, supra note 134, at 133 ("One objective in
encouraging diversity in the composition of committees, both IRBs and IECs, is to
keep the committees honest."); Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 763 ("Less susceptible to
the criticism that it is representing the interests of the institution rather than those of
the patient"); id. at 785 (arguing that "includ[ing] members from outside the health
care institution" having the committee "represent more than one institution" can help
overcome the puppet problem); Kimberlee K. Kovatch, Neonatology Life and Death
Decisions: Can Mediation Help?, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 251 (2000) (recommending outside
mediators); Smith et al., supra note 196, at 1274 ("A review committee with significant
membership from outside the hospital where the patient in question has been
admitted could potentially diminish institutional bias (or its appearance) ....");
Schuppli & Fraser, supra note 146, at 297 ("Other possible solutions are to move to
greater independence from the institution-for example by using a regional
committee .... ); Denver Cmty. Bioethics Comm., supra note 279 ("Because the DCBC
is not attached to any particular institution .. . it offers objective, thoughtful
consideration of tough issues.").
333. Before stopping its sale of ethics services for tax reasons, the University of
Pennsylvania offered its mediation service as "truly independent." UNIV. OF PA. CTR.
FOR BIOETHICS, MEDIATION SERVICE BROCHURE, http://www.bioethics.upenn.edu/pdf/
bioethics -mediation.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) [hereinafter UNIV. OF PA.
BROCHURE]. The Center operated "as an interdisciplinary unit of the University of
Pennsylvania School of Medicine with input from a Faculty Advisory Board of
academic leaders and an External Advisory Board of key corporate and civic leaders."
Id. Thus, if another Philadelphia-area hospital had referred a case to the University, its
ethics committee would be substantially free from any incentive to appease the
medical staff or administration of the referring hospital. See id.
334. Ethics and Rural Healthcare, supra note 161. See id. at 136 ("The costs
associated with a complicated, un-insured case can compromise the health of an entire
community.").
335. Id.
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ture infant "because his less influential family lacked funds to pay for
the procedure.
336
Since at least a majority of a MI-HEC's members would come from
institutions other than that of the healthcare provider in a given case,
the MI-HEC would not be swayed by extra-ethical factors.337 A major
criticism of intramural HECs is that they cannot "procure an extra-
institutional professional appraisal of the medical facts. '338  But this
needed detachment is precisely what the MI-HEC offers. A more
diverse HEC better ensures a more unbiased, impartial review of the
case.
339
This is perhaps best illustrated by In re Torres.34 ° Rudolfo Torres
was a patient at the Hennepin County Medical Center. Mr. Torres
336. Id.
337. See Bolin supra note 275, at 65 ("The virtual ethics committee model
allows . . . a neutral committee unlikely to be affected by small town politics."); M.
Fukuyama et al., A Report on Small Team Clinical Ethics Consultation Programmes in
Japan, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 858 (2008) ("The consultation service offered by our project
was . . . independent of any specific medical institution. There was no conflict of
interest between the consultants and the clients, and thus we could freely provide
candid advice."); UNIV. OF PA. BROCHURE, supra note 333 ("Our Service is designed to
avoid problems associated with traditional in-house ethics mechanisms [and] has a
number of advantages: ... [p]reservation of integrity [which] might [otherwise] be
compromised . . . by powerful clinicians or hospital
administrators [and] . . . [e]nhancement of integrity when the institution
acknowledges and manages its potential, perceived, or actual conflicts of interest.").
The court in In re Quinlan anticipated that an HEC would "screen out" cases "which
might be contaminated by less than worthy motivations of family or physician." 355
A.2d 647, 669 (NJ. 1976). Similarly, a MI-HEC can screen out cases contaminated by
less than worthy motivations of an intramural HEC. Notably, Israeli HECs established
under the 1996 Patients Rights Act, which have decision making authority, require an
independent chair. See N.S. Wenger et al., Hospital Ethics Committees in Israel:
Structure, Function, and Heterogeneity in the Setting of Statutory Ethics Committees, 28 J.
MED. ETHICS 177 (2002).
338. Wilson & Gallegos, supra note 48, at 379.
339. Arthur Caplan, Comment, in CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 7; Jaffe, supra
note 11, at 428.
340. 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984). There are other, more current examples. Since
1985, New York has authorized the operation of Surrogate Decision-Making
Committees to make treatment decisions for unbefriended patients with mental
disabilities. Clarence J. Sundram et al., The First Ten Years of New York's Surrogate
Decision-Making Law: History of Development, in REPRESENTING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
(Patricia W. Johnson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007). The SDMCs, which have handled over
15,000 cases, consist of twelve volunteers, including a health care professional, an
attorney, a family member or former client, and an advocate for persons with mental
disabilities. Id. See Inquest into the Death of Paulo Melo (2008) N.T.M.C. 80, 107-08,
110 (Austl.), available at http://www.nt.gov.au/justice/ntmc/judgements/2008
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became comatose likely as the result of medical malpractice.3 41 His
providers determined that the appropriate course of action was to
remove his ventilator.342  Ronald Cranford, chair of the medical
center's intramural HEC, recognized the committee's inability to make
an independent judgment in the matter because the negligent incident
had occurred within its parent institution.343 As a result, he declined
to review the case.344 Instead, he sought to implement the extramural
model, asking the ethics committees of three other hospitals to deter-
mine whether the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment was
appropriate.345 The Minnesota Supreme Court found these external
committees' reports very useful.346
Here, as with earlier discussions, the experience of IRBs provides
guidance. While many institutions outsource research-related ques-
tions to independent IRBs for the sake of efficiency, many also do so to
staff the IRB in a way that mitigates conflicts of interest.347 For exam-
ple, New Zealand has employed regional committees for nearly twenty
years, initially prompted by a scandalous Tuskegee-like 348  study
12182008ntmc080.htm (encouraging a rural hospital to include outside members on
its HEC).
341. Id. at 334. At a hearing, "counsel for Mr. Torres and the Hennepin County
Medical Center stipulated that Mr. Torres ha[d] a potential cause of action based on
negligence against the Hennepin County Medical Center." Id.
342. Id. at 335.
343. See id. at 335-36. Compare the scenario in the text to that of Memorial
Hermann Hospital in Houston, which had its own HEC review the treating physician's
decision to withdraw life-saving medical treatment under similar circumstances. See
supra text accompanying notes 125-29.
344. See Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 335-36
345. Wolf 1986, supra note 47, at 13.
346. Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 336 n.2 ("[T]hese committees are uniquely situated to
provide guidance to physicians, families, and guardians when ethical dilemmas
arise.").
347. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW BOARDS: THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT BOARDS ii (1998), available at http://
www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-97-00192.pdf (observing that independent
boards "provide a detached source of expertise"); id. at 5 ("[T]he independent IRBs
can operate without being influenced by concerns about the financial well-being or
prestige of the institution that employs them or the career interests of colleagues ....
land] such detachment . . . leads to greater objectivity.").
348. The Tuskegee Study was a troubling research program in which African-
American males infected with syphilis, but unaware of it, were solicited and studied-
but denied treatment-so that researchers could observe the effects of the disease on
living subjects. See JAMES JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT: A
TRAGEDY OF RACE AND MEDICINE (1981).
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involving cervical cancer.349 In New Zealand, "[i]ndependence from
the providers of care and researchers [has come] to be seen [as a] sine
qua non."35°
Commentators have objected to the general proposition that Ml-
HECs can effectively address committee corruption. First, Richard
Saver 3 5 ' argues that experience with corporate boards of directors sug-
gests that the MI-HEC will not improve HEC performance. Such
adding of more independent directors-directors not otherwise affili-
ated with the company-to a corporate board does not improve board
director performance; likewise (the argument goes), adding committee
members to HECs will not ameliorate similar problems in those
committees.352
But Professor Saver's argument is inapposite here. The MI-HEC
model entails a more significant organizational upheaval than making
mere "numerical changes in the insider/outsider mix. '353 Applying
the multi-institutional model works a dramatic change in the very
organization of the HEC, delegating the deliberation and decision
making to a wholly new and separate committee.354
Susan Wolf makes a second objection,355 namely that MI-HECs
are just like HECs in that they are still "dominated by health care pro-
fessionals employed at the cooperating institutions. 356 She argues
349. S. R. CARTWRIGHT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS
CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF CERVICAL CANCER AT NATIONAL WOMEN'S HOSPITAL AND
INTO RELATED MATTERS 151 (1988) (attacking HECs as "too closely attached ... to be
trusted" and urging that "the Auckland Hospital Board . . . establish an ethics
committee which is able to be more detached").
350. Donald Evans, Ethical Review of Innovative Treatment, 14 HEC FORUM 53, 53-54
(2002).
351. Richard Saver is a law professor at the University of Houston.
352. HoSFORD, supra note 10, at 270-71. This is also the position of the Singapore
Health Minister Khaw Boon Win. While the minister points to a conflict of interest
where committees "sit in the same hospitals where [lucrative live donor] transplants
are performed," he recognizes that this conflict can be managed by "constitut[ing] the
ethics committee properly" and "includ[ing] those from outside the hospital." Hua,
supra note 113. See Safeguards Against Organ Trading Already in Place, STRAITS TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2009 (reporting Minister Win as stating that although the HECs have
discretion, his ministry must approve HEC composition and processes).
353. Saver, supra note 101, at 3.
354. See LORIS A. NESBITT, CLINICAL RESEARCH: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS 62
(2004) (arguing that by eliminating their internal IRBs, outsourcing hospitals reduce
conflicts of interest and the appearance of bias since the board members will not be
friends or colleagues of the researchers).
355. Susan Wolf is a law professor at the University of Minnesota.
356. See Wolf 1991, supra note 47, at 838. Similarly, the Dunlop Commission was
skeptical when large law firms established an alternative dispute resolution program
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that, whereas an intramural HEC is predisposed to protect its sponsor-
ing institution, the MI-HEC's motives are also corrupt-but in favor of
the joint and several interests of its various member institutions rather
than a single parent entity.
But while MI-HECs do draw their members from much of the
same "pool" as intramural HECs, available data does not suggest that
professional camaraderie corrupts MI-HEC decisions. For example,
while Professor Wolf may be correct to note that corporations are
repeat players in ADR forums, "statistics of [such] favoritism within
ADR processes have yet to be documented. ' '35 7 In addition, indepen-
dent review of difficult ethics questions has been endorsed by the FDA,
the Office for Human Research Protections, and the National Cancer
Institute. 358 Even if Professor Wolf is correct in stating that MI-HECs
cannot wholly eliminate committee corruption, they can nevertheless
materially mitigate it.
B. MI-HECs Mitigate the Risk of Committee Member Bias
The MI-HEC's ability to draw from a broad diversity of voices and
perspectives addresses the problem of biased decision making among
intramural HECs. 35 9 Diversification of the MI-HEC's membership is
analogous to broadening the roster of arbitrators in an ADR setting so
that the pool does not favor either party.360 Just as the HEC was pro-
posed as a check on the idiosyncrasies of the individual provider, the
MI-HEC serves as a check on the idiosyncrasies of the individual intra-
mural HEC.361
in which arbitrators for firm employee disputes had to be selected from a panel
composed of partners in large firms. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
supra note 110 (citing More Law Firms Seek Arbitration for Internal Disputes, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 26, 1994, at B13).
357. Kovach, supra note 154, at 1036 (emphasis added). See Lewis L. Maltby,
Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
29, 46 (1998) (reviewing studies finding that "employees prevailed more often in
arbitration than in court").
358. Meeker-O'Connell, supra note 139, at 6.
359. See Ethics and Rural Healthcare, supra note 161, at 137.
360. Prototype Agreement on Job Bias Resolution, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), May 11,
1995, at D34.
361. MARGARET BRAZIER & EMMA CAVE, MEDICINE, PATIENTS, AND THE LAW (2007)
("Given a sufficiently large and diverse committee, there will always be people who
represent different ethical viewpoints present and each perspective will, at least, get a
chance to make its case.").
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C. MI-HECs Mitigate the Risk of Careless Decisions
The broader pool of professional and community representatives
available to the MI-HEC also addresses the risk of committee careless-
ness.362 The MI-HEC can solicit more disciplinary expertise, embrace
more disciplinary perspectives, and support more formal training than
can an individual intramural HEC.363 This enhanced expertise in the
ethics committee ensures its members receive a more robust education
in the subject matter, reducing the likelihood that a decision will be
made haphazardly.
An individual healthcare provider or facility might lack the time,
money, or expertise required to assemble an adequate HEC. 364 The
MI-HEC model can help an institution overcome such a lack of ade-
quate ethics resources by allowing it to benefit from the input and
deliberation of a large multidisciplinary body, while only requiring it
to contribute a fraction of the committee's cost and personnel. 365
"This model has the potential to be efficient and effective by sharing
ethics expertise and financial support. '3 66 Support can be pooled
without unduly taxing any individual institution, allowing more
resources to be spent on educating a greater number of members.367
362. Cf. Heath, supra note 131 ("Recruitment of members for an independent IRB is
usually from a broader pool.").
363. Cf. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 349, at 151 ("National Women's Hospital is too
small an institution [and] lacks the broad scientific and ethical bases needed .... ");
Glantz, supra note 134, at 130 (arguing the fact that "[d]ifferent groups have different
primary concerns,... seems to be a good argument for having people from different
fields on each IRB"); HOSFORD, supra note 10, at 264 ("Officials of several hospitals,
particularly small ones, could establish a joint committee, thus pooling expert
people."); Nelson, supra note 193.
364. Ethics and Rural Healthcare, supra note 161, at 135.
365. Id. at 137 ("It would also allow hospitals to share training and technical
assistance resources."); Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 763 (observing that a joint
committee is "likely to be better educated," and "could spend more resources on
workshops"); Nelson, supra note 193, at 32 ("When there are limited resources at one
facility to support an ethics committee, another option is a multi-facility ethics
committee (MFEC)."). This was probably the goal of the Community Healthcare
Ethics Committee, a project of the Nevada Center for Ethics and Health Policy: "to
fulfill ethics committee functions for those organizations and facilities that desire or
need these services but lack resources to have their own." Craig Klugman, Model of
Ethics Committees in the Public Arena http://apha.confex.com/apha/131am/
techprogram/paper 59968.htm (last visited May 4, 2009).
366. Nelson, supra note 193, at 33; Nyika et al., supra note 167, at 190 ("The
paucity of resources makes it critical [to] promote synergistic collaborative efforts.").
Cf. RICHARD A. BREALEY, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 870-903 (2007).
367. See Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 762 (arguing it would be more efficient to have
"community committees or joint committees [because] more resources could be spent
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For example, if each of three rural Montana hospitals were indi-
vidually too small to support their own ethics committees, they could
pool their efforts. Each could contribute one-third of the prospective
MI-HEC's members and pay one-third of the cost of library materials,
educational requirements, clerical support, and other expenses. 368 In
short, shifting to "inter-institutional activities" can achieve significant
"economies of scale."'3 69
D. MI-HECs Mitigate the Risk of Arbitrary Decisions
MI-HECs not only mitigate the risk of corrupt, biased, and care-
less decisions, but they also address the lack of reliable procedures and
methods in intramural HECs. Since the MI-HEC serves several institu-
tions, it must operate with greater transparency and accountability.
Furthermore, the higher volume of referrals gives the MI-HEC more
experience.370 And with a greater caseload, the MI-HEC will work
more formally.371 More uniformity improves consistency and reliabil-
ity in decision making.
E. Summary of MI-HEC Advantages
Equipped with the collective strength of multiple institutions'
financial, professional, educational and disciplinary resources-and
detached from what is often the unduly persuasive influence of indi-
vidual supporting institutions-the MI-HEC can operate as a diverse,
accountable, and independent decision making body, ensuring diffi-
cult bioethical dilemmas are addressed with enhanced uniformity and
on educating members and improving the quality of the committee's services"); see
also Oosterhoff & Rowell, supra note 283, at 303 ("In exchange for financial
contribution to the shared costs of the Initiative, similar organizations would receive
consultative and educational bioethics services.").
368. Berkowitz & Dubler, supra note 59, at 143; Niemira et al., supra note 201, at 80
(arguing that MI-HECs "hold the promise of consolidating resources").
369. Ethics and Rural Healthcare, supra notel61, at 138.
370. See Heath, supra note 131, at 15. New Zealand reduced its number of regional
committees from fifteen to six to "concentrate expertise." NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON
HEALTH & DISABILITY SUPPORT SERVS. ETHICS, REVIEW OF THE CURRENT PROCESSES FOR
ETHICAL REVIEW OF HEALTH AND DISABILITY RESEARCH IN NEW ZEALAND (2003), available
at http://www.neac.health.govt.nz/moh.nsf/pagescm/970/$File/reviewprocesses
ethicalresearch.pdf. Cf. NESBITT, supra note 354, at 62 (outsourcing means economy
of scale, and cases go to experts whose sole focus is IRB).
371. Cf. Bashir Jawani, A Mandate for Regional Health Ethics Resources, 16 HEC
FORUM 247 (2004). One system of MI-HECs operates pursuant to detailed procedures.
S.C. DEP'T OF DISABILITIES & SPECIAL NEEDS, ETHICS COMMITTEES-REGIONAL CENTERS
(2007), available at http://www.ddsn.sc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/038AB500-52ED-4878-
889A-2017A7DF15C0/0/50208DD.pdf.
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care. Whether an institution resorts to the network model, the extra-
mural model, the quasi-appellate model, or the joint model of MI-HEC
constitution, its decision to utilize the MI-HEC should ultimately con-
tribute to an improvement in the quality of its patient care.
372
V. OVERCOMING CHALLENGES TO THE FORMATION OF MI-HECs
There is not much debate that MI-HECs can eliminate-or at least
substantially mitigate-the problems presented by dependent, insular,
and resource-deficient intramural HECs. Yet, there remains an utter
dearth of MI-HECs across the United States.373 So it seems that the
greatest challenge lies not in proving the remedial value of MI-HECs,
but in proving that these benefits outweigh their costs.
MI-HECs present their own problems and challenges. They take
time and effort to form and operate. Ironically, they may even be too
detached from the institutional context in which cases arise. And
there are liability, confidentiality, and communication logistics
problems connected with MI-HECs as well.
But these challenges can be readily overcome-indeed, they have
already been demonstrably overcome by existing MI-HECs. These
multi-institutional committees are a viable solution to the intramural
HEC problems, but the greatest obstacle to their implementation may
be convincing healthcare institutions that those problems exist and are
worth addressing.
A. Classic Obstacles to MI-HECs
1. Transaction Costs
Some have argued that institutions are "unlikely to come together
to plan joint committees because of the transaction CoStS. ' 37 4 "It takes
372. I thank Professor Peter D. Jacobson for reminding me that the promise of
improved performance should be empirically tested by surveying and comparing
intramural HECs and MI-HECs across a range of relevant dimensions such as
composition and training.
373. The primary exception is for MI-HECs for long-term care facilities in states like
Maryland and New Jersey, where they are an appealing vehicle for satisfying regulatory
requirements.
374. Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 769. See Ethics and Rural Healthcare, supra note
161, at 135 (discussing potential increase in demand for and cost of expertise and
resources); Nelson, supra note 193, at 30 (explaining that staff in rural hospitals "have
little time to participate on a committee and the facility has limited economic
resources to support the committee"); Scannell, supra note 111 ("[N]o
financial ... support is available for such an undertaking and structure."); Smith et al.,
supra note 196, at 1274-75 ("[Tjhis procedural change would then raise concerns
about... administrative burden."). Cf. Caroline McNeil, Debate over IRBs Continues as
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time and expert personnel to develop and implement a single ethical
policy. '375 Intramural HECs often lack the funds necessary to "find
and allocate time in order to resolve present and evolving ethical
issues."3 76 While a MI-HEC can reduce some of those costs, it does
not obviously produce an overall net savings. Each institution must
invest time and resources simply to coordinate with the other member
institutions.3 7
But these organizational costs may not be too onerous. Organiza-
tions are already in place, such as county medical societies, which can
help reduce expense.378 And costs can be shared by each institution
that requests consultation. Moreover, these costs would be a prudent
investment, because an effective ethics committee-often achievable
only in the MI-HEC form-can reduce operational costs, legal costs,
and marketing costs. 37 9 Ethics committee costs "would be minor com-
pared with the cost of litigation (which hopefully would be
avoided)."380
Alternative Options Emerge, 99 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 502, 503 (2007) ("Another
barrier to the use of central IRBs is confusion over how local and nonlocal boards can
work together.").
375. Monagle & West, supra note 59, at 260; see also Fletcher, supra note 15, at 871.
376. Id.
377. Cf. Oosterhoff & Rowell, supra note 283, at 309 (describing challenges of a
"shared leadership" model, including differences concerning the goals of bioethics and
concerns about the overuse of resources).
378. Miller, supra note 51, at 211.
379. Nelson, supra note 2. See Jennifer Bell & Jonathan M. Breslin, Health Care
Provider Moral Distress as a Leadership Challenge, 10 JONA's HEALTHCARE L. ETHICS &
REG. 94, 95-96 (2008) (arguing that ethics committees can reduce moral distress,
increase the quality of patient care, and reduce turnover); Jeffrey Nichols, When There
Is No Ethics Committee, CARING FOR THE AGES, Oct. 2008, at 13 ("One of the greatest
advantages to the physician of the ethics committee process is the time and energy that
committee can save him or her in gathering all this information [about the patient].").
380. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, A BRIEF CASE FOR ETHICS (2007); Caulfield, supra
note 63; Bj. Heilicser et al., The Effect of Clinical Ethics Consultation on Health Care
Costs, 11 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 31 (2000); Miller, supra note 51, at 211; Nelson, supra
note 193, at 30 ("[E]thics committees can be economically beneficial for the
organization."). See Banerjee & Kuschner, supra note 2, at 143 (reviewing literature
showing "measurable benefits" from ethics committees).
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2. Locality
It has long been considered important for HECs to be "local.
381
The same was thought to be true regarding IRBs.3 8 2 For either a HEC
or a research review committee to be effective, it must be familiar with
the cultural milieu of the institution and the local community.38 3
Therefore, "[a]t least one argument against [MI-HECs] ... is that health
care institutions are unique and need to be attuned to the unique char-
acteristics of each institution and to its staff.
38 4
While this argument has some force against the extramural
model, in which an institution may have no direct representation on
the MI-HEC, 38 5 it has little weight applied against the quasi-appellate
or joint models, which allow each hospital its own representation on
the MI-HEC. 38 6 The quasi-appellate model is independent from each
member institution that refers a case. Yet, since each institution has
representation, the MI-HEC panel is still in touch with local institu-
381. An early version of the Patient Self Determination Act required ethics
committees. S. 1766, 101st Cong. (1989). But the requirement was dropped because
of a desire for local control. See Fletcher, supra note 15, at 871; Hoffmann, supra note
30, at 753. Some significant opposition to the 1983 Baby Doe rules rested "on the
grounds that local ethics review would be more valuable." Heitman, supra note 23, at
411.
382. 21 C.F.R. § 56.107(a) (2008) ("The IRB shall have.., sensitivity to such issues
as community attitudes .. "); 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (2008). In the IRB context local
review is desirable because local members know: (i) the research, (ii) the resources,
(iii) the reputation of the investigators, (iv) the capabilities of the investigators, and (v)
the attitudes of the community. Also, local members can build a culture of trust.
Steven Peckman, Local Institutional Review Boards, in 2 ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES
INVOLVING HumAN PARTICIPANTS (2001). Local review committees have traditionally
been considered better than national or regional committees because they are more
familiar with actual conditions surrounding the conduct of the research and can work
closely with investigators. See Nat'l Commission, Report and Recommendations: IRBs
(1978).
383. See sources cited supra note 382; see also OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH
PROTECTION, IRB KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL RESEARCH CONTEXT (2000). Notably, some
objected to intramural HECs as "undesirable bureaucracy not sufficiently close to the
clinical situation." Am. Med. Dirs. Ass'n, supra note 256.
384. Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 762.
385. Even the extramural MI-HEC can overcome the locality objection. Through a
regular, ongoing relationship, the MI-HEC will acquire substantial local knowledge.
Since physicians are on staff at several hospitals, some MI-HEC members will already
have direct local knowledge. See id. at 762 n.97.
386. However, on some MI-HEC proposals, the treating facility would have no
representation. See, e.g., Buchanan et al., supra note 217, at 191 ("Individuals who
had a financial conflict of interest with the patient's 'home' facility or managed care
plan could not participate on that patient's panel, and every effort was made to avoid
institutional affiliation between panel members and the patient's site of care.").
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tional culture and possesses "relevant local knowledge. '38 7 And since
the committee's functions are not entirely outsourced and the referring
institution has some representation on the committee, relevant com-
munity norms and values can still be considered.
An equivalent model was suggested which would provide a local-
318ity-sensitive solution in the IRB context. For example, the Western
Institutional Review Board (one of the largest independent IRBs)
utilizes "regional representatives who take the pulse of the local com-
munity to determine attitudes and customs that might influence
research protocols. '38 9 "Routine visits to sites and videos and telecon-
ferences provide the Board with additional information about local
conditions. "390
3. Liability
Lawsuits against ethics committees are rare; but they do occur.
39 1
Indeed, it is just such a threat that may corrupt an intramural HEC's
decisions and recommendations.392  In contrast, MI-HECs have a
reduced risk of corruption because no single institution has control
over the MI-HEC.
Unfortunately, this same lack of control can have a chilling effect
on the willingness of a healthcare institution to participate in a MI-
HEC.3 9 3 The fear of lawsuits "makes some institutions reluctant to
387. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 524 (2001).
388. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: USING A
CENTRALIZED IRB REVIEW PROCESS IN MULTICENTER CLINICAL TRIALS 4-5 (2006), available
at http://www.fda.gov/Cder/guidance/OC2005201fnl.pdf (suggesting as "a sufficient
mechanism to ensure meaningful consideration" the participation of an institution in
the deliberations of or the provision of information to the central IRB).
389. W. Inst. Review Bd., supra note 290.
390. Id. See also Heath, supra note 131 (describing alternative approaches "for
assuring accurate and up-to-date knowledge of local issues and attitudes").
391. BERNAT, supra note 36, at 116-17; Fletcher & Spencer, supra note 15, at 270-75;
SUSAN B. RUBIN & LAURIE ZOLOTH, MARGIN OF ERROR 355-60 (2000) (five lawsuits
against HEC). See Charles Lewis, Hospital Sued for Keeping Infant Alive, NAT'L POST,
Mar. 14, 2009 (describing a newly-filed $3.5 million lawsuit in Montreal in which the
parents of Phebe Mantha are suing the Montreal Children's Hospital); S.M. Staubach,
What Legal Protection Should a Hospital Provide, If Any, to Its Ethics Committee, 1 HEC
FORUM 209 (1989).
392. See supra Part II.A.
393. Miller, supra note 51, at 211; see also Scannell, supra note 111 ("[N]o
legal ... support is available for such an undertaking and structure."). A Community
Healthcare Ethics Committee in Nevada dissolved shortly after its formation in
significant part because of concerns about liability. Email and Telephone Interview
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relinquish control. ' 394 Moreover, a MI-HEC could increase an institu-
tion's exposure to liability, assuming it makes the institution more
likely to make controversial decisions.
But this legal fear is misplaced. An MI-HEC substantially miti-
gates liability concerns in four ways. First, MI-HECs increase chances
for resolution of treatment conflicts, thus reducing the risk of litiga-
tion.395 Second, in the unlikely event of litigation, the MI-HEC serves a
protective role. The original attraction of HECs was the reassurance
that they could provide in the face of adverse legal consequences. MI-
HECs can do the same job better, since courts are more likely to defer
to a broader, more independent committee.396 Third, MI-HECs are
often accorded statutory civil, criminal, and disciplinary immunity.397
Finally, in the unlikely case of litigation and possibly even liability, Ml-
HECs can carry insurance.398
4. Confidentiality
Some commentators have argued that MI-HECs are problematic
because they require institutions to share sensitive information about
with Noel V. Tiano, Nevada Center for Ethics and Health Policy, and Thaddeus Mason
Pope, Associate Professor of Law, Widener University (Feb. 4, 2009).
394. McNeil, supra note 374, at 502. Cf. Winn & Cook, supra note 189, at 37
("[Flacility officials may believe that an institutional ethics committee may actually
increase the risk of liability.").
395. See HOSFORD, supra note 10, at 314-16; MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 73,
§ 3.25[A][31[d]; Monagle & West, supra note 59, at 258 ("Bioethics committees
reduce, not increase, legal exposure."). Cf. J.T. Wagner & T.L. Higden, Spiritual Issues
and Bioethics in the Intensive Care Unit: The Role of the Chaplain, 12 CRITICAL CARE
CLINICS 15 (1986).
396. Peter McShannon, Panel Discussion: Implementing and Utilizing an Institutional
Ethics Committee, in CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 7, at 226, 237 ("The looser the
committee, as far as the courts are concerned, the less value and the less deference
they would give to a doctor going to that committee.").
397. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-8A-4 (LexisNexis 1975); DEL. CODE § 24-1768(a)
(2008) ("[M]embers of other peer review committees ... whose function is the review
of . . . medical care, and physicians' work, with a view to the quality of care and
utilization of hospital or nursing home facilities ...are immune from claim, suit,
liability, damages, or any other recourse, civil or criminal, arising from any act,
omission, proceeding, decision, or determination undertaken or performed, or from
any recommendation made ...."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.404(2) (West 2005); GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-39-4 & -7 (2006); HAw. REv. STAT. § 663-1.7(b) (West 2008); MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-374(c) (LexisNexis 2008); MONT. CODE § 37-2-201
(2008).
398. Cf. HOSFORD, supra note 10, at 116, 316-17; John A. Robertson, The Law of
Institutional Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REv. 484, 535 (1979).
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their problem cases with competitors.3 99 Others maintain that most
institutions are "unlikely to come together to plan joint committees
because of [their] insular views."400
But the issue of whether the HECs are open or closed seems to be
a red herring, as not only are a number of MI-HECs already operating
but also even the intramural HECs already have outside members.401
Additionally, some types of cases necessitating ethically-charged deci-
sion making (such as whether to withdraw life support) seem-by their
nature-less likely to become the choice morsels fought over by com-
peting institutions, which recognize the mutuality of their stake in
managing these disputes discretely. 402 At the very least, those doubt-
ing the MI-HECs' ability to function without compromising confidenti-
ality and institutional competitiveness should recognize that
regulatory and common law liability-which may attach to the com-
mittee as well as its individual members-may provide safeguards
against the misuse or undesired sharing of important data.
5. Distance
Some have argued that since rural facilities are separated by great
distance, a cooperative venture like a MI-HEC would be impractical. It
would be very difficult, says the objection, for members from the differ-
ent constituent institutions to get together for ethics education, policy
development, or case consultation.40 3
399. HOSFORD, supra note 10, at 141 ("[O]utsiders might learn confidential
information about patients, might hear of failures or bickering among health care
providers .... ); Loeben, supra note 265, at 230 ("HECs are relatively used to the idea
of operating behind closed doors."); Smith et al., supra note 196, at 1274-75 ("[Tihis
procedural change would then raise concerns about patient confidentiality .... ). Cf.
Szmania et al., supra note 143, at 73; U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, Nat'l Center for
Ethics in Health Care, ECWeb: A Quality Improvement Tool of Ethics Consultation, http:/
/www.ethics.va.gov/integratedethics/ecweb.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2009) (compiling
consults from all VHA facilities but only allowing each facility to view its own data and
aggregate nationwide data)..
400. Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 769.
401. See STATE INITIATIVES, supra note 270, at 3 ("There was initial concern.., about
hanging out our dirty laundry for competitors to see, but . . . the concern didn't
bloom."); Bayley, supra note 202, at 362 ("Although neighboring hospitals are often in
competition, ethics committees have traditionally been natural allies since many of
their goals are not zero sum games ....").
402. See sources cited supra note 403.
403. Niemira et al., supra note 201, at 78 ("Distances between institutions ... are
obvious obstacles that must be overcome."); id. at 80 (arguing that "practical issues"
such as "distances between members" may limit the usefulness of MI-HECs);
Oosterhoff & Rowell, supra note 283, at 312-13.
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This may have been true just a decade ago, but it is not true
today.40 4 Technology already available-or soon to become available-
in rural healthcare institutions can effectively facilitate the necessary
communication. Telemedicine is proving its feasibility and usefulness
in the clinical context, for example, by allowing a rural family physi-
cian to instantly consult with an urban specialist through live interac-
tive videoconferencing.4 °5
Just as telemedicine is addressing the lack of rural physicians,
"teleethics" can address deficiencies in rural bioethics.4 °6 For exam-
ple, nearly fifteen years ago, the University of Missouri developed the
Missouri Telehealth Network to enhance access to care to more than
forty underserved Missouri counties.40 7 More recently, over the past
three and one-half years, the University of Missouri Center for Health
Care Ethics has incorporated this very same telemedicine technology
for use by ethics consultants to provide consultation services to ethics
committees and healthcare providers at rural facilities where such ser-
vices are not available.408
In a very recent medical futility dispute in the remote Northern
Territory of Australia, the court recommended establishing "a clinical
ethics committee" that would be "independent of the treating doctors
and the family."4 9 The court noted that, "given the small population
404. Bayley, supra note 202, at 362 (telephone and email may make possible "an
ongoing, if geographically distant, buddy relationship"); Pinnock & Crosthwaite,
supra note 59 (observing that "smaller centres could gain access to ethicists/clinical
ethics committees via teleconferencing").
405. See Arnold R. Eiser et al., Electronic Communication in Ethics Committees:
Experience and Challenges, 27 J. MED. ETHics i30 (2001); Kathy Hedberg, N. Idaho
Robot Connects Doctors and Patients, USA TODAY, Apr. 4, 2009.
406. See Fleming, supra note 191, at 250-51, 257. See also Fukuyama et al., supra
note 318 ("[E]mail was used as the primary means of consultation .... Advantages of
our method . . . included the ability to request consultation anonymously from
anywhere in Japan."); Nelson, supra note 193, at 32-33; L.A. Shaw, The Use of Email in
Clinical Ethics Case Consultation, 12 J. CLINICAL ETHics 39 (2001); University of
Missouri, Tele-ethics Consultation Services, http://ethics.missouri.edu/Tele-Ethics-
Consultation (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
407. See Mo. Telehealth Network, http://telehealth.muhealth.org/ (last visited Mar.
30, 2009).
408. At the 2007 annual meeting of the American Society of Bioethics and
Humanities (ASBH), David Fleming and Donald Reynolds reported that the
accessibility and feasibility of providing teleethics services have proven to be very
effective. See also Bolin et al., supra note 275, at 65 (describing a "virtual ethics
committee program").
409. Inquest into the Death of Paulo Melo (2008) N.T.M.C. 80, 107-08, 110 (Austl.),
available at http://www.nt.gov.au/justice/ntmc/udgements/200812182008ntmc080.
htm.
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of the Northern Territory, for the committee to have any independence
at all from the treating doctors it would probably need to have inter-
state members (who would need to be available on short notice by
telephone or videoconferencing)."' 1 °
B. Big Obstacle: Lack of Motivation
Perhaps the most significant challenge to the expanded use of MI-
HECs is enabling healthcare ethicists and committee members to rec-
ognize and comprehend the extent of the deficiencies inherent in an
intramural HEC.411 Our discussion thus far, of course, has assumed
people want an ethics committee.412 The MI-HEC has gone unap-
preciated because it sits on the bench, seeing infrequent use.
413 But
successful popularization of this unknown resource depends not upon
a criticism of the player currently on the field (the intramural HEC),
but upon proactive efforts by those in the healthcare ethics field to
bring meaningful attention to the superior abilities of the pinch hitter
(the MI-HEC).
Importantly, the MI-HEC can improve not only the quality of insti-
tutions' ethics but also the perception of that quality by both providers
and the public. Many have "little idea of what to expect. 414 If health-
care providers were confident that the MI-HEC could handle an issue
and bring about positive results, they would be more likely to use the
committee.415 More positive experiences will lead to more usage and
more usage, as I have explained in this Article, will lead to more posi-
tive experiences. Working virtually in unison, a larger number of MI-
HECs can create consistency among institutions, increasing public
understanding and trust in committee functions.
Traditional approaches that aimed at improving the HEC have
done little to alter the status quo. Education has not worked: problems
associated with HECs have continued despite being widely publicized
for decades at conferences and in professional literature such as HEC
Forum and the Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics. Litigation-
410. See id.
411. Miller, supra note 51, at 214 ("These proposals, though long overdue in terms
of need, may even now be premature in terms of acceptance.").
412. Hoffmann Study, supra note 47, at 114-15, 118.
413. Fox et al., supra note 59, at 13; Pinnock & Crosthwaite, supra note 59. See
Ethics and Rural Healthcare, supra note 161; Jessica Gacki-Smith & Elisa Gordon,
Residents' Access to Ethics Consultations: Knowledge, Use, and Perceptions, 80 ACAD.
MED. 168 (2005); Willing, But Waiting, supra note 116; J.P. Orlowski et al., Why
Doctors Use or Do Not Use Ethics Consultation, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 499 (2006).
414. FRY-REVERE, supra note 160, at 26.
415. Fry-Revere, supra note 222, at 451.
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given its cost, complexity, and unpredictability-is not a good method
by which to develop cohesive standards; 416 plus, HECs are often statu-
torily immune or are so endemically postured as to deter most plain-
tiffs from pursuing claims.417
Of the traditional efforts at achieving systemic reform, those cen-
tered on utilizing legislation or accreditation standards are most prom-
ising, since HECs must be held more accountable as they begin to look
more like gatekeepers. 418 Many obstacles to the formation of MI-HECs
can be overcome if prospective participants are supplied with the
proper incentives by way of responsive lawmaking.419 But even the leg-
islative approach will gather moss if the valuable benefits of MI-HECs
are not effectively demonstrated to providers and the public.
CONCLUSION
Since the function of HECs has evolved from one of advising, clar-
ifying, and facilitating to one of decision making, the form of HECs
must evolve as well. Today, most HECs are intramural committees
whose decisions are subject to material risks of corruption, bias, arbi-
trariness, and carelessness. Reconstituting intramural HECs as net-
work-based, extramural, quasi-appellate, or joint MI-HECs can
significantly mitigate these risks.
Unfortunately, material advances in bioethics are often made only
in response to crises. Since rural healthcare facilities may most acutely
feel the need to fix problems with their ethics mechanisms, they may
serve a sort of sentinel or bellwether function. Rural healthcare facili-
ties may serve as the spark to the Joint Commission, state regulators,
or others to give definition to the composition and operation of HECs.
They may serve as the laboratory in which to test solutions that may
later be adapted more broadly.
416. Id. at 454-55. See Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance
Regulatory Policy Making: Evaluating Climate-Change Litigation in Light of Lessons from
Gun-Industry and Clergy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1837-38 (2008)
("Compared to other forms of regulation, litigation is often unnecessarily complex,
protracted, costly, unpredictable, and inconsistent. Moreover, courts are generally less
well equipped ... to evaluate technical information . . . [or involve] public input and
accountability .... ).
417. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 765.404(2) (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-
1.7(b) (West 2008); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-374(c) (LexisNexis 2008).
418. See supra text accompanying notes 207-08.
419. See Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 769, 789-90 (listing-as examples of such
incentives-education, grants, and immunity).
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